Term
| Bierman v. City of NY (1969) |
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Definition
| Judge Younger invoked “substantial justice” by rejecting that she needed to find an exact source. Strict liability should apply (reasons include cost spreading, deterrence, responsibility/fairness). On appeal: the court can permit an inference of negligence (water mains do not just burst for no reason) was due to the city and strict liability does not apply |
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Term
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Definition
P is burned and injured when playing with exposed trolley wires above a bridge.
Cardozo held that D should not be found negligent since this type of injury has never occurred before and therefore could not have been foreseen. D took reasonable precautions and couldn’t have foreseen “bizarre accidents.”
NOTE: this case was a question of fact of whether a reasonable person would leave the wires exposed, which jury decided in favor of P, but Cardozo said jury got it wrong and decided it was a matter of law and found it favor of D. |
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Term
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Definition
Wheelchair collapsed on bus.
The court held that the “utmost care” standard no longer applies to common carriers with advance in technology.Moved the standard for common carriers to reasonable person standard.
Also stated standards of care should be 1) external, 2) objective, 3) uniform to provide flexibility to circumstances regardless of the “actor.” |
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Term
| Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co. |
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Definition
D cab driver jumped out of a cab when held at gunpoint and cab hit a family on the sidewalk.
No liability because self-preservation comes first for a reasonable person.
Example of applying the reasonable person standard to circumstances of an emergency doctrine. Cab driver acted as reasonable person would in the particular emergency. |
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Term
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Definition
D was compared to a reasonable epileptic person and not found liable for crashing into P’s bike shop during a seizure.
His actions at the relevant time were wholly beyond his control (unconscious), but per Roberts v. Ramsbottom if the driver retained some control (even if imperfect – i.e. stroke), and the driving was below the required standard for a reasonable person, the driver remains liable (can always pull over and stop driving if driving is impaired, but not unconscious).
A person with a physical disability (i.e. blindness) is held to the standard of ordinary care expected of a reasonable person with a disability (i.e. blind person). |
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Term
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Definition
D hit two cars and drove away, claiming she freaked out. The court refused to accept her mental disability as a defense because:
-Mental deficiencies are easy to fake.
-hose with mental illnesses should pay for the damages their illnesses cause (rather than innocent victims)
-Liability will encourage family members to take care of mentally disabled and make sure they don’t cause accidents. |
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Term
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Definition
P 13 year old girl who was killed by D’s train when crossing the tracks.
Court held that it was error in instructing jury that women are held to different standards than men (women are not less careful than men). Age, however, is a relevant characteristic: did she act like the reasonable 13 year old? (this does not apply when children are engaged in adult activities--such as driving) |
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Term
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Definition
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Term
| U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co. |
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Definition
Barge owned by US (P) sinks when operator (D) absent from barge.
Learned Hand formula: J. Hand held that if the burden of precaution was less than the probability of accident times the potential loss associated with injury, D should be found negligent. If the burden of precaution was greater than the probability of accident times the cost of the harm, then no negligence.
Also took into account custom and the "reasonable bargee" |
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Term
| Grimshaw v. Ford (CA 1981) |
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Definition
| Pinto had a design defect that caused the fuel tank to be easily punctured up on low-impact, rear-end collisions.
D had conducted their own B |
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Term
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Definition
P-tenant was injured when fell through glass door of shower and showed evidence that it was customary to use shatterproof glass since 1950s.
Custom reflects the expectation of society and may be used to prove that D has fallen below a recognized standard. It shows whether it is feasible to prevent (engineering and cost). It is evidence of reasonable care but is not conclusive of negligence. |
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Term
| Sheeley v. Memorial Hospital |
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Definition
P brought suit for complications in OB/GYN procedure conducted by D, a family practitioner in RI.
Trial court refused to allow P’s expert witness, an OB/GYN based on similar locality rule.
The S. Ct. abandoned the rule and moved to national standard as medical practices are widely nationalized today. |
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Term
| Martin v. Herzog (NY 1920 – Cardozo) |
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Definition
P no headlights on (violating statute). D crosses center lane. Car accident.
Court holds that a violation of a statute is not just evidence of negligence it IS the standard of care. Must show respect to legislative statutes (representative of the people), but note that the court is choosing to adopt the statute for it still has the power to interpret common law under judicial independence. |
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Term
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Definition
P are hit by car while walking on right side of a high way, though a statute says pedestrians must walk on the left (opposite traffic).
