Term
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Definition
| added to 84-85 CBA stipulated a team could resign one player that would put them over the salary cap. hope was that rule would aid small market teams in retaining their players. players can become FAs, but incentivize remaining with current team. |
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Term
| 2 clauses made free agency ineffectual after the merger of the ABA and NBA |
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Definition
| Rozelle rule and right of first refusal |
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Term
| Rozelle Rule and Right of first refusal |
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Definition
Rozelle: any team that signed a FA had to give compensation back as determined by commisioner
Right of first refusal: meant that the team losing a player could match any offer. kept FA bids low as teams didn't want other teams driving up prices |
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Term
| 84/85 CBA (NBA) additions |
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Definition
Salary cap set b/n 48-53% of DGR..players agreed because thought owners were losing money
and the Bird Exception
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Term
| DGR: definition and calculation |
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Definition
defined growth revenue
national and local media money + gate revenues (more than 80% of NBA revenues) |
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Term
| 1991 NBA players union did what? |
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Definition
| brought a grievance against league claiming owners were hiding money (keeping salary cap artificially low). Union must always be aware how teams are reporting money. |
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Term
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Definition
| One time head of NBA players union but fired for stealing money. |
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Term
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Definition
| Replaced Grantham, had been working in commissioner's office...negotiated the 95/96 CBA which included 3 new additions (weakening of Bird Exception, got rid of mid-level exception, implemented 7 year max on contracts) |
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Term
| NBA CBA of 95/96 additions (3) |
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Definition
| 1. weakening of Bird Exception so a player had to have spent three years with team to qualify (previously only 1). 2. got rid of Mid-level exception,which had been in place to create a "middle class" in union. 3. implemented 7 year max on contracts and restricted balloon payments so a contract could not have an annual increase greater than 20%. |
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Term
| 1998 player work stoppage because displeased w/gourdine's CBA. New deal negotiated by... |
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Definition
| Billy Hunter (still union leader). Unhappy with the stratification in union as a result of new middle level. John Stockton leaked union info to Larry Miller (jazz owner) indicating disarray of union |
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Term
| 1999 compromise to end work stoppage included: |
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Definition
1. DGR broadened to Basketball related income (BRI = DGR + 40% of luxury box revenue + 40% of signage + 40% of personal seat licensing).
2. Salary cap 48% of BRI
3. Bird exception stayed, mid level reinstated (each team could have one player for each per year)
4. Implementation of Escrow System. intention was to turn the soft salary cap (because of exceptions) into a hard cap |
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Term
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Definition
1. teams withheld 10% of every player's salary which would be kept by owners, shared, or returned to players' depending on players share of BRI
Example: say BRI is 3 billion (100 mill/team), cap is 48 million (48% of team's BRI), the escrow level is 55 mill and luxury tax at 61.1% |
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Term
| 1999 compromise also implented: |
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Definition
| 1. minimum salaries, rookies had lowest and then it was scaled up for veterans. |
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Term
| Changes to CBA since 1999: |
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Definition
Escrow level raised from 55% to 57%, contracts max lowered to 6 years for bird players and 5 for everyone else.
Labor strife now because owners want 35% reduction in players' salaries and there is almost no revenue sharing. 6 million is the max amount.
(look into developments here) |
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Term
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Definition
| NFL responded by hiring scabs, union called off strike |
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Term
| In 1989, NFL players filed... |
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Definition
| an AT suit against the NFL over free agency. System was in place at the time dictated that teams could reserve 37 of 45 players on their rosers (8 free agents) |
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Term
| Bill Radovich vs. NFL (he got blacklisted from NFL and sued them on AT grounds) |
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Definition
| Supreme court agreed that NFL did not have AT exemption as Baseball....free agency allowed with Rozelle Rule |
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Term
| John Macey challenged the rozelle rule and won, but NFL PA bargained away what they had won to compensate people previously affected by the rule |
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Definition
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Term
| Mcneil Case sued for players' right to free agency |
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Definition
| and won based on AT (won $189 million), players formed a union and reached a CBA for the first time in 1993 and extended up until current labor situation. |
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Term
| 1993 CBA to present...what did it entail |
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Definition
CBA had a salary cap and FA. salary cap based on DGR (gate revs +media + spillover. stadium revenues were excluded.
