Term
|
Definition
...all that is the case. 1
...the totality of facts, not things.1.1
...the totality of existing states of affairs.
...determined by the facts, and by their being ALL the facts. 1.11
...the facts in logical space. 1.13
the sum total of reality. 2.063 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
what is the case. 2
the existence of states of affairs. 2
a picture. 2.141 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
(a state of things)
a combination of objects (things).2.01 |
|
|
Term
| It is essential to things that they should be: |
|
Definition
| possible constituents of states of affairs.2.011 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| If a thing CAN occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be: |
|
Definition
| written into the thing itself. 2.012 |
|
|
Term
| If things can occur in states of affairs, this possiblity must be |
|
Definition
| in them from the beginning.2.0121 |
|
|
Term
| Nothing in the province of logic can be |
|
Definition
merely possible2.0121
Logic deals with all possibilities and all possibilities are its facts.2.0121 |
|
|
Term
| Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all POSSIBLE situations, but this ofrm of independence is |
|
Definition
| a form of connexion with states of affairs, a form of dependence.2.0122 |
|
|
Term
| If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in state of affairs. Every one of these possibilities must be |
|
Definition
| part of the nature of the object. A new possibility cannot be discovered later. 2.0123 |
|
|
Term
| If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know |
|
Definition
| all its internal properties. 2.01231 |
|
|
Term
| If all objects are given, then at the same time all POSSIBLE states of affairs are |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| in a space of possible state of affairs. 2.023 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| situated in infinite space. 2.0131 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the possibility of all situations. 2.014 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the possibility of its occurring in state of affairs.2.0141 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
simple.2.02
what constitute the unalterable form an imagined world has in common with the real one.
colorless.2.0232
what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable. |
|
|
Term
| Every statement about complexes can be |
|
Definition
| resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely. 2.0201 |
|
|
Term
| Objects cannot be composite because |
|
Definition
| they make up the substance of the world.2.021 |
|
|
Term
| It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have |
|
Definition
| SOMETHING--a form in common with it.2.022 |
|
|
Term
| The substance of the world CAN only determine |
|
Definition
| a form, and not any material properties. 2.0231 |
|
|
Term
| If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinction between them, apart from their external properties, is |
|
Definition
| that they are different. 2.0233 |
|
|
Term
| If there is noting to distinguish a thing, I cannot distinguish it, since |
|
Definition
| if I do it will be distinguished after all. 2,02331 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
what subsists independently of what is the case.2.024
form and content. 2.025 |
|
|
Term
| Space, time, and color are |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| There must be objects, if the world is to have |
|
Definition
| an unalterable form.2.026 |
|
|
Term
| Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The configuration of objects produces |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is |
|
Definition
| the structure of the state of affairs.2.032 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the possibility of structure.2.033 |
|
|
Term
| The structure of a fact consists of |
|
Definition
| the structures of states of affairs.2.034 |
|
|
Term
2.05
The totality of existing states |
|
Definition
is the world. 2.06
of affairs also determines states of affairs do not exist. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. |
|
|
Term
2.06
We also call the existence of states of affairs |
|
Definition
| a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative fact. |
|
|
Term
2.061
States of affairs are |
|
Definition
| independent of one another. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
a presentation of a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of state of affairs. 2.11
A model of reality. 2.12
constituted by elements that are related to one another in a determinate way, which is the structure of the picture. 2.14 and 2.15.
a fact. 2.141.
laid against reality like a measure. 2.1512
also includes the pictorial relationship, which makes it into a picture. 2.1513. |
|
|
Term
| The elements of the picture are |
|
Definition
| representatives of objects.2.13 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.2.151 |
|
|
Term
| The pictorial relationship is |
|
Definition
| the correlations of the picture's elements with things. 2.1514 |
|
|
Term
| If a fact is to be a picture, it must have |
|
Definition
| something in common with what it depicts.2.16 |
|
|
Term
| What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in the way it does, is |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| A picture can depict any reality |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
depict its pictorial form: it displays it.
place itself outside its representational form. 2.174
depict reality correctly or incorrectly if it doesn't have logical form, i.e. the form of reality. 2.18 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
its subject from a position outside it.
a possible situation in logical space. 2.202
that which it represents independently of its truth or falsity, by means of its pictorial form. 2.22
its sense. 2.221 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
is a picture whose pictorial form is logical form. 2.181
can depict the world. 2.19. |
|
|
Term
| A picture depicts reality by |
|
Definition
| representing a possibility of existence and non-existence of states of affairs. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the possibiity of the situation that it represent. 2.203. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false 2.21 |
|
|
Term
| In order to tell whether a picture is true or false |
|
Definition
we must compare it with reality. 2.223
It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false. 2.224 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
a logical picture of facts.
a proposition with a sense. 4 |
|
|
Term
| A totality of true thoughts represents |
|
Definition
| a picture of the world. 3.01. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the possibility of the situation of which it is the thought. 3.02. What is thinkable is possible. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| of something illogical, since if it were, we should hae to think illogically. 3.03. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the sign with which we express a thought.3.12 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world. 3.13.