This was NOT NPS for a statute does not define a standard of care under all possible circumstances.
Distinguished from Martin v. Herzog: 1) by limiting that ruling to safety statutes and saying the Telda statute was not a safety statute, just a rule about highway conduct 2) legislature would not have intended pedestrians to subject themselves to more danger by walking against heavy traffic. |
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Term
| Byrne v. Boadle (Ct. of Exchequer 1863) |
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Definition
A barrel of flour fell out of a window and hit P on the head as he was walking by and unable to show what happened.
The Ct held that the falling of the barrel is prima facie evidence of negligence (falling barrel implies some negligence) |
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Term
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Definition
| P driving behind D’s tractor trailer when D’s spare tire came loose and crashed into the windshield of P’s car. The Ct held RIL applied, permits, but doesn’t compel, an inference of negligence. Outer limits of RIL |
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Term
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Definition
P underwent surgery and resulted in injury to right shoulder.
Although P was unable to demonstrate what instrumentality caused the injury and who’s exclusive control it was in, the Ct. applied RIL because: 1) Ds had to exercise ordinary care and each would be liable unless one provided rebuttable evidence of his/her innocence, 2) unreasonable to as P to prove what D did while unconscious, 3) should be enough that P can show injury resulting from external force applied while unconscious during surgery.
Trying to smoke out Ds |
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Term
| Larson v. St. Francis Hotel (CA 1948) |
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Definition
P sued D alleging chair hit them during VJ Day out of hotel window.
Ct. granted motion to dismiss because Ct. says that RIL does not apply considering it was unreasonable for the hotel to foresee a guest throwing a chair out a window (and hotel was probably not the negligent party). |
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Term
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Definition
| Security guard left post to get lunch and causes car accident. P sues employer and employee. D-Co. argues that guard was not acting within scope of employment. Ct. holds that determination of whether guard was within scope is question for the jury, not a legal question. |
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Term
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Definition
P went to hospital for ab scans and surgery and a complication led to further hospitalization. Radiologist (independent contractor) misread scans.
Apparent agency doctrine prevents a principal (hospital) from denying the authority of an agent (radiologist) when the principal (hospital) permitted an appearance of authority in the agent (radiologist), justifying a third-party’s reliance upon that appearance.
P has no relationship with the agent (never saw radiologist) nor did patient have a choice. Relying on principal (hospital) to provide suitable care. NOTE: If hospital had sign giving notice that doctors are not employees, then no liability. |
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Term
| MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co (NY 1916 Cardozo) |
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Definition
| P brought car from dealership, which purchased from D (Buick). Injury arises due to defective wooden wheel. J. Cardozo held that everyone has a duty to act reasonably to prevent foreseeable accidents. This decision overruled the privity (special relationship) doctrine (need direct relationship to have duty) because it is foreseeable that when you sell a car, people will purchase from dealership and drive it. |
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Term
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Definition
| Where P paralyzed after jumping off D’s boat into shallow water. Ct. held no privity (special relationship) existed to place affirmative duty on D as a social host. Ct. said P can establish privity only if D had custody of P under circumstances in which P was deprived of normal opportunities to protect himself. Superior knowledge of a dangerous condition by itself in absence of a duty to provide protection is insufficient to establish liability in negligence. Also, difference between action and inaction. |
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Term
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Definition
| P- Farwell and friend drank and made advances to girls near a restaurant. P was then severely beaten by D. Friend drove P around for several hours and left him in the car of the driveway of his grandparents where they found him unconscious. He later died. The Ct held that a special relationship existed (partners in social venture) engaged in a common undertaking. Friend also voluntarily assisted (partial rescue) P and had the duty to use reasonable care for protection of P instead of exacerbating the P’s situation (by leaving him where he wouldn’t be found until much later). |
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Term
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Definition
P 81 year old broke her hip and D prescribed best rest instead of surgery which led to deterioration of her condition.
The Ct imposes an affirmative duty of informed consent with doctor-patient fiduciary relationship (not just restricted to invasive procedures) and uses the reasonable patient standard (minority rule) – for a doctor to disclose information a reasonable patient would want under the circumstances to encourage self-determination and not impose doctor’s values onto patient.
