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Definition
| inability to remember events from one's own personal past |
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Definition
| a dominating school of thought in the history of psychology, according to which psychology is the science of behavior not a science of the mind or consciousness. They looked for empirically measurable methods. |
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Definition
| nonconscious visual perception in patients suffering from damage to the primary visual cortex and cortical blindness |
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| a term coined by Dennett to indicate a special place in the brain where experiences happen and are presented to the subject. Dennett argued that many scientists intuitively think about consciousness as a cartesian theater, but according to Dennett the cartesian theatre is a misleading idea and should be rejected |
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| a hypnotic suggestion that aims to change some cognitive process (such as perception, memory), and thus creates perceptual hallucinations, amnesia or false memories, for example, that the hypnotized person experiences as real |
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Definition
| theoretically interesting, opposite patterns of cognitive deficits in two patients -- one with brain damage who cannot perform one type of cognitive task but can perform another type, and the other who has the exact opposite abilities -- showing that the two tasks are functionally and anatomically separate from each other in the brain |
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Definition
| philosophical mind-brain theory, by Descartes. The material body and the immaterial mind are in two-way interaction with each other |
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| philosphical mind-brain theory that eliminates the concepts "mind" and "consciousness" from science, arguing that such phenomena do not really exist and tat therefore in future neuroscience such concepts will not be needed |
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| philosophical mind-brain theory that says that physical matter is organized into lower and higher levels, and from the lower level physical entities new and unpredictable higher level physical entities or features can appear. Consciousness is precisely such a higher level, emergent entity. |
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| philosophical mind-brain theory: brain activities cause changes in consciousness, but consciousness has no effect on the brain or anything else; consciousness is a superfluous epiphenomenon |
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| one of the most important figures in the early history of experimental psychology; founder of psychophysics and the first scientist to measure and quantify the relationship between objective stimulus features and subjective experience |
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| philosophical mind-body theory where the mind consists of functions or input-output relationships, such as a computer program, and the brain is the machine or hardware where the program is running |
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| an originally German school of psychology, launched in the 1920s, that emphasized the holistic nature of conscious perception |
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| the problem of explaining how any physical thing could produce any experiences at all...essentially the root of consciousness. |
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Definition
| a term coined by Dennett to denote a methodology for studying consciousness from the third-person point of view as purely objective behavior, primarily using the verbal reports, texts or narratives produced by a person |
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Definition
| the idea that to explain conscious perception we have to postulate a smaller conscious agent (humunculus, "little man") inside the brain who observes the contents of consciousness, and, in turn, to explain this internal agent's abilities we have to postulate an even smaller homunculus inside its head, and so on in infinite regression |
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| the philosophical theory opposing materialism and physicalism, saying that the world ultimately consists not of matter but of spirit or consciousness |
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Term
| interactionism (or interactionist dualism) |
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Definition
| philosophical mind-body theory, the variety of dualism saying that brain and consciousness interact bidirectionally: brain activity causes changes in consciousness, and conscious mental activities cause changes in brain activity and thus also in behavior |
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| the mental process where we attend to some part of our own experience (in phenomenal consciousness) to verbalize and communicate our experiences (by using reflective consciousness) |
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| JND (just noticeable difference) |
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Definition
| the smallest physical difference between two stimuli that causes a recognizable difference in conscious sensation or perception |
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| a medical condition where brain damage has affected only motor functions and left the patient immobile and unresponsive to stimuli, but internally consciousness remains normal YIKES |
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Definition
| the philosophical theory that everything in the universe consists ultimately of nothing but physical matter |
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Definition
| the idea that mind or mental phenomena have causal powers to change some purely material (eg biological or neural) processes in the brain |
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| the ultimate form of reductive (or eliminative) materialism, according to which only the botom level of elementary physical particles and forces really exists and everything else, the whole macroscopic world, is only an illusion created by the coarseness of human perception of reality |
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Definition
| the philosophical problem concerning the relationship between the mind and the body, especially consciousness and the brain |