a function of the expressions contained in it. 3.318
an expression. 3.31
a picture of reality. 401
a model of reality as we imagine it. 4.01 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| all that the projection includes, but now what is projected. 3.13. |
|
|
Term
| A proposition does not contain |
|
Definition
| its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it. 3.13. |
|
|
Term
| The content of a proposition means |
|
Definition
| the content of a proposition that has sense. 3.13. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the form, but not the content, of its sense.3.13. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a sense, a set of names cannot. 3.142. |
|
|
Term
| 'That "a" stands to "b" in the relation R' |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Situations can be described, but not given |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the elements of a propositional thought. 3.201 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
an object. 3.203
The simple signs employed in propositions. 3.202
is a primitive sign. 3.26
the representative of an object in a proposition. 3.22 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
the representative of an object. 3.221.
what can be perceived of a symbol. 3.32
arbitrary. 3.322 |
|
|
Term
| A proposition that mentions a complex will not be nonsensical, if the complex does not exist, but |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| A proposition has one and only one |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| propositions that contain the primitive signs and can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known. 3.263 |
|
|
Term
| Only in the nexus of a proposition, does a name have meaning. 3.3 |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
the mark of a form and a content. 3.31
the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions. 3.311
presented by means of the general form of the propositions that it characterizes. 3.313
presented by means of a variable whose values are the propositions that contain the expression.3.313 |
|
|
Term
| What values a propositional variable may take is something that is |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| What values a propositional variable may take is something that is |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
the stipulation of values. 3.316
merely a description of symbols and states nothing about what is signified. 3.317 |
|
|
Term
| The stipulation of values is |
|
Definition
| is a description of the propositions whose common characteristic the variable is. 3.317. |
|
|
Term
| How the description of the propositions is produced is |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a sign for identity. 3.323. |
|
|
Term
| In order to avoid such confusions as "Green is green," Wittgenstein says we must use |
|
Definition
| a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar--by logical syntax. 3.325 |
|
|
Term
| In order to recognize a symbol by its sign |
|
Definition
| we must observe how it is used with a sense. 3.326. |
|
|
Term
| It must be possible to establish logical syntax without mentioning the |
|
Definition
| meaning of a sing: only the description of expressions may be presupposed. 3.33 |
|
|
Term
| No proposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional sign cannot be |
|
Definition
| contained in itself (that is the whole of the 'theory of types'). 3.332 |
|
|
Term
| The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that |
|
Definition
| the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain itself. 3.333 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| those that result from the particular way in which the propositional sign is produced.3.341 |
|
|
Term
| So one could say that the real name of an object was |
|
Definition
| what all symbols that signified it had in common.3.3411 |
|
|
Term
| A proposition determines a place |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The propositional sign with logical co-ordinates |
|
Definition
| that is the logical place. 3.41 |
|
|
Term
| In geometry and logic alike a place is |
|
Definition
| a possibility: something can exist in it. |
|
|
Term
| A proposition can determine only |
|
Definition
| one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given by it. 3.42 |
|
|
Term
| The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The force of a proposition reaches through |
|
Definition
| the whole of logical space. 3.42 |
|
|
Term
| A propositional sign, applied and thought out, |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The totality of propositions is |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our |
|
Definition
| failure to understand the logic of our language.4.003 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| 'a critique of language.' 4.0031 |
|
|
Term
| The possibility of all imagry is contained in |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| We understand the sense of a propositional sign without its having been |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| If I understand a proposition, I understand |
|
Definition
| the situation it represents, without having had it sense explained to me. 4.022 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
its sense. 4.022
how things stand IF it is true. And it says that thye do so stand. 4.022 |
|
|
Term
| A proposition must restrict reality to |
|
Definition
| two alternatives: yes or no.. 4.023. |
|
|
Term
| A proposition describes reality by its |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| A proposition constructs a world with the help of a |
|
Definition
| logical scaffolding, so that one can actualy see from the proposition how everything stands in logic IF it is true.4.023 |
|
|
Term
| One can draw inferences from |
|
Definition
| a false proposition. 4.023 |
|
|
Term
| To understand a proposition means |
|
Definition
| to know what is the case if it is true. 4024 One can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is true.) 4.024 |