Under a reasonable doctor standard (majority rule), a doctor would disclose information a reasonable physician would give under the circumstances. |
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Term
| Tarasoff v. Regents of UC |
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Definition
D treats patient who kills P. Killer told D he was going to kill P. The Ct held that it is in the public interest for therapist to warn third-parties when a patient poses a serious threat to persons or property. There is no duty to warn the world but a duty to an identifiable victim and further defined therapist-patient relationship as fiduciary and superimposed that onto the therapist-third party. CA adopted a multi-factor test to determine duty to warn:
• Foreseeability of harm to third-party
• Harm to third-party and it’s closeness to physicians conduct
• Moral blame attached to physician’s failure to warn
• Policy of preventing future harm
• Burden on physician resulting from imposing the duty and its consequences on community
• The availability cost and prevalence of insurance. |
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Term
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Definition
D (doctor) didn’t tell patient that her blood transfusion was contaminated with HIV. The patient then had sex and the P (sex partner) contracted HIV and died.
The court relied on Tarasoff and held that D (doctor) owed a duty to P despite the lack of doctor-patient relationship. Note the causal relationship – if patient had been told at the time of transfusion, then she would’ve warned P (or had the duty to) and D would not have been infected. |
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Term
| Randi W. v. Muroc School Dist. |
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Definition
| P is molested student who sues school for negligently misrepresenting a former teacher in recommendation letters to new school. They old school knew history of sexual misconduct. The Ct held that old school (D) owed duty to third-persons (P) to not actively misrepresent the facts in describing the qualifications and character of a former employee if making such misrepresentations would present a FORESEEABLE risk of injury to another (action, not inaction). The court considered some of the “CA-factors” of Tarasoff: foreseeability and causality; moral blame; availability of insurance and public policy. |
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Term
| A.W. v. Lancaster School Dist. |
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Definition
| A student was molested in a school bathroom after teachers and admin failed to stop/escort a strange man out of the school. The court held that there is a duty owed to P, but that foreseeability (of the sexual assault) is not a question of duty, but a question of reasonable care and therefore is a question for the jury (not a party of duty analysis.) Duty exists in special categories of cases, not particulars of a case. |
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Term
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Definition
| ConEd has 25-hr power failure throughout NYC and P fell down stairs of dark basement to get water. Ct. held that ConEd was grossly negligent, but had no duty to tenant (only to building owner who paid bill for lights on stairwell). Liability limited by contractual relationships (customers/landlords only). Otherwise, ConEd would be liable to all non-customers (>8 million people) and it would be “crushing liability.” The more people injured by an actor’s gross negligence, the less responsibility for injuries incurred. Pure policy argument. |
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Term
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Definition
NY had statute indicating that schools were mandated to check for scoliosis. School failed to check. P developed scoliosis and sued D for violating statute. If the statute does not specifically say that the gov is liable for not enforcing statute (explicit duty).
Courts employ a 3-part test to see if there is implied duty: 1) Is P part of class the statute was intended for? 2) Does it promote legislative purpose? 3) Creation of liability right would be consistent with legislative scheme?
Ct. held that holding school liable was inconsistent with creation of legislative scheme because there is an administrative body to handle oversight, so it was not intended to be handled by tort law. |
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Term
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Definition
P was terrorized by ex for 6 months and was refused police protection on multiple occasions. Ex later hired thug to throw acid in P’s face.
The Ct. held that police have no liability relying on crushing liability policy reasons. |
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Term
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Definition
The court recognized the general rule that there is no duty to provide police protection to an individual, excepting a special relationship, with reliance, the elements which are:
-an assumption by municipality through promises or action of an affirmative duty to act
-knowledge by municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm
- some form of direct contact between municipality’s agents and injured party
- a party’s justifiable reliance on municipality’s undertaking |
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Term
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Definition
P’s son died and Med Examiner reported homicide after autopsy. Police investigated P’s father as primary suspect. ME later discovered death was natural and failed to notify police who continued to investigate for over a year.
Ct. held that gov’t didn’t owe a duty to P. Distinguished between discretionary acts (subject to immunity) v. ministerial acts (subject to liability). Though ME’s acts were ministerial, no duty found because of policy reasons not to limit orbit of liability and P not fulfilling the Cuffy factors or proving that duty was owed to him. |
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Term
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Definition
P came to D’s house for bible study and slipped on black ice outside of home.
The Ct. held that P was a licensee because D did not derive any material benefit from P’s visit, nor was the house open to the general public (only to select members of church), so D only owed duty to warn of known dangers. |
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Term
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Definition
P visiting his daughter at hospital and slipped on snow at front when exiting.