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| the philosophical theory that ultimately the universe consists of one substance |
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Definition
| the one and only fundamental substance is physical matter |
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Term
| NCC (neural correlates of consciousness) |
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Definition
| neural activities in the brain that co-occur with conscious experience in the mind |
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Definition
| a disorder of spatial awareness caused by brain damage o the right posterior parietal lobe. the patient is typically unaware of the left side of perceptual space and/or the left side of his or her body |
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Definition
| the philosophical theory that ultimately the universe consists of one substance and the one and only fundamental substance is neither matter nor mind, but something even more fundamental LOL WHAT? |
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Definition
| the version of parallelsim that says that god synchronizes mental and physical events separately on each occasion when a mental event happens |
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Definition
| the patient can see visual objects but cannot point t them or reach them manually; a visuomotor disorder caused by brain damage to the posterior parietal cortex |
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Definition
| the problem that we have no way of objectively knowing, measuring, detecting or perceiving the contents of other minds, thus we do not know with any certainty which creatures have a mind at all or what goes on in any other mind besides our own. |
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Definition
| the philosophical mind-body theory that says there is no causal interaction between consciousness and brain in either direction; they exist synchronized and in parallel without causal interaction |
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Definition
| the most basic form of consciousness, which consists of subjective experiences and qualia but is independent of language and higher cognition |
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Definition
| the theory that physical matter is dependent on perception and only exists as a potential object perception |
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Definition
| the branch of experimental psychology that studies the exact relationships between physical stimuli and the subjective sensations and perceptions caused by them |
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Definition
| the simplest components of phenomenal experience, subjective components of experience, what is is "like" |
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Term
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Definition
| mind-body theory that says that consciousness exists but it consists of only ordinary neurophysiological processes and therefore it can be exhaustively described in purely neurophysiological terms |
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Term
| res cogitans, res extensa |
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Definition
| terms introduced by Descartes to dnote the two substances (mind and matter) that the world ultimately consists of (res cogitans thinks, res extensa has spatial dimensions) |
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Term
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Definition
| the part of our long-term memory that stores information about the meanings of words, concepts, facts, categories and other knowledge about the world |
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Definition
| the philosophical theory that only my own conscious experience exists and the whole universe is contained within my consciousness; I alone exist |
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Definition
| the atomistic theory of consciousness supported by Titchener: consciousness consists of simple elements that are combined to form more complex mental contents. employed the method of introspection to identify the basic building blocks of conscious experience |
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Term
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Definition
| one of the leading introspectionists in the history of experimental psychology. he developed the ultimate form of introspectionism, called structuralism |
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Term
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Definition
| a state of unarousable unresponsiveness in a brain-damaged patient. However, the patient shows a preserved sleep-wake cycle and spontaneous eye-opening (if not, then the state is called coma) |
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Term
| weak emergent materialism |
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Definition
| this theory states that when the lower and higher levels of emergent materialism are completely described, we can explain how the higher level phenomena (consciousness) emerge from the lower level (brain activity) |
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Term
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Definition
a law about the relationship between physical stimuli and subjective experience, according to which subjective sensation is a logarithmic function of physical intensity.
Weber's Law allows us to compare the acuity across different modalities of sensation and across different species; and that Fechner's law states that sensation grows more slowly than stimulation. |
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Definition
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| defined psychology as the science of mental life, by which he ment conscious mental life |
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Definition
| concerned with the biological underpinning sof sensation and perception |
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Definition
| introspectionist, became dissatisfied with introspection, and redefined psychology as the science of bhevior, leaving consciousness and all mental life out of the picture |
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Definition
| return of consciousness to psychology after long period of behaviorism. Proponents Tolman etc |
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Definition
4 reasons for the avoidance of consciousness created by Owen Flanagan.