|
|
Term
| A proposition must use old expressions to |
|
Definition
| communicate new sense. 4.03 |
|
|
Term
| A proposition communicates a situation to us, it must be |
|
Definition
| ESSENTIALLY connected with the situation. 4.031 |
|
|
Term
| A proposition states something |
|
Definition
| only in so far as it is a picture 4.03 |
|
|
Term
| How is a state of affairs presented? |
|
Definition
| One name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and htey are combined with one another. In this way the whole group--like a TABLEAU VIVANT --presents a state of affairs. 4.0311 |
|
|
Term
| On what principle is the possibity of propositions based? |
|
Definition
| On the principle that objects have signs as their representatives. 4.0312. |
|
|
Term
| Logical constants are not |
|
Definition
| representatives. There can be no representatives of the LOGIC of facts. 4.0312 |
|
|
Term
| In a preposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts are in |
|
Definition
| the situation that it represents. 4.04. |
|
|
Term
| A preposition and the situation that it represents must both contain |
|
Definition
| the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity. (The same no. of distinguishable parts). 4.04 |
|
|
Term
| This mathematical multiplicity cannot itself be |
|
Definition
| the subject of depiction. One cannot get away from it when depicting. 4.041 |
|
|
Term
| If we wanted to express what we now write as '(x). fx' by putting an affix in front of 'fx'--for instance by writing "Gen. fx" --it would not be adequate: we should not know what was being |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of |
|
Definition
| being a picture of reality. 4.06 |
|
|
Term
| A proposition has a sense that is independent of |
|
Definition
| the facts: otherwise cone can easily suppose that true and false are relations of equal status between signs and what they signify. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| we use it to say that things stand in a certain way, and they do; andif by 'p' we mean ~p and things stand as we mean that they do, then, constued in the new way, 'p' is true and not false. 4.062 |
|
|
Term
| The signs 'p' and '~p" CAN say |
|
Definition
| the same thing. For it saws that nothing in reality corresponds to the sign '". 4.0621 |
|
|
Term
| The ocurrence of negation in a proposition is not enough to characterize |
|
Definition
| its sense (``p) =p). 4.0621 |
|
|
Term
| The propositions 'p' and '~p' have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Every proposition must already have |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. 4.1
the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it--logical form. 4.12 |
|
|
Term
| The totality of true propositions is |
|
Definition
| the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of natural science.) 4.11 |
|
|
Term
| True or False: Philosophy is one of the natural sciences. |
|
Definition
| False. The word 'philosphy' must men something whose place is above or below the natural sciences,not beside them.) 4.111 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the logical clarification of thoughts. 4.112 |
|
|
Term
| Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| A philosophical work consists essentially of |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in |
|
Definition
| the clarification of propositions. 4.112 |
|
|
Term
| Without philosophy, thoughts are |
|
Definition
| cloudy and indistinct. Philosophy makes them clear and gives them sharp boundaries. 4.112. |
|
|
Term
| Philosophy is no more closely related to philosophy than is any other |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the philosophy of psychology. 4.1121 |
|
|
Term
| Darwin's theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other |
|
Definition
| hypothesis in natural science. 4.112 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
to the much disputed sphere of science. 4.113
to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. 4.114 |
|
|
Term
| Philosophy signifies what cannot be said |
|
Definition
| by presenting clearly what can be said. 4.115 |
|
|
Term
| Everything that can be thought at all can be thought |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Everything that can be put into words can be put |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Propositions cannot represent |
|
Definition
| logical form; it is mirrored in them. 4.121. |
|
|
Term
| What finds its reflection in language, language |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the logical form of reality; they display it. 4.121 |
|
|
Term
| If two prepositions contradict on another, then their structure |
|
Definition
| shows it; the same is true if one of them follows from theother. And so on. 4.1211. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Now, too, we understand our feeling that once we have a sign-language in which everything is all right, |
|
Definition
| we already have a correct logical point of view. 4.1213 |
|
|
Term
| Instead of 'structural property' Wittgenstein says |
|
Definition
'internal property.
4.122 |
|
|
Term
| Instead of 'structural relation', Wittgenstein says |
|
Definition
| 'internal relation.' 4.122 |
|
|
Term
| An internal property of a fact can also be called |
|
Definition
| a feature of that fact (in the sense inwhich we speak of facial features, for example.) 4.1221 |
|
|
Term
| A property is internal if it is |
|
Definition
| unthinkable that its object should not possess it. 4.123 |
|
|
Term
| The existence of an internal propert of a possible situation is not expressed by means of a proposition: rather, |
|
Definition
| it expresses itself in the proposition representing the situation, by means of an internal property of that proposition. 4.124 |
|
|
Term
| I call a series that is order by an internal relation |
|
Definition
| a series of forms. 4.1252 |
|
|
Term
| When something falls under a formal concept s one of its objects, this cannot be expressed by means of a proposition. Instead it is shown in |