The Ct. held that the common law distinctions between licensees and invitees should be abolished and there is a duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of premises for protection of lawful visitors. Discussed reasonableness factors (i.e. foreseeability of harm, entrant’s purpose, expected use of premises, ect.) Incentive for hospital (and other commercial premises) to make conditions safer. |
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Term
| Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman |
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Definition
| Man was hit by train crossing the tracks. Court said he was familiar with cross and should’ve taken more precaution when crossing. Court held even if you as an individual were contributory negligence then you would lose the lawsuit even if the D was completely negligent. Holmes say this has to do with conduct and not facts and dismisses case (since there was contributory negligence). Matter of law, not fact. |
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Term
| Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co. |
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Definition
| Man hit by train at train crossing. Distinguishes from Goodman by saying Goodman is specific to a certain set of facts and that the facts should be left to the jury (as to whether he exercised reasonable care when crossing the train tracks). Matter of fact for jury, not law for judge. |
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Term
| Rylands v. Fletcher (Exchequer Chamber & House of Lords) |
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Definition
| The Ct imposed strict liability upon one who introduces a hazardous condition upon his property that, upon its escape, causes harm to another. D’s reservoir broke flooding P’s mine. Ct. held that while an actor is not absolutely liable for perils associated with natural activities on his land, the actor is liable for perils associated with non-natural activities that affect neighboring land. |
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Term
| Indiana Harbor Belt RR v. American Cyanamid Co |
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Definition
| Held that a shipper of hazardous chemicals is held to a negligent standard and strict liability may only be imposed when a high degree of risk associated with an activity cannot be eliminated through due care. |
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Term
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Definition
| Waitress takes bottle out of fridge and it explodes, cutting her. RIL with products liability, would not have occurred without defect. Concurrence: should be absolute liability. Manufacturer is responsible for an injury to any person who comes in lawful contact with the product. Arguments for absolute liability: deterrence, allocational efficiency, cost spreading |
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Term
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Definition
| Held that a jury could’ve found that the roasting pan’s overall utility for cooking low-volume foods outweighed the risk of injury when cooking heavier foods, but the product was unsafe for the purpose for which it was marketed and sold and, as such, was defective under the consumer-expectations test. |
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Term
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Definition
P removed safety guards on saw. Blade fell off and cut him. Warnings explicitly told him not to remove the guards. P said the warnings should’ve warned him that the blade could come loose. Ct. looks to content, placement, format etc.
Ct. held that manufacturer does not have a duty to warn about everything, only has to give a reasonable warning as D did. |
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Term
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Definition
P had silicone breast implant explode and cause injury. Manufacturer didn’t know at the time of the implant that it was dangerous. Ct held that the manufacturer can’t warn against something they don’t know about so not going to apply strict liability for hindsight. Ct is only going to weigh D’s knowledge of product at time of sale.
Manufacturer held to reasonable expert standard for warning, must: 1) Do reasonable testing prior to marking 2) Manufacturer charged with knowing what reasonable testing is 3) D may not be held to duty to warn about risk they discover after sale (only in some jurisdictions) |
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Term
| Affirmative Defenses to Product Liability |
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Definition
A. Pre-emption: says that the P has no right to bring case in court (total defense)
B. Learned Intermediary
C. Contributory Negligence
D. Comparative Negligence
E. Unreasonable Use
F. Sophisticated User |
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Term
| Scope of Employment Test (Christensen v. Swenson; Birkner Test) |
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Definition
a. Conduct was the kind employee was hired to perform
b. Conduct was within the spatial and temporal boundaries of employment
c. Conduct was motivated (in part) to serve employer’s interest |
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Term
| Exceptions – Special Relationships |
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Definition
a. Physician-Patient
b. Common Carriers
c. Innkeepers
d. Premises liability
e. Partial rescue
f. “Partners in Social Ventures” (Farwell v. Keaton)
g. Parent-child (custodian-child)
h. Employer-employee
i. Causing the harm |
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Term
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Definition
Vicarious liability--Employee committed unreasonable act or omission (subject to scope of employment test). Note: vicarious liability can apply in other legal relationships.