1) positivistic reserve, the idea that the behaviorists had a point, and psychologists should study objective, publicly observable phenomena
2) a piecemeal approach, the strategy of approaching consciousness indirectly, by figuring out how thinggs like perception and memory work
3) conscious inessentialism, the idea that because mental functions can be performed both consciously and unconsciously, conscious isn't a necessary part of mental life
4) epiphenomenalist suspicion that conscious mental states play no causal role in behavior |
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Term
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Definition
| the idea that the behaviorists had a point, and psychologists should study objective, publicly observable phenomena |
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Term
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Definition
| the strategy of approaching consciousness indirectly, by figuring out how things like perception and memory work. Cognitive psychologists generally view consciousness as something to be understood in a "bottom-up" fashion -- that if we get a good enough grip on perception, memory, and other topics, we'll finally understand consciousness. |
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Term
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Definition
| the idea that because mental functions can be performed both consciously and unconsciously, conscious isn't a necessary part of mental life (although it may still have some function) |
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Term
| epiphenomenalist suspicion |
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Definition
| that conscious mental states play no causal role in behavior |
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Term
| Revonsuo's definition of a conscious being |
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Definition
| a conscious being is not merely alive in the sense of reaizing a collection of physiological processes and capacities sucha s growth or self replication, that earate biological organisms from nonliving physical systems. A conscious being is mentally, internally alive. Unlike physical objects and simple biological organisms, a being who possesses a conscious mind also senses or feels or experiences its own existence. To crystalize this idea: a conscious being has an internal psychological reality, a mental life consisting of subjective experiences, with a stream of consciousness flowing within. The inner stream of subjective experience, which is directly present for us and continuously revealing itself to us, is consciousness. |
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Term
| why the natural sciences struggle with consciousness |
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Definition
| so far as we know, none of the things thoroughly described and explained by the sciences has an inner psychological reality, a stream of subjective experience. Essentially is is difficult to study a subjective thing with objective science. |
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Term
| the nature of converging evidence |
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Definition
| evidence that all points in the same direction. When we investigate the relationship between consciousness and brain, the most direct evidence comes from two sources: studies on neuro psychological patients who have suffered a brain lesion that affects some aspect of consciousness; and laboratory measurements of natural brain activity or artificial stimulation of the brain in normal subjects when specific conscious phenomena happen in their minds in a controlled manner. the converging evidence, as we shall see, shows that particular areas of the brain are concerned with particular aspects of consciousness. If a certain well specified part of the brain is damaged, the damage leads to a certain type of loss or distortion of subjective experience. if the same part is artificially stimulated in a healthy subject, changes in the same kind of experience are reported by the subject. and when a subject engages in a task that calls for this type of consciousness, brain activity is seen in the same area where damage wipes that aspect of consciousness away. |
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Term
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Definition
| links conscious events and brain events: for each and every conscious event, there is a corresponding brain event (this is the PRINCIPLE OF COVARIANCE between consciousness and brain. Note that this only works in one direction (the converse statement is not ture, that each and every brain event ther would be a corresponding conscious event. The supervenience relation includes also the assumption that the conscious events owe their existence somehow to the brain events and thus could not float free of them. |
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Term
| ontological dependency of consciousness |
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Definition
| there can be no consciousness if there is no brain, but there can of course be a brain without any consciousness |
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Term
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Definition
| each and every subjective conscious phenomenon in the mind must invariably correlate with soe objective neural phenomena in the brain. Thus, it makes sense to try to find out with objective measurements absolutely everything we can about the objective neuroanatomical and neurophysiological details of the union between consciousness and the brain. |
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Term
| NCC (neural correlates of consciousness) by Koch |
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Definition
| Koch: the minimally sufficient neural system or activity that invariably co-occurs together with a conscious experience of a specific kind |
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Term
| the nature of theory in science |
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Definition
| a theory is something that is supposed to do explanatory work and "explanation" is something that is supposed to make us understand what is really going on. Theories help us to understand what kind of phenomena there are in the world, what they are composed of, how different phenomena interact to produce causal effects and, in general, how the world works. |
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Term
| William James: five characters of consciousness |
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Definition
subjectivity: personal ownership of thoughts, MY thoughts
change: can never have the same thought twice
continuity: consciousness is a single thing
intentionality: "aboutnes" or representations of features of the world
attention: can ignore some things and focus on others, not conscious of everything at once |
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Term
| Kant: three absolutely irreducible mental states |
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Definition
what goes on in our minds comes in three basic forms:
knowing (perceiving, remembering, solving problems)
feeling (emotion, positive, or negative)
desiring (motivation, approach or avoidance) |
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Term
| three aspects of consciousness according to introspectors |
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Definition
| qualia, intentionality, subjectivity |
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Term
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Definition
Dennett: ineffable (indescribable), intrinsic (unanalyzable), private (no interpersonal comparisons), directly apprehended (unmediated)
...what something is "like" (Nagel) |
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Term
| Jackson: Mary the Color Scientist |
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Definition
| Mary is a neuroscientist, knows all there is to know about color, lives in a achromatic chamber her whole life, if she escapes this chamber, will she have any new experience? |
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Term
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Definition
| "aboutness," making reference to the outside world. Easily applied to cognitive mental states, however NOT as easily applied to non-cognitive mental states such as hunger, anxiety |
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Term
| ontological vs. epistemic subjectivity |
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Definition
ontologically subjective: rembrant was the best dutch painter ever
epistemicaly subjective: pains tickles, suspicions
Searle: conscious mental states have a subjective ontology (they only exist when experienced by someone) |
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Term
| Muller's Doctrine of Specific nerve energies |
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Definition
| each different sensory modality is associated with a different neural system. What gives rise to certain sensation is in the activity of certain neural structures |
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Term
| absolute vs. relative threshold |
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Definition
absolute = identify point when stimulus is present
relative = identify when stimulus has changed |
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Term
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Definition
every psychological property of a sensation is related to some physical properties of the corresponding stimulus.
