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P1: The concept of God is coherent in being omnipotent and omniscient
R: Both omnipotence and omniscience are coherent concepts as long as the definitions of these concepts are accepted to being perfectly powerful and perfectly knowing within logical capability. Challenges such as the paradox of the stone requires an illogical object to exist, and the question of Free will in God knowing the future requires knowledge of something that does not exist (Swinburne) and so these arguments remain coherent
I: While we may not have yet experienced the future, under God there still is a future to come and so if God is perfectly knowing, God must be capable of foreseeing/knowing this future
C: This issue relies on an eternal understanding of God. If God is everlasting though, then whether or not the future comes, the future does not yet exist to God. God knowing what the future contains, something that does not exist, would be like God knowing what a four sided triangle looks like, it is logically incapable.
E: Overall, while the very basic understanding of God's properties as perfectly powerful and knowing with no refinements could lead to incoherence, a refined definition as given by Aquinas creates a very logical nature of God.
P2: The concept of God is coherent within his relation to time
R: God's relation to time is coherently everlasting, as an eternal God faces problems with simultaneity. If the fall of Rome is simultaneous with God's perception, and we today are too simultaneous with God's perception, then we must be existing simultaneously with the fall of Rome.
I: Philosophers such as Stump could argue that this is simply mistaking forms of simultaneity. What we understand as things being simultaneous is what is T-simultaneous, while God's perception being simultaneous with all points of time being ET simultaneity, an atemporal simultaneity.
C: Not only is this a weak argument is that it is incredibly ad hoc, with ideas such as there being multiple ideas of simultaneity being created purely for the purpose of allowing an eternal nature of God to be coherent, but also would mean that God is perceiving our future actions, therefore our actions are already determined, and we do not have free will, which while possible and would allow God to remain coherent, is highly against our intuition.
E: Overall, the concept of God as an everlasting being is the most coherent understanding of God that does not force us to completely alter our understanding of Free Will. **(Possibly Argue God would ensure we have free will)**
P3: The Concept of God as perfectly good
R: The nature of God as perfectly good can remain coherent under divine command theory, where moral good comes from what God commands is good
I: Euthyphro Dilemma, if God is good because of his good actions, then Divine Command Theory is false, if actions are Good because God states that they are good, then you have the issue arbitrariness, emptiness and abhorrence.
C: Philosopher such as Kierkegaard have made incredibly strong points that it could be that a description of God as perfectly good is entirely meaningless, that good is entirely arbitrary and that what we understand as abhorrent could become morally good, but that's just all part of the nature of God and therefore the nature of moral good, and so we should take a leap of faith and follow the moral good of God anyways, even if it completely goes against our intuitions. This may make it difficult to support the idea of a morally perfectly good God, but the concept continues to remain coherent.
E: Overall I find that Kierkegaard's method of accepting that our intuitions do not align with the nature of God as incredibly strong, with no actual logical paradoxes behind the omnibenevolent nature of god, the concept of a perfectly good God remains coherent. |
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P1: The form of the ontological arguments can be used to prove the existence of anything
R: Using Guanilo's response to Anselm's ontological argument, we can prove that the form of the argument is clearly flawed as the existence of the "lost island" is clearly absurd
I: Anselm does respond to this, stating that the difference between God and the Lost island is that God, by definition, must exist *in some form*
C: This form of the argument still however must be flawed. We can similarly use the argument to prove the existence of a Nunicorn, that is a horse with a horn which necessarily must exist, as defined. This is of course ridiculous however
E: Therefore, the actual form of some Ontological arguments is flawed in that the arguments can be used to prove the existence of other beings we are confident are mythical
P2: The nature of the ontological arguments in inherently flawed
R: The actual nature of an ontological argument, that is an argument that attempts to prove the synthetic existence of a being through apriori premises through defining God is flawed, this is present by Aquinas's objection that we can not define God as God is infinitely greater than our possible understanding, as well as the fact that Existence can not be a predicate, and so we can not prove God's existence through his definiton
I: Some ontological arguments, such as Descartes's does not actually define God, it simply gives a clear and distinct idea of God.