Direct claim--company's policy lead employee to commit negligent act (company unreasonable)
Not applicable to intentional torts |
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Term
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Definition
| Location, hours, conduct (work related?), and whether it serves the employer's interest |
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Term
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Definition
Rossler v. Novak
a. Representation by the principal (can be implicit)
b. Reliance on that representation by a third-party
c. A change in a position by a third-party in reliance on that representation (i.e. misreading of scans led to harm) |
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Term
| Soule v. General Motor Corp. |
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Definition
| Design defect: designed in such a way that this happened, but shouldnt have." Didn't cause crash--> caused injuries. Crashworthiness. Used RAD and consumer expectation test (both are used in CA) |
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Term
| Camacho v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd |
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Definition
| Motorcycle accident. "Crashworthiness" greater injury because of design. Rely on RAD in crashworthiness to assess design. Note: assumption of risk doctrine applies. |
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Term
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Definition
| Who should be liable? Doctor is learned intermediary, they prescribed the drugs and have duty to warn--therefore drug companies absolved from liability. Not applied in most states. Arguments against: direct contact between drug companies and consumers (ads, webmd, etc.), and without doesn't mean Dr. isn't also liable. |
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Term
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Definition
| Dr. didn't have relationship with patient--no duty. Drs cannot always been on call (Hurley), however, if there were evidence beyond the nurse's interaction that he had taken them on as a patient--duty (Nash v. Royster). |
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Term
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Definition
| RockCreak Parkway: 2 claims: neg and inadequate warning. Is it ministerial or discretionary? Only applies with social, political, or economic goals. Fine line between discretionary and non-discretionary. |
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Term
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Definition
| Question as to whether D's unreasonable act or omission caused accident. Did the lack of life-preservers cause the death? No he might've died anyways. But for causation. However, when creating a complex counterfactual hypothetical it can become complex. |
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Term
| Stubbs v. City of Rochester |
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Definition
| Water contaminated, Plaintiff contracts typhoid. You can't see causation in this case, must rely on affirmative expert opinion and epidemiology. Only way for P to recover. Not allocational efficiency. |
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Term
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Definition
| PPH. Was it an overdose that killed her? No stats or tests on Danocrine. Again, expert testimony is relied upon. Judge is gatekeeper and must determine the reliability of expert testimony (factors: peer reveiwed? tested? Margin of error? generally accepted theory? Plausible?). |
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Term
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Definition
| Do we permit recovery for loss of chance of life? (Dr was negligent in not ordering tests, found cancer too late). P have to show whether Drs' timely intervention made a difference. 50% rule as to rate of survival has no deterrent effect. Proportional damages with loss of chance of survival, requires death. |
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Term
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Definition
| 2 Ds shooting quail, P gets shot. Not acting in concert.50-50 likelihood each of them did it--problematic as common law requires more likely than not (more than 50%). However, both were negligent. Court applies joint and several liability: both are liable for 100% but P cannot collect more than 100%. This is liability without causation. Rare case. |
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Term
Concerted action
Independent and concurring causes
Alternative Liability |
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Definition
Joint and several liability, assume they are one. Agreement can be tacit (doesn't have to be explicit)
Simultaneous and coincidental act. Sufficient but not necessary; the other one would've done it. Substantial factor test
Summers v. Tice. 2 Def's only one of them could've done it, both are negligent, it's 50/50, Burden of causation switches to defendants to show they didn't do it, if they cannot they are joint and severally liable. |
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Term
| Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. |
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Definition
No question DES caused these cancers (signature disease), issue is which pharmacies supplied it. Market Share: proportionate liability in probability. Here the probability is that any one of them caused it and over a large enough sample it ends up proportionate the injury actually caused. P should not have to bear the cost just because there are so many wrongdoers. No exculpation, without joint and several liability P won't get 100% (dissent thinks that there should be several liability with exculpation).