In vision, for example, the quality of hue (or color) is related to the wavelength of electromagnetic radiation that falls on the retina of the eye. Short wavelengths correspond to blue, longer wavelengths to yellow, etc |
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Term
| Helmholtz's doctrine of specific fiber energies |
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Definition
| extension of Muller's doctrine. Within each modality, every quality of sensation is mediated by a specific neural system. With respect to color vision it means that different colors are perceived with different rods and cones/neural fibers |
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Term
| how structuralists used introspection to identify sensation |
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Definition
| structuralists used experimental introspection to identify basic qualities of sensation within each modality. They used Henning's taste tetrahedron and smell prism blackberry example |
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Term
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Definition
dualism=the universe as a whole consists of two categorically different types of entity or substance (one physical, one mental).
monism=the universe consists of only one type of matter |
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Term
| interaction between bottom-up and top-down processing |
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Definition
there is two-way causal interaction between the external physical reality and the subjective psychological reality, or brain and consciousness.
bottom-up: physical stimuli hits sensory organs, then signal is transferred to neural impulses, brain gets in touch with consciousness matter to produce subjective experience.
top-down: travels the opposite direction leading from conscious input (thought) to physical output. |
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Term
| causal closure vs. causal inertness |
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Definition
| The physical realm is causally closed and respectively, and the non physical world is inert . The causal closure of the physical world menas that physical events can only be causally influenced by other physcal events, and are abl eto cause futher events only of the purely physical kind. The causal inertia of consciousness means that our experiences, if they are thoroughly nonphysical, have to be unnecessary for any physical events to happen and in fact they must be inherently incapable of movine or influencing anything in the physical world what-soever, including neural activities in our brain. |
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Term
| interactive dualism vs. epiphenomenalism (strengths and weaknesses of each) |
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Definition
id=brain and consciousness interact bidirectionally
epi=brain causes changes in consciousness, but consciousness has no effet on brain |
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Term
| psychophysical parallelism |
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Definition
| no causal relation between consciousness and brain in either direction, they exist synchronized and in parallel without causal interaction |
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Term
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Definition
| the gap between subjective experience and brain activity: we cannot give any intelligible account as to how subjective experiences could or why they should arise from brain activity |
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Term
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Definition
| James: "consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. such words as "chain" or "train" do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. it is nothing jointed; it flows. a "river" or a "stream" are the metaphors by stream of through" |
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Term
| why Watson wanted to get rid of consciousness |
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Definition
| Watson: consciousness cannot be an object of study in a scientific psychology. science should be based only on the directly and publicly observable |
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Term
| how cogsci could be a science of the mind without being a science of consciousness ar |
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Definition
| merged with biological approach to the mind in cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. became the science of mind, or mental processes. Information processing. |
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Term
| conscious vs. conscious of something |
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Definition
conscious: in a state that allows subjective experiences
conscious of something: has intentionality? |
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Term
| change blindness/inattention blindness |
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Definition
cb: when you can't notice a change in environment
ib: do not notice something because not paying attention
suggest that whatever remains outside the spotlight cannot be seen |
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Term
| varieties of introspection |
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Definition
analytic: (used by structuralists) identify specific qualia
interpretive: what we use everyday, explaining our choices, etc
descriptive: still useful as a scientific method, subjects use everyday language to describe experience |
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Term
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Definition
| an unconscious being imitating a conscious being. if an argument for consciousness leads to us being a zombie, then it cant really be right. Searle accuses Dennett of calling us zombies. Functionalism and epiphenomenalism get in trouble with the zombie argument. |
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Term
| alternative definitions of consciousness and problems they present |
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Definition
the ability to respond to external stimulaiton, but subjects could respond automatically OR can not respond, but is conscious
ability to represent information from the external world: no necessary connection to subjective experience
wakefulness: dreams
access to output systems, control of behavior or behavioral interactions with the world: requires verbal or external response, also leaves out qualia |