2. spillover is how much greater the ratio of Expected DGR/total revenue is from one year to the next (take additional percentage of EDGR and add to salary cap)
3. salary cap fluctuated based on ratio of player compensation/DGR, it would increase if ratio was below .6 and increase if it was above .67...salary cap steadied out at around 62/63% (no team allowed below 50%).
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Term
| There was an incentive to renew the deal because in last year there would be no salary cap (incentive for owners). for players, you couldn't reach free agency until six years (as opposed to four). other provision is that contract can't go beyond two years of CBA, so limited contract length |
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Definition
franchise tag, team gets right to resign free agent if they pay the player the average of the top 5 salaries at his position
2. transition tag, sign player for average of top 10 salaries at his position. |
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Term
| Current contentious points of NFL CBA: (4) |
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Definition
1. owners now want firm rookie scale (pay according to draft pick
2. nfl doesn't guarantee contracts...nfl players get signing bonuses instead...signing bonuses can be manipulated so that the cap hit for one year is diminished
3. players only get medical benefits for 5 years after retiring, do not want to extend to 18 game season...to qualify for medical benefits, have to be in league for 3 years
4. owners get 5% off top for league costs, and players give owners a credit to build stadiums. |
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Term
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Definition
1. DGR + spillover turned into total revenue
2. player's share reduced to 57% then 59%, then increase above 59%, any team that went above had to give back the next year...trigger system
3. overall, players got a little more money and owner's had more security
4. owners still want to reduce revenue base by 18%, dislike "trigger system" |
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Term
| Revenue Sharing and the NFL (5) |
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Definition
1. national media and licensing distributed whole league
2. gate sharing 2/3 to home team; 1/3 for league
3. supplemental revenue sharing (SRS) money given from rich to poor
4. about 75% of all revenue is shared in the NFL
5. low market teams feel hurt by '06 agreement, because increase in revenue of large teams (cowboys/ny's stadiums) result in a salary increase for small teams....want more sharing. |
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Term
| NFL overall is the most... |
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Definition
1.balanced leauge with highest sharing, also: reverse draft, no extra revenue for making playoffs, bad teams get lighter schedule, tight cap
2. No relation between payroll and win percentage
3. additional trouble: owners against revenue sharing as some teams get public funding, while others build own franchise with private money(i.e. Kraft vs. Cinncinnati)...agree on reducing players' base by 18%
4. revenue does not equal profit!!!
5. currently: 5% off immediately, stadium subsidies and players if building new stadium, 1 billion taking off top |
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Term
NHL
Historically had FA for players in league 10 years or older than 31
in 1980... |
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Definition
| introduced arbitration and salaries exploded |
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Term
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Definition
was NHL commssioner (released figures of players' salaries for arbitrators)
Followed by two lockouts...eventually reached an agreement in July 2005 |
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Term
New agreement in July 2005 which lasts through 2012
all salaries reduced by 24% |
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Definition
| salary set at 54% of hockey related revenues, which raised to 57% by 1% steps (hockey related revs = $104 million/team |
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Term
| NHL has instituted a cap since the last lockout--is a range and salaries have to fall in that range...escrow...estimated and adjusted each year---insures no team goes over a certain amount-no need for a luxury tax. |
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Definition
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Term
| Labor RElations/ INsurance |
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Definition
Teams offer longer and longer contracts because of competitive nature teams took out insurance policies on players. Insurance companies realized they were exposed after 9.11 and the steriod era (people getting hurt easier) started to offer less covereage----teams did not see it reasonable to insure a lot of players why leagues don't self insure-would benefit teams with most expensive and longest contracts.