For this standard to be applied need identical products, which is rare. |
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Term
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Definition
| Eggshell plaintiff: D takes the P as they find them |
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Term
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Definition
| Test: was negligent? Was any damage foreseeable; Was the damage the direct and traceable result of the chain of events that were started by the negligence? |
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Term
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Definition
| Rejects Polemis, foreseeability is the standard. Test: Was there negligence? If so, was the particular harm foreseeable? |
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Term
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Definition
Exploding rat poison
Foreseeability test: was specific harm foreseeable? (different from Wagonmound--don't look at negligence). Here, if it was not the accident anticipated, not negligent |
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Term
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Definition
| 3rd party issues. Failure to prune bush led to the assault by another party. Substantial factor test: was of the general nature that is foreseeable? |
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Term
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Definition
| Cardozo. Guard who helped man on train caused man to drop package, explosion which caused weights to fall on P's head. Guard has no duty to P, relationship too indirect. Limit to what is foreseeable otherwise unlimited liability. |
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Term
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Definition
| If there was physical contact, and then miscarriage, then P would be liable (eggshell plaintiff), no contact, no liability for harm. |
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Term
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Definition
| Husband stuck by car, didn't hit wife. Wife frightened and becomes physically sick. If there is no contact you need physical manifestations of fear, and severe emotional trauma. No eggshell psyche, must be reasonable fear. |
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Term
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Definition
Ps see a plane about to crash, claim to have been terrified might crash on them. Ct. denied because:
The fear was short-lived
It would open up unlimited liability
The people in the plane should have priority in claim (limited pool of damages)
Company already deterred by regulations and other suits from passengers |
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Term
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Definition
| Asbestos case, fear of developing cancer. Physical contact doesn't apply: no immediate harm. Must be fear of sudden traumatic injury |
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Term
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Definition
| Severed leg case. Reasonable person would've been terrified. Here there is no fear of physical harm, just sudden traumatic injury. Ct. still find liability. Exceptional case: funeral home has duty to deal with emotional distress of bereaved, sort of special relationship. |
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Term
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Definition
| Child slowly dies trapped in elevator. Different from Falzone: no fear for her own safety. Bystander case, uses factors set forth in Dillon v. Legg: proximity to the accident, directly perceived, legally recognized close relationship. They also add the factor of severity of injury. Most courts don't recognize these kinds of cases. |
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Term
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Definition
| Affirmative defense. If P was negligent, P could not recover at all. Does not apply for intentional torts or recklessness. |
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Term
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Definition
Drunk driving accident, died during subsequent surgery. Info about Ps drunkeness would be prejudicial to jury. However, it was important to the allocation of damages, should bifurcate the issues. Doctors cannot have negligence nullified by patient's previous negligence.
Exceptions: lying about medical history, not following directions |
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Term
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Definition
| Tubing, hurts ankle, sues, but signed a waiver. Hyson-here waiver was clear enough. Not enforceable given the Tunkl Factors. Dissent finds the opposite, asserts the recreational nature of the activity. |
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Term
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Definition
Almost all jurisdictions have abandoned contributory negligence and have adopted one of two models of comparative negligence:
1. Pure
a. Where P only recovers the amount that D is liable for
b. (i.e. if P is 90% negligent and D is 10% negligent, then D can only recover 10%)
2. Modified
a. If P’s negligence is not as great as D’s negligence, P can recover
b. (i.e. if P was 70% negligent and D was 30% negligent, P does NOT recover)
c. (i.e. if P and D are both 50% negligent, P does NOT recover)
d. (i.e. if P was 45% negligent and D was 55% negligent, P can recover) |
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Term
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Definition
Compensatory: In general, pain and suffering, past and future; medical expenses etc.
Nominal-because rights were violated set amount, not necessarily injury.
Punitive-egregious behavior; willfull misdeed, only available if intentional/malicous |
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Term
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Definition
Interrupts chain of causation
New defendant liable for additional harm
Comet or murderer (intentional torts can be a superceding cause depending upon the jurisdiction) |
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Term
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Definition
Foreseeable
Ex: rescuer harms already harmed plaintiff
Defendant liable for additional injury |
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Term
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Definition
Inference of circimstance
Accident is of the kind that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence
Agency/instrumentality is in exclusive control of the defendant
Not due to the voluntary action of plaintiff |
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Term
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Definition
| Action brought by decedent's representative, for death |
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Term
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Definition
| Action brought by estate when plaintiff injures defendant and defendant dies pending trial |
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Term
| Affirmative Defense to Negligence |
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Definition
contributory
comparative
immunities
assumption of risk |
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Term
| Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress |
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Definition
Zone of physical danger--could've happened to them
Suffer severe emotional distress
Physical manifestations
Case Falzone
Bystander
Direct observation: temporally and proximately
Closely, legally related to the victim
Death/serious injury to victim |
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Term
| Affirmative Defenses to Intentional Torts |
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Definition
Consent
Protected privilege
Necessity |
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Term
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Definition
Intent to place in reasonable apprehension of immediate contact
Plaintiff is placed in this apprehension |
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Term
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Definition
Intent to impose restraint
Substantially total restraint
No reasonable means of escape
It must be aware
Against plaintiff's will |
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Term
| Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress |
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Definition
Intent of harm or recklessness
Outrageous conduct
Causal connection between conduct and distress
Severe emotional distress, no eggshell psyche |
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Term
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Definition
Must have touch
Doesn't need to cause injury
Objects attached to person |
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