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Term
| why consciousness makes the mind-body problem as difficult as Nagel thinks it is |
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Definition
| humans understanding consciousness is like a dog understanding physics, it's past our mental capacity, intractable |
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Term
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Definition
| the universe if comprised of two different substances, one mental and one physical |
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Term
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Definition
| mind affects body, body affects mind (can be either property or substance dualism) |
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Term
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Definition
| the connection of mind and body (fancy word for the mind-body problem) |
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Term
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Definition
| consciousness is a mystery, beyond our cognitive capacities (see Nagel) |
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Term
| what it mens to say we are conscious automata |
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Definition
| (epiphenomenalism) means we have consciousness, but it has no affect on our brain/behavior |
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Term
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Definition
| when anyone has the same mental state as someone else, they also have identical brain states |
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Term
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Definition
| MY mental states will always have same brain state in ME, but will look like a different brain state in someone else |
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Term
| mind body problem in neuroscience |
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Definition
| assumes a typetype identity theory because looking at someones brain to make claims about all brains |
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Term
| intertheoretic reductionism |
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Definition
| psych --> bio --> chem --> physics --> quantum (math) |
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Term
| contemporary debate related to cartesian categories |
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Definition
Searle: mind is higher order property of biological functions. says can not ontologically reduce the mind to the physical, would take away meaning (looks like a dualist)
Dennett: looks like an epiphenomenalist, says that the mind is an info processor (funcitonalist), everything the mind does could be done by an unconscious computer...zombie
Chalmers: looks like a property dualist: we can explain everything in terms of their causal connections except for the mind (different properties). Searle's Chinese room argument to prove that a machine is not conscious. |
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Term
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Definition
depends on def of consciousness
wakefulness: RAS
qualia: neural substrates of those qualities (doctrine of specific nerve fibers)
intentionality: priming amnesia (blindsight, etc) |
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Term
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Definition
- placebo (peoples beliefs affect the functioning of specific tissues and organs in brain )
- suggestion effects |
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Term
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Definition
19th century spiritualism, contacting the spirit world, quija bord
modern parapsychology, guessing what card i have... |
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Term
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Definition
| behaviorism, philosophical functionalism, consciousness is not essential for behavior, if we have consciousness, it is epiphenomenal |
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Term
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Definition
allow us to image brin activity directly, but differ in their temporal resolution (fMRI ~6, PET ~3 sec)
EEG MEG, instant, but hard to localize precisely |
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Term
| what would be "the best imaginable NCC experiment?" |
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Definition
| - converging evidence, dissociation |
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Term
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Definition
| Crick: consciousness is an issue of synchrony in the brain |
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Term
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Definition
| Searle: consciousness is a higher order property of neurons/brain |
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Term
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Definition
| related consciousness to quantum mechanics...solves one mystery with another mystery |
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Term
| Dennett denies the reality of consciousness |
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Definition
| functionalist, mind can be modeled without consciousness, zombie argument |
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Term
| why is Chalmers a property dualist? |
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Definition
| because he believes in functionalism except for the mind, which has different properties |
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Term
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Definition
| attention determines what becomes conscious |
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Term
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Definition
early: attention determines what goes into consciousness
late: we process everything (unconsciously), then attend to certain things
debate: how much processing goes on before we're conscious of it? |
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Term
| capacity models of attention (transcend late vs. early selection) |
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Definition
attention = mental effort
- cognitive resources are limited
- undemanding parallel
- demanding serial
- skirts debate by saying that it's not the processing of all or nothing, it's that it depends on the manner and how much we're processing