Solution: make teams contribute to fund based on contract lengths---no salaries would allow teams to take more risk. |
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Term
| Why rich people don't get a long about the salary cap |
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Definition
| owners can't agree because they come from different markets; union politics---agents want to have a job---negotiations would be minimized if there is a salary cap...human nature everyone wants to better themselves and make more money. |
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Term
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Definition
pay people based on MRP
lowest salary with no free agency--reservation wage of player (opportunity cost)
highest salary with no FA = MRP
highest salary with FA = MRP
lowest salary with FA-$1 more than the next highest offer from another team...MRP is easiest to tell in baseball.
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Term
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Definition
TR of MLB = f(win%, win%t-1, market size, facility)
you can calculate the marginal value of a win and then you can dertermine how much each person contributes to that win
pitfalls of measuring MRP:
1) have to select best measurement of each category
2) imprecision in stats, because doesn't account for performance of other players + situational events (e.g. player's health, team chemistry)
3) relationship between categories may not be linear, hard to capture non-linearity of sports |
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Term
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Definition
1) owner's discrimination--paying minorities less, have discr. coefficients (would be better off if not discriminating)
2) co-workers discrimination -- dissipates over time
3) customer discrimination -- minorities offer less MRP, and therefore get paid less, no market pressure that can get rid of this type of discrimination. |
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Term
| How to tell discrimination? |
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Definition
| look at MRP and compare it to the salary, salary = f (race, perf) used to be case that minoriteis not hired as often...now they are hired, but what about salaries?? |
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Term
Wage disrcimination in 70s/80s of about 20% eliminated in 90s
french canadians in hockey seemmed to be discriminated
other possible discrimination: length of contracts (no study yet), exit and retention rate |
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Definition
Stacking? positional discrimination? blacks under represented in positions that require more thinking??
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Term
| Manager discrimination-under paid and under hired. how to tell: |
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Definition
1) compare results to previous year-forbes
2) look at previous 3 years--elias
3) run regression (win% on off. -def. perf) and compare to league, but lots of noise (e.g. health, team chemistry) seems to be the best method though. |
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Term
| League wide discrimination...limit on # of foreigners, mainly soccer |
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Definition
MLS limited to 3 foreigners
EPL limits each to 3 non-european players
objective to develop strong national players
fan discrimination--fans would rather see people form own country |
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Term
| Gender---have to look at MRP and see if there is discrimination. |
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Definition
tennis: women used to get less prize money, no partially equal
justified?: TV ratings, lenght and strength of games, history of game, highlights, sexuality
Golf: men have more prize money, what if there is customer discrimination?
have to look at revenues!!!
In some sense, a vicious circle. |
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Term
Competitive Balance
What is it? |
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Definition
| uncertainty in outcomes of games and season and uncertainty across seasons. |
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Term
| "when well managed teams have recurring hope of making the post season" optimal balance...depends on what league is trying to maximize?? |
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Definition
| Want MR of last win to be equal across all teams, want large market teams to win. |
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Term
Measurements of competitive balance:
Standard deviation of win pct.