|
Definition
| the very sign for this object. "A name shows that it signifies an object, sign for a number that it signifies a number, etc. ) 4.126 |
|
|
Term
| Formal concepts cannot be |
|
Definition
| represented by means of a function, as concepts proper can. For their characteristics, formal properties are not expressed by means of functions. 4.126 |
|
|
Term
| The expression for a formal property is |
|
Definition
| a feature of certain symbols. 4.126 |
|
|
Term
| So the sign for the characteristics of a formal concept is |
|
Definition
| a distinctive feature of all symbols whose meanings fall under the concept. 4.126 |
|
|
Term
| So the expression for a formal concept is |
|
Definition
| a propositional variable in which this distinctive feature alone is constant. |
|
|
Term
| The propositional variable signifies |
|
Definition
| the formal concept, and its values signify the objects that fall under the concept. 4.127 |
|
|
Term
| Every variable is the sign for |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Every variable represents |
|
Definition
| a constant form that all its values possess, andthis can be regarded as a formal property of those values. 4.1271 |
|
|
Term
| The variable name 'x' is the proper sign for the |
|
Definition
| pseudo-concept object. 4.1272 |
|
|
Term
| Wherever the word 'object' ('thing', etc.) is correctly used, it is expressed in conceptual notation by |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| It is nonsensical to speak of the total number of |
|
Definition
| objects. The same applieds to the words 'complex', 'fact,' 'function', 'number', etc. They all signify formal concepts, and are represented in conceptual notation by variables, not by functions or classes (as Frege and Russell believed.)4.1272 |
|
|
Term
| '1 is a number', 'There is only one zero', and all similar expressions are |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| A formal concept is given immediately |
|
Definition
| any object falling under it is given. 4.12721 |
|
|
Term
| In order to express the general term of a series of forms, |
|
Definition
| we must use a variable, because the concept 'term of that series of forms' is a FORMAL concept. |
|
|
Term
| We can determine the general term of a series of forms by giving its first term and the general form |
|
Definition
| of the operation that rpoduces the next term out of the proposition that precedes it. 4.1273 |
|
|
Term
| To ask whether a formal concept exists |
|
Definition
| is nonsensical, for no proposition can be the answer to such a question. 4.1274 |
|
|
Term
| Logical forms are without |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The sense of a proposition is |
|
Definition
| its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence of a state of affairs. 4.2 |
|
|
Term
| An elementary proposition |
|
Definition
is the simplest kind of proposition. 4.21
a proposition which asserts the existence of a state of affairs. 4.21
is a proposition for which there can be no elementary proposition contradicting it. 4.211
consists of names. 4.22
is a nexus, a concatenation of names. 4.22 |
|
|
Term
| Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of infinitely many states of affairs and every state of affairs is composed of infinitely many objects, there would still have to be |
|
Definition
| objects and state of affairs. 4.2211 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the simple symbols: I indicate them by single letters ('x', 'y', 'z'). |
|
|
Term
| I write elementary propositions as functions of |
|
Definition
| names,, so that they have the form 'fx', 'ø(x,y)' etc. Or, I indicate them by the letters 'p', 'q', 'r'. 4.24 |
|
|
Term
| When I use two signs with one and the same meaning, I express this by |
|
Definition
| putting the sign '=' between them. 4.241 |
|
|
Term
| a=b means that the sign 'b' can be |
|
Definition
| substituted for the sign 'a'. 4.241 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a rule dealing with signs. |
|
|
Term
| Expression like 'a=a', and those derived from them, are neither elementary propositions nor is there any other way in which they make |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| If an elementary proposition is true |
|
Definition
| the state of affairs exists. 4.25 |
|
|
Term
| If an elementary proposition is false |
|
Definition
| the sate of affairs does not exist. 4.25 |
|
|
Term
| If all true elementary propositions are given, the result |
|
Definition
| is a complete description of the world. |
|
|
Term
| The world is completely described by |
|
Definition
| giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false. 4.26 |
|
|
Term
| Truth-possibilities of elementary propositions mean possibilities of existence and |
|
Definition
| non-existence of states of affairs. 4.3. |
|
|
Term
| We can represent truth possibilities by |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Truth possibilities of elementary propositions are |
|
Definition
| the conditions of the truth and falsity of propositions. 4.41 |
|
|
Term
| The understanding of general propositions depends on |
|
Definition
| the understanding of elementary propositions. 4.411 |
|
|
Term
| If the order of the truth -possibilities in a schema is fiexed once and for all by a combinatory rule, |
|
Definition
| then the last column by itself will be an expression of the truth-conditions. |
|
|
Term
| If for all truth possibilities of the emelmentary propositions a proposition is true, we say that the truth-conditions are |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| truth conditions, since it is unconditionally true. 4.461 |
|
|
Term
| A contradiction is true on |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Tautologies and contradictions |
|
Definition
lack sense. 4.461 For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining. 4.461
are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism, just as '0' is part of the symbolismof arithmetic. 4.4611.
are not pictures of reality.