- all based on limited capacity
- what was once complex can be automatized, frees cognitive capacities to meaningfully interact with the world
- even if having a conversation, still have enough cog capacity left to semantically process my name |
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Term
| canonical features of automatic |
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Definition
inevitable evocation - when you perceive it, you have to act/respond
incorrigible completion - when you start, you must finish
efficient execution - no cog capacity
parallel processing - can be done simultaneously with other tasks
...essentially unavailable to conscious awareness and conscious control |
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Term
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Definition
| subjects are shown a color word written in a color, are asked to say the color of the ink, because automatically read word, ink color naming is inhibited |
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Term
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Definition
| structuralist defined problem: when describe the stimulus, not the qualities of the experience (ex: blackberry) |
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Term
| Helmholtz, unconscious inferences |
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Definition
| arguing for unconscious perception |
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Term
| Process-dissociation procedure |
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Definition
designed to estimate the contributions of automatic and controlled processes by putting them in opposition to each other
Jacoby: had stem completion "with word not from list" if wrote the word from the list, then they explicitly did not remember, but implicitly they did |
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Term
| social-psychological appropriation of the concept of automaticity |
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Definition
| social scientists think that everything is essentially automatic, (conscious inessentialism, epiphenomenal suspicion, free will, rely strongly on the Libet experiment), however no evidence of this form PDP research |
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Term
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Definition
helped convince people that they had no free will, showed brain spike before people reported "wanting to press the botton." readiness potential showed up before report of wanting to press botton
the readiness potential is also called the predecisional negative shift |
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Term
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Definition
a funcitonalist, Searle accuses him of denying consciousness. coined the term cartesian theatre (where the humunculus lives). falls victim to the zombiezzzz
multiple drafts theory: believes purely in info processing, things are output by becoming "famous in the brain" and therefore will produce output/behavior |
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Term
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Definition
brains are necessary, but not sufficient for consciousness
all about embodied experience
a brain by itself is meaningless, needs causal interactions with world
everything you interact with causally is part of your conscious (because talks about causal relations, is related to functionalism) |
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Term
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Definition
functionalist/property dualist,
believes everything can be simplified to computation, except for the mind, which "has different properties"
coined the "hard problem" which is how the brain creates consciousness |
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Term
| Crick and Koch (neurobiological theory) |
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Definition
first version of theory: 40 hz = consciousness
second version: you only need the synchronous firing at the beginning, later on you don't need synchrony to continue perceiving
synchronous firing of sensory areas make up the sensory experience |
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Term
| Tononi & Edelman (the dynamic core) |
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Definition
| neural darwinism, during brain development, some groups of neurons are selected over others due to behavior and experience. The dynamic core, groups of neurons that strongly interact with each other, different deural populations participate in the dynamic core at different times, and it si the holistic, integrated activity that correlates with consciousness rather than the participating neurons as anatomical units |
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Term
| Thalamocortical binding theory |
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Definition
the thalamocortical system is basically the seed of conciousness, pulls from the 40 hz theory, but says that everything is pulled together at the thalamus in the RAS (responsible for the 40 hz oscillation in the brain). damage to the RAS results in loss of consciousness, damaging other cortical areas will have modality specific damage
bidirectional pathways of information, make sure everything is in sync |
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Term
| Damasio (anti-cartesian theory) |
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Definition
| argues for embodiment, complex dynamic world with a self, emotions, he says there can be unconscious qualia |
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Term
| the location of consciousness: externalism vs. internalism |
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Definition
| either qualia and consciousness are in the in the brain (we should look for neural correlates), or in examples such as the sensorimotor theory, contents of consciousness can not be located in the brain, but rather in the world. |
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Term
| the fundamental nature of consciousness: phenomenology vs. cognition |
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Definition
what is the relationship between consciousness and cognitive functions? consciousness as purely phenomenological, experiential, subject to qualia, independent of cognitive functions, need underlying neural mechanisms to integrate info