C: Even if we accept that an idea of God is distinguished enough from a definition of God, the predicate of existence that Descartes attempts to prove still only applies to this "idea of God". Descartes at best, proves that within the idea of God, God must exist, but this has no actual real world consequences. Furthermore, from an Empiricist perspective, the attempt to prove a sythetic fact through apriori premises is clearly contradictory to Hume's fork, and so is necessarily not possible.
E: Overall, this is both successful and the most crucial argument against Ontological arguments, as it does not just prove given Ontological Arguments to be flawed, but proves that any attempt to form an Ontological argument will always be flawed.
P3: Ontological arguments that rely on God as a non-contingent being always fail as God is a necessarily impossible being
R: Malcolm's and Pantinga's argument prove God to be either necessarily true or false, and as he is not false, he must be true. This is wrong however, as the idea of God is self contradictory
I: Figures may argue that the nature of God as a supremely perfect being is not contradictory as long as you understand God's nature to exist under logical capability
C: While it may be the case that the concept of God is possible under this new definition of God, this is clearly ad hoc and a changing of the actual understanding of God
E: Therefore as the nature of God is incoherent, God necessarily must not exist, and so ontological arguments that rely on this as a premise fail |
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P1; Paley's argument from design cannot successfully indicate the existence of a God, as it relies on Swinburne's ideas of temporal order:
R: Explain Paley's argument from design, with emphasis on the complexity of spatial order within the world
I: Most of the spatial order we see in the world, such as the design of the human body, can have natural explanations such as evolution, this is crucial against Paley as there is no longer any reason to conclude the existence of God
C: For evolution to be able to explain the design of nature however, we would need to be able to explain the temporal regularity required for evolution
E: This argument is crucial as if temporal order relies on the existence of God, then this argument would prove God as an explanation to the cause and design of the universe
P2; Swinburne's argument from Design is strongly persuasive in proving God's existence as describing God as the best explanation for Temporal Order:
R: The existence of temporal disorder, such as the example of relativistic mass where the mass of substances can be measured differently if its further away in the universe, suggest that there is no need for any explanation, let alone a personal explanation
I: Still however, there is incredibly complexity in the temporal order that is consistent, mass on earth is always measured the same and interacts the same way every single time
C: While this may be true, Swinburne's argument uses the allegory of a personal explanation being caused by an intelligent being. Through this, we can infer God to have human properties, such as being a collection of beings, being a gendered being, being fallible etc.
E: These issues against Swinburne are successful as they do genuinely weaken the allegory of God as a personal explanation for temporal order, and while neither of these issues outright disprove God as the personal cause, they make God a much weaker explanation, and so God is no longer the best explanation of temporal order.
P3; The fine tuning fails to indicate the existence of a designer due to the universe's unique case
R: Explain the fine tuning argument and state that it fails as the existence of the universe and its properties is that of a unique case. We cannot infer anything about its creation
I: Hume's problem of unique case is not successful, as even if the universe is a unique case, we can still study it and its properties, which collectively we can infer from, for example we can estimate the age of the universe
C: Most of these properties are dependent on eachother, ie physical constants might be mathematically dependent on eachother. Therefore, we still have incredibly little to be able to infer from
E: While the fine-tuning argument may be convincing as it cannot necessarily be explained by science, it does not actually successfully argue for the existence of |
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P1. Cosmological arguments fail because they rely on the assumption of infinite regresses being impossible
R: If an infinite regress is possible, than all cosmological arguments would be significantly weaker as they offer God as the only possibility of a first cause / source of reality
I: Many philosophers are happy to outright reject the concept of infinity due to mathematical paradoxes around the concept of infinity. Paradox with infinity
C: However some mathematicians argue that infinite regression is entirely a possible concept, it is just too complicated for us to properly understand. Cantor and abstract infinite theories.
E: Overall, while it is a successful criticism, it does not outright disprove any arguments, simply weakening them so its not particularly crucial.