do not represent any possible situations.4.462 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| admit ALL possible situations 4.462 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| admit no possible situations. 4.462. |
|
|
Term
| In a tautology the conditions of agreement with the world--the representational relations-- |
|
Definition
| cancel one another, so that it does not stand in any representational relation to reality. 4.462 |
|
|
Term
| The truth-conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leave open |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| A tautology leaves open to reality |
|
Definition
| the whole--the infinite whole--of logical space: 4.463 |
|
|
Term
| A contradiction fills the whole of logical space leaving |
|
Definition
| no point of it for reality. 4.463. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| certain, a proposition's possible, a contradiction's impossible. 4.464 |
|
|
Term
| The logical product of a tautology and a proposition says |
|
Definition
| the same thing as the proposition. 4.465 |
|
|
Term
| What corresponds to a detreminte logical combination of signs is |
|
Definition
| a determinate logical combination of their meanings. |
|
|
Term
| The existence of a general propositional form is proved by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form |
|
Definition
| could not have been foreseen (i.e. constructed). 4.5 |
|
|
Term
| The general form of a proposition is: |
|
Definition
| This is how things stand. 4.5 |
|
|
Term
| An elementary propostion is |
|
Definition
| a truth-function of itself. 5 |
|
|
Term
| Elementary propositions are |
|
Definition
| the truth-arguments of propositions.5.01 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| arranged in series. That is the foundation of the theory of probability. 5.1 |
|
|
Term
| Wittgenstein gives the name TRUTH-GROUNDS of a proposition to |
|
Definition
| those truth-possibilities of its truth-arguments that make it true. 5.101 |
|
|
Term
| The truth of a proposition 'p' follows from the truth of another proposition 'q' if all the truth-grounds of the latter are |
|
Definition
| truth-grounds of the former. 5.2 The truth grounds of the one are contained in those of the other: p follows from q. 5.121 |
|
|
Term
| If p follows from q, the sense of 'p' is contained in |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| every proposition that follows from it. 5.124 |
|
|
Term
| 'p.q' is one of the propositions that affirm 'p' and at the same time one of the propositions that affirm |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Every proposition that contradicts another |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| When the truth of one preposition follow from the truth of others, we can see this from the structure |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| One elementary proposition cannot be deduced |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to the existence of |
|
Definition
| another entirely different situation. 5.135 |
|
|
Term
| We cannot infer the events of the future from |
|
Definition
| those of the present. Belief in the causal nexus is superstition. 5/1361 |
|
|
Term
| The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing |
|
Definition
| actions that still lie in the future. 5.1362 |
|
|
Term
| The connexion between knowledge and what is known is that of |
|
Definition
| logical necessity. 5.1362 |
|
|
Term
| If one proposition foolws from another, the latter says |
|
Definition
| more than the former, and the former less than the latter. 5.14 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| follows from all propositions: it says nothing. 5.142 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
that common factor of propositions which NO proposition has in common with another. 5.143
the outer limit of propositions.5.143. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
the common factor of all propositions that have nothing in common with one another.5.143
the unsubstantial point at their center. 5.143 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| outside all propositions: tautology vanishes inside them. 5.143 |
|
|
Term
| Contradiction is the outer limit of |
|
Definition
| propositions: tautology is the unsubstantial point at their center. 5.143 |
|
|
Term
| When propositions have no truth-arguments in common with one another, we call them |
|
Definition
| independent of one another. 5.152. |
|
|
Term
| In itself a proposition is neither |
|
Definition
| probably nor improbably. Either an event occurs or it does not: there is no middle way. 5.153 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a generalization. It involves a general description of a propositional form. 5.156 |
|
|
Term
| A probability proposition is a sort of |
|
Definition
| excerpt from other propositions. 5.156 |
|
|
Term
| The structures of propositions stand |
|
Definition
| in internal relations to one another. 5.2 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| what has to be done to the one proposition in order to make the other out of it. 5.23. |
|
|
Term
| The internal relation by which a series is ordered is equivalent to the operation that produces |
|
Definition
| one term from another. 5.232 |
|
|
Term
| Truth functions of elementary propositions are results of operations with elementary propositions as |
|
Definition
| bases. (These operations I call truth-operations.) 5.234 |
|
|
Term
| Negation, logical addition, logical multiplication, etc, etc. are |
|
Definition
| operations. (Negation reverses the sense of a proposition. 5.2341 |
|
|
Term
| An operation manifests itself as a variable; it shows how we can get from one form of proposition |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Operations and functions must not be |
|
Definition
| confused with each other. 5.25 |
|
|
Term
| Successive pplication of an operation means |
|
Definition
| an operation applied repeatedly to its own results. 5.2521 |
|
|
Term
| Wittgenstein uses the sign '[a,x,O'x]' for the |
|
Definition
| general term of a series of forms a, O'a, O'O'a, .... . 5.2522 |
|
|
Term
| The concept of successive applications of an operation is equivalent to |
|
Definition
| the concept 'and so on'. 5.2523 |
|
|
Term
| All propositions are results of truth operations on |
|
Definition
| elementary propositions. 5.3 |
|
|
Term
| A truth-operation is the way in which a truth-function is produced out of |
|
Definition
| elementary propositions. 4.3 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the result of truth-operations on elementary propositions. 5.3 |
|
|
Term
| There are no 'logical objects or 'logical constants' (In Frege's and Russell's sense.) True or False |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The reason for 5.4 is that the results of truth operations on truth-functions are always identical |
|
Definition
| whenever they are one and the same truth-function of elementary propositions. 5/41 |
|
|
Term
| All the propositions of logic say the same thing, |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Truth functions are not objects. True or false. |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| If we are given a proposition, then with it we are also given the results of all truth-operations that have it |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| There are no numbers in logic. True or false. |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| In logic there is no co-ordinate status, and there can be no classification. True or False |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| In logic there can be no distinction between the general and the specific. True or false. |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Sings for logical operations are |