idealized standard deviation
actual/ideal ratio standard deviation |
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Definition
1. (sqrt[sum{[WPi - WPav]^2}/n)...the smaller it is the less disparity in the leauge
2. standard deviation of perfect equality divided by # of games = .5/sqrt(n)
3. allows for comparison across leagues (=RSD) |
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Term
competitive balance:
NBA has the highest standard deviation...league has low revenue sharing, soft salary cap, easier for one player to dominate
NFL has lowest SD
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Definition
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Term
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Definition
another measurement method for comp. balance
general definition: A/(A+B)
Example: income distribution in the US:
the higher the coefficient (i.e. the higher area A, the more inequality exists |
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Term
correlation b/n wins and payroll:
high correlation in EPL
94% of variation in win % is explained by diff. in payrolls
EPL has no restrictions in labor market
MLB has |
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Definition
highest correlation among american sports leagues, others have a very low correlation
NHL, if doing well, payroll increases before trade deadline |
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Term
Competitive Balance MLB:
2002, MLB decided to increase revenue sharing:
each team taxed 35% on its net defined local revenue (tickets, local TV, advertising, minus stadium expenses)
funds from local revenue constitute straight pool systemL distributed in equal parts among teams |
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Definition
Revenue from national, international TV, internet and licensing is distributed via a split pool syste:
teams below the average revenue receieve funds
supposed to benefit poor/hurt rich
BUT CLIFF PROBLEM |
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Term
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Definition
| makes the marginal tax rate for bottom clubs higher than for top clubs (39% for top and 48% for bottom), because the increase in revenue results in less redistribution and rewards failure |
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Term
| changes in 2006 to reduce the problem: (3) |
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Definition
lowered the straight pool rate
based split pool system on four year avg.
hurt teams that did well in past four years (red sox) |
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Term
| historically, the idealized standard deviation over the past 100 years has |
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Definition
decreased: one particular reason is a talent compression, the talent difference used to be very high (babe ruth)
the trend stopped in 1990 and the standard deviation increased despite the introduction of revenue sharing... |
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Term
payroll coefficient of variation increased instead of getting compressed
2.having teams consistently at the top is not necessarily undesirable: adds incentinve to beat them, they might be in a larger market... |
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Definition
| so in particular, the bottom teams are important to focus on, and one is not sure if the division between top and bottom teams would be even worse without revenue sharing (i.e. cincinnatti reds) |
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Term
| Sports as part of US economy |
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Definition
MLB 2010 revenue was 6.5 billion (.0005% of US GDP)
but important to Amerians...public good, can't exlucde, can stil enjoy a team without ever paying a dime or going to a game.
sports create a sens of community
demand for sports is inelastic, meaning it price is insensitive and has a vertical demand curve |
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Term
| The most special part of sports economics: one team cannot meet the dmenad...must be some balance (10 NFC champs in 10 years)...a player's salary will be there MRP, because we can quantify sports players, we can test economic thoeries. |
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Definition
Are sports isolated from economic downturns...no not completely, attendance strong, although NFL has cut jobs and secondar market ticket prices have dropped.
TOM Hicks filed for bankruptcy (used to own half of Liverpool) |
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Term
| Business Model change of early ninetiesL |
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Definition
Larry Luchino at forefront of movement
moved camden yards to downtown baltimore...people would go after work, businesses would buy suites, spend dough...businesses are now more willingly to spend a lot on in stadium ads.
NFL is different b/c of the fact that there is only one game a week.
Luchino is important --zimbo has a hard on for him, the suites at stadiums are often the first things businesses cut |
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Term
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Definition
| was first person to organize baseball players into a labor union and in 1972 he was at the head of their first strike |
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Term
assume that firms maximize profits...what is an owner's objective function?
win a championship and remain fiscally sound (winning restricted by breaking even), positive popularity (increase in ego), owning a sports team is fun, buesiness contacts and building brand strength, |
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Definition
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Term
| short term vs. long term profit max |
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Definition
| "gentrification of the ballparks" -- moving stadiums downtown, made tickets affordable for middle class, open stadiums for warm ups...younger kids, is this a long run solution? |
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Term
| when did baseball become national pasttime? 1881 american association charged 25 cents a ticket, allowed drinking at games, played on sundays and beer magnates sponsered it. national leauge used to be only league. |
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Definition
| does an owner want to max operating income or all investments related to team? why did tom hicks pay Arod 252million?, hicks is thinking that having arod will raise the value of naming rights, i will be able to sell x many t shirts ,my other businesses will profit from a rod, etc. Japanese use baseball advertising, make loss with teams. |
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