P2. Cosmological arguments based off causation are logically flawed
R: Arguments such as Aquinas's second way and Descartes causation argument rely on the causal principle, but we cannot make universal principles about causation as we can only observe in constant conjunction
I: Some arguments rather than being based off causation, follow the principle of sufficient reason. As a logical rational principle, it is more reasonable to think of it as a universal principle.
C: Nevertheless, these arguments based off sufficient reason (and same with the causal principle) still fail however as we can conceive (and in some cases witness) effects that occur without a cause / sufficient reason, particularly in terms of moving and appearing particles within Quantum Physics.
E: This is both a successful criticism and is successful against lots of different cosmological arguments.
P3. Cosmological arguments are inherently flawed due to illogical conclusion of God's existence.
R: Cosmological arguments are all logically flawed in assuming that just because events / effects in reality are either contingent, have a cause etc, that the universe as a whole must have a cause as well. The universe may simply be just a brute fact.
I: Some would argue that the universe having no cause is a disappointing answer however, and that we should still use cosmological arguments in attempt to find some sort of source, which could be God.
C: This is still flawed however due to the contradictory nature of a necessarily being such as God. Firstly there is Russell's logical contradiction on the existence of logical beings. |
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P1. The PoE succeeds as no theodicy can sufficiently defend against the existence of moral evil
R: The free will defence explains that evil exists as an output of freewill. However, as Flew suggests, we could have a world of limited freewill and only morally good choices, and this would be better.
I: This still limits our freewill however, and so if we accept free will is more important than a lack of evil, than this is the right choice
C: However, this is not the radical dichotomy as before as complete freewill or no freewill. We are still free beings, just slightly less so, with there existing absolutely no evil anymore
E: This is not entirely crucial, as it is not deductive. It relies on you agreeing that a world with limited freewill but no suffering is better than the one today. Nevertheless this is better than before
P2. The PoE succeeds as no theodicy can strongly explain the inductive problem of evil (applied to natural evil)
R: Evil does not exist consistently across the globe, it exists disproportionately. Victims of colonialism, oppressed groups, etc. suffer more. the SMD cannot explain this because it does not make sense that these groups ought to suffer / develop more than other groups
I: Figures such as Swinburne argue that suffering cannot exist consistently around the world, as if suffering were formulaic, it would lose its meaning to us
C: This is a poor argument though, because the existence of suffering is still very consistent and formulaic. Evil consistently exists in the suffering of oppressed groups and consistently does not exist for the oppressors.
E: It is still an inductive argument, as it relies on our perspective of distribution of suffering, however it is a very convincing, and if accepted, crucial argument.
P3. The PoE succeeds as no theodicy can sufficiently explain natural evil in its application to animals
R: In the case of the Fawn in the Forrest, the fawn suffers a painful death for no purpose. The fawn does not have freewill, and so the FWD has no role here, and as animals generally are not considered to have souls, the SMD fails too
I: Some modern philosophers may argue that as living beings, animals, such as Fawns do have souls
C: Even if this were the case, some beings are not rational enough creatures to be able to understand their surroundings, and so their suffering is still unnecessary. For example a cockroach who starves to death will not understand his own suffering, and so there is no way in which his soul could develop
E: Very crucial as this uses the logical problem of evil, it is deductive and completely disproves the existence of a triomni god |
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P1: Religious language cannot be "proven to be meaningful or meaningless" through VP
R: The verification principle is too strict in that pretty much every single statement can not truly be verified, for example statement of the past, or even present day statements with a skeptic view
I: Later Ayer slackens the necessary conditions for a statement to be verified, where it can just be verified to be likely and verified indirectly.
C: Even if this were true, we still can not say whether or not God can be verified as if God exists, we will verify through eschatological verification, if God doesn't exist, we won't be able to. So VP is still poor.