|
Definition
| punctuation-marks. 5.4611 |
|
|
Term
| Wherever there is compositeness, argument and function are present, and where these are present |
|
Definition
| we already have all the logical constants. 5.47 |
|
|
Term
| One could say that the sole logical constant was what ALL propositions, by their very nature, |
|
Definition
| had in common with one another. But that is the general propositional form. 5.47 |
|
|
Term
| The general propositional form is |
|
Definition
| the essence of a proposition. 5.471 |
|
|
Term
| To give the essence of a proposition means |
|
Definition
| to given the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world. 5.4711. |
|
|
Term
| The description of the most general propositional form is the description of the one and only |
|
Definition
| general primitive sign in logic. 5.472 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| In a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| What makes logic A PRIORI is the IMPOSSIBILITY of |
|
Definition
| illogical thought. 5.4731 |
|
|
Term
| Every truth function is a result of successive appli-cations to elementary propositions of the operation |
|
Definition
| '(-----T)(ƺ,....)'. This operation negates all the propositions in the right-hand pair of brackets, and Wittgenstein calls it the negation of those propositions. 5.5 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| What is common to all symbols that affirm both p and q is the proposition |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| What is common to all symbols that affirm either p or q is |
|
Definition
| the proposition 'p v q'. 5.513 |
|
|
Term
| Two propositions are opposed to one another if they have |
|
Definition
| nothing in common with one another. 5.513 |
|
|
Term
| Every proposition has only one negative, since |
|
Definition
| there is only one proposition that lies completely outside it. 5.513 |
|
|
Term
| The positive proposition necessarily presupposes the existence of the |
|
Definition
| negative proposition, and vice versa. 5.5151 |
|
|
Term
| The generality-sign makes its appearance as |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| If objects are given, then at the same time we are given |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| If elementary propositions are given, then at the same time |
|
Definition
| All elementary propositions are given. 5.524 |
|
|
Term
| We can describe the world completely by means of fully generalized propositions, i.e. |
|
Definition
| without first correlating any name with a particular object. 5.526 |
|
|
Term
| The truth or falsity of every proposition does make |
|
Definition
| some alteration to the general construction of the world. 5.562. |
|
|
Term
| Wittgenstein expresses identity of object by |
|
Definition
| identity of sign and not by using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of signs. 5.53. |
|
|
Term
| To say of two things that they are identical is |
|
Definition
| nonsense, and to say of ONE thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all. 5.5303. |
|
|
Term
| The identity-sign, therefore, is not an essential constituent of |
|
Definition
| conceptual notation. 5.533 |
|
|
Term
| In the general propositional form propositions occur in other propositions only as |
|
Definition
| bases of truth-operations. 5.54 |
|
|
Term
| 'A believes that p', is of the form '"p" says p": and this involves not a correlation of a fact with an object, but |
|
Definition
| the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects. 5.524 |
|
|
Term
| This shows there is no such thing as the |
|
Definition
| soul--the subject, etc. Indeed, a composite would no longer be a soul. 5.5421. |
|
|
Term
| Elementary propositions consist of |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Since we are unable to give the number of names with different meanings, we are unable to give the |
|
Definition
| composition of elementary propositions. 5.55 |
|
|
Term
| Whenever we have to look at the world for an answer to problems of logic, that shows that |
|
Definition
| we are on a completly wrong track. 5.551 |
|
|
Term
| The 'experience we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things |
|
Definition
| but, that something IS: that, however, is NOT an experience. Logic is prior to every experience. 5.552. |
|
|
Term
| Logic is prior to the question "how?", not prior to the question |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| When there is a system by which we can create symbols, the system is what is |
|
Definition
| important for logic and not the individual symbols. 5.555 |
|
|
Term
| Empirical reality is limited by |
|
Definition
| the totality of objects. The limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions. 5.5561 |
|
|
Term
| All the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in |
|
Definition
| perfect logical order. 5.5563. |
|
|
Term
| That utterly simple thing, which we have to formulate here, is not an image of the truth, but |
|
Definition
| the truth itself in its entirety. 5.5563 |
|
|
Term
| Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most |
|
Definition
| concrete that there are. 5.5563 |
|
|
Term
| The APPLICATION of logic decides |
|
Definition
| what elementary propositions there are. 5.557 |
|
|
Term
| The limits of my language mean |
|
Definition
| the limits of my world. 5.6 |
|
|
Term
| Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The world is MY world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of LANGUAGE |
|
Definition
| (of that language which alone understand) mean the limits of MY world. 5.62 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| world. (The microcosm.) 5.63 |
|
|
Term
| There is no such thing as the subject that |
|
Definition
| thinks or entertains ideas. 5.631 |
|
|
Term
| The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a |
|
Definition
| limit of the world. 5.632 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Whatever we can describe at all could be other |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Solipsism, when its implication are followed out strictly, coincides with |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that |
|
Definition
| 'the world is my world'. 5.641 |
|
|
Term
| The philosophical self is not the human being, but rather the |
|
Definition
| metaphysical subject, the limit of the world--not a part of if. 5.641 |
|
|
Term
| A number is the exponent of an |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The concept of number is simply what is common to all numbers, |
|
Definition
| the general form of a number. 6.022 |
|
|
Term
| The concept of number is the |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The genral form on an interger is |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The propositions of logic are |
|
Definition
| tautologies. Therefore the propositions of logic say nothing. 6.1 |
|
|
Term
| All theories that make a proposition of logic appear to have content are |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize that they are true from |
|
Definition
| the symbol alone, and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic. 6.113 |
|
|
Term
| The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal--logical--properties of |
|
Definition
| language and the world. 6.12 |
|
|
Term
| The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by combining them so as to |