consciousness as a cognitive function, can be described by its functional, rather than phenomenal features, criterion is access to output mechanisms and verbal reportability, neural mechanisms is some sort of global workspace, info enters through top down attention selection |
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| the fundamental form of phenomenal consciousness: atomism vs. holism |
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Definition
began with structuralism vs. gestalt psych
consciousness as a collection of qualia, later bound to a unified percept
unified field theory (Searle), the dynamic core theory (Tononi), Demasio's theory of consciousness, suggest that consciousness is basically a unified, holistic phenomenon, individual qualia are mere modulations of the unified field |
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Definition
| the presentation of a stimulus that later influences behavior, can be conscious or unconscious |
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| word-stem completion, word-fragment completion |
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Definition
- if the word is primed, it's more likely to be completed in a word-stem or word-fragment task
also, are more likely to complete nur__ with nurse after being primed with doctor (semantic priming) |
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| spared priming in amnesia |
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Definition
| if complete stem or fragment with primed word after being told not to (Jacoby) (retain implicit memory, while losing explicit) |
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| if you teach someone something, they will relearn it faster than they learned it originally, showing that they implicitly remembered it in some way |
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| repetition priming vs. semantic priming |
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Definition
priming with a word, vs. primed with a semantically related word (stem completion vs. doctor to nurse)
semantic primes has to have meaning based representation |
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Term
| perception-based and meaning-based knowledge representations |
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Definition
perception based: based on physical features
meaning based: knowledge is being represented based on semantics and intentionality |
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Definition
objects and events influence behavior even though they are not consciously perceived
subjects make discriminative responses to stimuli, or differences between stimuli, that they cannot consciously detect |
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| criticism of subliminal perception studies |
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Definition
investigators may not have determined thresholds properly, what seemed to be "subliminal" stimuli were actually "supraliminal"
also, if the subject makes a discriminative response, then the subject is aware by definition |
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Definition
| erases the iconic representation of a stimulus, subjects will have no conscious awareness of the stimulus |
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| Marcel, masked associative priming |
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Definition
doctor --> nurse
subliminal stroop affect ( in which subjects must name a color patch accompanied by a masked color word) |
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Term
| subjective vs. objective thresholds |
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Definition
ubliminal Stroop effect was confirmed by Cheesman & Merikle
"subliminal" perception occurs in the space between them.
objective threshold: can't detect stimulus below that level
subjective threshold: depends on the person a bit more
semantic priming can occur in the regions close to subjective, while repetition priming can occur in regions close to the objective threshold |
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Term
| limitations of implicit perception |
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Definition
- limited in terms of duration and effect
- can't do too much semantic processing (enemy loses) |
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Definition
| subjects can identify the soluble triad, even though they don't know the solution. this shows implicit thought |
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Term
| incubation, intuition, insight |
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Definition
incubation - time when you are forming an idea, unconscious
intuition - gut feeling, beginning of conscious knowledge that you MAY have a solution
insight - when you have the answer, consciously |
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Term
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Definition
in which subjects acquire knowledge through experience (the definition of learning), and use this knowledge in various ways (e.g., various forms of discriminative responding), without having conscious access to the knowledge they've acquired
scope and power of implicit learning is controversial |
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Term
| artificial grammar (Reber) |
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Definition
subjects couldn't tell you what grammar rule was, but could pick out which words were formed grammatically
mplicit learning pertains to semantic and procedural knowledge (don't confuse with implicit memory, which is recalling facts) |
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Definition
latency of reaction....
does not discriminate between having a positive bias for one thing, and a negative bias for the other, just assumes if you favor one, you disfavor the other |
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cortically color blind
painter went color blind, new everything there was to know about color, but couldn't see it |
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Definition
inability to recognize objects,
special case of prosopagnosia |
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| hemineglect, can perceive (vision is fine) but don't pay attention to a certain part of space |
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| dissociation between explicit and implicit modes of processing |
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Definition
blindsight: don't see, but perform above chance
what where pathways: cant see, but can perfectly pick up
prosopagnosia: biological response |
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