E: This is only partially crucial as while Logical Positivism used to be much more dominant, other criteria of meaning such as the falsification principle have grown much more popular
P2: Religious language cannot be non-cognitively meaningless or meaningful
R: In cases like Hare's gardener, not only should it still be cognitive because there still is a gardener whether you can prove it or not, if it holds meaning to a person, the statement would still be meaningful, even if it isn't factually meaningful
I: Philosophers such as Hare however would argue that this is only an issue with non-cognitively meaningless interpretations, examples such as the parable of the lunatic still work
C: It is wrong to describe religious language as some completely unfalisifiable worldview though because people can rationalise in and out of being religious. It would be more accurate to describe Religion as a significant article of faith
E: Very crucial as now religious language must be cognitive, and therefore meaningful
P3: It does not make sense to say that religious language is cognitively meaningful due to FP
R: It does not make sense for a statement to be meaningful depending on its falsifiability, it should only depend on whether the statement itself can meaningfully convey information
I: Figures such as Mitchell would argue that in cases like the Partisan, the only reason why these statements have meaning over completely insane bliks is because they are theoreticaly falsifiable
C: Other parables such as that of the living toys is a completely unfalsifiable statement (aswell as unverifiable) but still very clearly demonstrates cognitive meaning.
E: Crucial in that it maintains that religious language is cognitively meaningful, but for some reason other than the falsification principle |
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P1. Behaviourism can satisfactorily define Mental States:
R: In cases of describing what people would refer to as mental states, these actions can always be described through physical behaviours, someone being sad is the same as them sulking, crying, their disposition to exclaim their upsetness.
I: Some 'mental states' are described however by other mental states, creating a circularity problem in which mental states regress into an infinite loop of mental states defining mental states
C: While some mental states in day to day use can be easiest explained through other mental states, ultimately these mental states can still be chained back into originating from understood physical behaviours. The objection does not actually disprove behaviourism, it just highlights how difficult it can be at times to explain physical behaviours.
E: Overall, the problem is unsuccessful in actually disproving behaviourism in anyway, and isn't crucial at all because behaviourism is only a theory on explaining how so called mental states can be explained and how they exist, whether or not the theory is complex or not has no role in whether it is successful.
P2 There is no clear distinction between mental states and physical behaviour
R: Criticisms against behaviourism such as Putman's distinction between mental states and physical behaviour fail as they do not combat behavioural dispositions. If a superspartan were removed from their environment, they could still demonstrate behaviours we'd regard as pain.
I: Some, such as Putman, take their arguments further to talk about X-worlds who can not display any change in behaviour in response to pain.
C: While Super Spartans are a believable concept, X-worlders aren't even necessarily conceivable. They are so far from anything that we understand in reality that we can reasonably say that they very well may just not be metaphysically possible
E: Overall, while Putman's super spartan example is successful enough to disprove hard behaviourism, it is still not particularly crucial as soft behaviourism works perfectly fine, with any further arguments on the distinction of mental states and physical states being entirely unsuccessful.
P3. The Asymmetry between self-knowledge and other people's mental states.
R: The advantage of soft behaviourism is that it explains how we are able to understand and often know other people's "mental states", and that our fallible knowledge of other peoples mental states is just due to mistakes in fully perceiving peoples physical behaviours.
I: Some would argue however that this creates some sort of issue in that knowledge in the mental states of others is gained fallibly through their behaviours, but our own is gained infallibly through introspection
C: The reality is is that we do learn of our own mental states through our own behaviours, and it seems fallible. The reason why our own "introspection" seems so infallible is because we are able to reflect and subconsciously take note of our own behaviours on a far deeper level than with other people. Even the most minuscule behaviours, especially internally, can be known to us.
E: Overall the this issue with behaviourism is unsuccessful in actually demonstrating any difference in our own reflection of mental states with others in any meaningful way against behaviourism. |
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P1: Interactionalist Dualist theories fail due to the interaction problem:
R: If the mind / mental properties are not physical, then it does not make sense that they are able to interact with the body, as interactions are based off physical contact / relations
I: Descartes would say this is not always the case, with gravity being an example of interaction without any physical contact
C: However, gravity is a force dependent on the mass of two substances, even though there is no direct contact, it is still a physical relation between the two substances that causes this interaction
E: Only partly successful, as it could still be possible for interaction to exist between substances without physical relations, it has just never been observed. Only crucial against interactionalism
P2. Epiphenomenalism is not a convincing explanation of mental states
R: Phenomenology of the mental life
I: It is possible that it only just seems that we move and act based off our mental states, when in reality these movements are completely independent
C: This may be possible, but it strongly goes against what seems intuitive. Furthermore, the existence of mental states does not even make sense due to the role of epiphenomenalism within evolution.