|
Definition
form propositions that say nothing. 6.121
This method could also be called a zero method. |
|
|
Term
| In a logical proposition, propositions are brought into equilibrium with one another, and the state of |
|
Definition
| equilibrium then indicates what the logical constitution of these propositions must be. 6.121 |
|
|
Term
| We can actually do without logical propositions; for in a suitable notation we can in fact recognize the formal |
|
Definition
| properties of propositions by mere inspection of the propositions themselves. 6.122 |
|
|
Term
| Not only must a proposition of logic be irrefutable by any possible experience, but it must also be |
|
Definition
| unconfirmable by any possible experience. 6.1222 |
|
|
Term
| We can "POSTULATE' the 'truths of logic' in so far as we can postulate an |
|
Definition
| adequate notation. 6.1223 |
|
|
Term
| Clearly the laws of logic cannot in their turn be subject to |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| no more than to be accidentally valid for all things. 6.1231 |
|
|
Term
| An ungeneralized proposition can be tautological just as well as |
|
Definition
| a generalized one. 6.1231 |
|
|
Term
| The general validity of logic might be called essential, in contrast with the accidental general validity of such |
|
Definition
| propositions as 'All men are mortal'. 6.1232 |
|
|
Term
| The propositions of logic |
|
Definition
describe scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. 6.124
presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense; and that is their connexion with the world. 6.124 |
|
|
Term
| It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of |
|
Definition
| symbols--whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character--are tautologies.6.124 |
|
|
Term
| Logic is not a field in which WE express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the |
|
Definition
| nature of the natural and inevitable signs speaks for itself. 6.124 |
|
|
Term
| If we know the logical syntax of any sign-language, then we have already been given all the |
|
Definition
| propositions of logic. 6.124 |
|
|
Term
| It is possible to give in advance a description of all |
|
Definition
| 'true' logical proposisiotns. 6.125 |
|
|
Term
| There can never be surprises in |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| One can calculate whether a proposition belongs to logic, by calculating the logical properties of |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Without bothering about sense or meaning, we construct the logical proposition out of others using |
|
Definition
| only RULES THAT DEAL WITH SIGNS. 6.126 |
|
|
Term
| The proof of logical propositions consists in the following process: we produce them out of other |
|
Definition
| logical propositions by successively applying certain operations that always generate further tautologies out of the initial ones. (And in fact only tautologies FOLLOW from a tautology.) 6.126 |
|
|
Term
| In logic process and result are |
|
Definition
| equivalent. (Hence the absence of surprise. 6.1261 |
|
|
Term
| Proof in logic is merely a mechanical expedient to facilitate the recognition of |
|
Definition
| tautologies in complicated cases. 6.1262. |
|
|
Term
| It is clear from the start that a logical proof of a proposition that has sense and a proof IN logic must |
|
Definition
| be two entirely different things. 6.1263 |
|
|
Term
| A proposition that has sense states something, which is shown by its proof to be so. In logic every proposition is the form of |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Every proposition of logic is a modus ponens represented in |
|
Definition
| signs. ( And one cannot express the modus ponens by means of a proposition.) 6.124 |
|
|
Term
| It is always possible to construe logic in such a way that every proposition is its own |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| All the prpositions of logic are of equal |
|
Definition
| status: it is not the case that some of them are essentially primitive propositions and others essentially derived propositions. 6.127 |
|
|
Term
| Every tautology itself shows that it is |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
not a body of doctrine, but a mirror image of the world. 6.13
is transcendental. 6.13 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
a logical method. 6.2
a method of logic. 6.234 |
|
|
Term
| The propositions of mathematics are |
|
Definition
| equations, and therefore pseudo-propositions. 6.2 |
|
|
Term
| A proposition of mathematics does not express |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| (In philosophy the question, 'What do we actually use this word of this proposition for?" repeatedly leads to |
|
Definition
| valuable insights.) 6.211 |
|
|
Term
| The logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic, is shown in equations by |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| If two expressions are combined means of the sign of equality, that means they can be |
|
Definition
| substituted for one another. 6.22 |
|
|
Term
| It is a property of affirmation that it can be |
|
Definition
| construed as double negation. 6.231 |
|
|
Term
| It is the essential characteristic of mathematical method that it employs |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The method by which mathematics arrives at its equations is the method of |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The exploration of logic means the exploration of EVERYTHING THAT IS SUBJECT TO |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Outside logic, everything is |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The so-called law of induction cannot possibly be a law of logic, since it is obviously a |
|
Definition
| proposition with sense. 6.31 |
|
|
Term
| The law of causality is not a law but the form of a |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The law of conservation, the law of least action, laws of the causal form, the principle of sufficient reason, |
|
Definition
| the laws of continuity in nature and of least effort in nature, etc., etc.-all these are A PRIORI inssights about the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast. 6.34 |
|
|
Term
| The possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics tells us nothing about the |
|
Definition
| world: but what does tell sus something about it is the precise way in which it is possible to describe it by these means. 6.342 |
|
|
Term
| Mechanics is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all the TRUE propositions that we need for |
|
Definition
| the description of the world. 6.343 |
|
|
Term
| The laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, still speak, however indirectly, about the object of the |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Laws like the principle of sufficient reason, etc., are about the net, and not about what the net |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: There are laws in |
|
Definition
| nature. But of course that cannot be said: it makes itself manifest. 6.36 |
|
|
Term
| One might say, using Hertz's terminology, that only connexions that are SUBJECT TO LAW are |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| We cannot compare a process with 'the passage of time'--there is no such thing--but only with another |
|
Definition
| process (such as the working of a chronometer.) 6.3611 |
|
|
Term
| Hence we can describe the lapse of time only by relying on |
|
Definition
| some other process. 6.3611 |
|
|
Term
| What can be described can also happen: and what the law of causality is meant to exclude cannot even be |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the SIMPLES law that can be reconciled with our |
|
Definition
experiences. 6.363
This procedure, however has no logical justification but only a psychological one. 6.3631 |
|
|
Term
| There are no grounds for believing that the simplest eventuality will in fact be |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has |
|
Definition
happened, The only necessity that exits is LOGICAL
necessity. 6.37 |
|
|
Term
| The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature of the explanation of |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| People today stop at the alws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were |
|
Definition
| treated in past ages. And in fact both are right and both wrong: the ancients have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if EVERYTHING were explained. 6.372 |
|
|
Term
| The world is independent of my |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Just as the only necessity that exists is LOGICAL necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is |
|
Definition
| LOGICAL impossibility.6.375 |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything |
|
Definition
| happens as it does happen: IN it no value exists--and if it did exist, it would have no value. 6.41 |
|
|
Term
| If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the |
|
Definition
| case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. 6.41 |
|
|
Term
| What makes what happens and what is the case non-accidental cannot lie WITHIN the world, since if it did |
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Definition
| it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world 6.41 |
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| It is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is |
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| It is clear that ethics cannot be put into |
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| WhWhen an ethical law of the form, 'Thou shalt...', is laid down, one's first thought is, 'And what if I do not |
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| do it? It is clear, however, that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. 6.422 |
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| There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the |
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Definition
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| It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. And the will as |
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| phenomenon is of interest only to psychology. 6.423 |
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| If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the |
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| facts--not what can be expressed by means of language. 6.43 |
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| In short the effect of the good or bad exercise of the will must be that it becomes an altogether different |
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| At death the world does not alter, but |
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Term
| Death is not an even in life: we do not live to experience |
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Definition
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Term
| If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to |
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Definition
| those who live in the present. 6.4311 |
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Term
| Our life ha no end in just the way in which our visual field has |
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Definition
|
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Term
| is not eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present ife? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies |
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Definition
| OUTSIDE space and time. 6.4312 |
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Term
| HOW things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal |
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Definition
| himself IN the world. 6.432 |
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| The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its |
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| It is not HOW things are in the world that is mystical, |
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Definition
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| To view the world from the viewpoint of eternity is to view it as a |
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Definition
| whole--a limited whole. 6.45 |
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| Feeling the world as a limited whole--it is this that is |
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| When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the |
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Definition
| question be put into words. The RIDDLE does not exist. 6.5 |
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Term
| If a question can be framed at all |
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Definition
| it is also POSSIBLE to answer it. |
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| Skepticism is NOT irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no |
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Definition
| questions can be asked. 6.51 |
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Term
| Doubt can exist only whre a question exists, a question only where an answer exists and an answer |
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Definition
| only where something CAN BE SAID. 6.51 |
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| We feel that even whe ALL POSSIBLE scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life |
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Definition
| remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.6.52 |
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| The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the |
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Definition
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Term
| There are things that cannot be put into words. They MAKE THEMSELVES MANIFEST. They are what is |
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Definition
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Term
| The correct method in philosophy would really be the following:; to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. |
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Definition
| propositions of natural science--i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person--he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy--THIS method would be the only strictly correct one. 6.53 |
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Term
| Wittengenstein's propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands him |
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Definition
| eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them--as steps--to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world again. 6.54 |
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| What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in |
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