E: Again, only partly successful as it is not a deductive argument against epiphenomenalism, however it is crucial against it
P3. Dualism as a whole fails in contrast to materialism
R: Dualism is filled with nomological danglers that do not match the rest of the observable universe and scientific model
I: The reason why dualism does not fit into the scientific model is because science is the study of natural properties, mental properties are not natural properties
C: Still, that relies on the idea that there is no scientific evidence for dualism. Even if it is still possible, it is incredibly unconvincing and irrational.
E: While again inductive, this alongside the other criticisms against dualism prove it to be an incredibly weak theory |
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(You can just swap around wording depending on which you are asked for)
P1: Eliminative Materialism is correct in being a physicalist theory due to the failures of dualism
R: Dualist theories fail due to their existence as nomological danglers and ockham's razor
I: Arguments such as Mary's room try to prove that dualist properties must exist though
C: Mary's room is incorrect as Mary simply learns new Ability Knowledge, not propositional knowledge
E: While does not outright disprove dualism, it is sufficient evidence that we need to use a physicalist theory / application of a physicalist theory
P2: Eliminative Materialism is correct in not being functionalist as Functionialism fails to answer the question of what the mind actually is
R: The premise of the mind simply being the functions performed is too vague and does not distinguish the mind from any other functional process
I: We are committing a category error in thinking that the mind must be something precise like a substance we can point to, and not a vague general process
C: We cannot be committing a category error however, as if we were to try and define the mind in terms of functional role, then China-Brain and incorrect
E: Very successful in proving the mind in being defined as a standard physicalist theory
P3: But Eliminative Materialism is incorrect to eliminate reference to mental states, ie "Folk Psychology" because of the use this language can have in day to day discussion
R: We use folk psycology in our day to day lives to simply explain actions and events, it is essential to be used for day to day language
I: It doesn't matter if Folk Psychology is easier to use for day to day use, it is still wrong
C: Even in modern day sciences, we still use outdated and incorrect models for the sake of simplicity, ie using simpler models of the atom. You can still use folk psychology without inhibiting science, as long as we are aware of its inaccuracies.
E: Overall I think it is successful as showing Eliminative Materialism as a poor theory, and therefore we support MBTIT. It specifically attacks the purpose in applying EM. |
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P1. Dualist applications of functionalism fail because they are incompatible with the dualist concept of qualia
R: If dualist functionalism were the case, then we would run into the problem of inverted qualia, which would inherently showcase dualist functionalist to be false
I: It is possible a dualist functionalist does not support the idea of qualia
C: Then the issue of absent qualia still plays a role, because in the China-Brain example, there is an obvious difference between a regular being and the china brain, and the best dualist explanation would be that of qualia, but this would still disprove dualist functionalism
E: Not the most crucial, as a func dualist may be able to find another answer
P2. Functionalism in general fails as it cannot thoroughly describe the mind
R: Functionalism defines the mind as its functional roles, however any object can be defined by its functional roles, and different minds may have different functional roles
I: We are committing a category error in thinking that the mind is some actual precise thing we can thoroughly define
C: Even if this is the case, then Functionalism is still failing to explain what the mind is.
E: This is fairly crucial as if the mind cannot be explained in terms of functional roles, than the whole philosophy of functionalism breaks apart
P3: Non-Functionalist physicalist theories can explain mental states better than functionalism
R: Physicalist theories are able to fully define mental states in terms of physical properties, for example physical properties of the brain. This is better as the mind can now be observed and understood
I: It may be unfair to say that other intelligent beings such as robots or aliens cannot have mental states too just because they do not share the same physical properties
C: Defining a mental state as its physical properties does not include other beings from having mental states, we just indicate that they have different mental states
E: Not entirely crucial, but still convincing. |
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