Secularization

Definition

Secularization

Bruce Thesis

3 main paths:

• Monotheism --> rationality --> science -> technology -> technological consciousness
• Prot. Ref -> individualism -> propensity to schism -> schisms & sects -> literacy/voluntary association
• Messy Middle: Prot. Ref. -> Prot. ethic -> industrial capitalism -> economic growth -> social differentiation, structural differentiation
• soc. diff -> soc./cultural diversity (& egalitarianism) -> reli. diversity (& secular states) --> sects & churches moderate -> relativism
• structural diff. --> egalitarianism --> sec. states & liberal democracies -> compartmentalization/privatization (and moderation, relativism)

 

Secularization

Bruce Thesis

Notes

• (Individualism tract)
• propensity to schism: happens in the Catholic Church, too, but they mostly keep in contained w/in the church (which is part why southern Europe can have a Catholic near-monopoly and higher rates of activism [?])
• voluntary orgs.: people realize they can schism in other things than religion, Church stops providing everything
• Messy Middle:
• Protestant ethic: Calvinism, people want to know if they're on the good or bad list, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy to work hard & save

Secularization

Challenges to Secularization Theory

Overview (5 pts.)

• Comparative "golden age" of religion
• The US - exceptional case
• Believers vs. belongers
• Global religious revival
• Are rationality and religion really antithetical?

Secularization

Challenges to Secularization Theory

Comparative Golden Age of Religion

• supposedly the Middle Ages, but religious participation has actually increased - sacrilization has decreased
• Ex.: colonial US, labor shortage -> influx of young single men who didn't want to spend their Sundays in church!
• Ex.: Europe, mostly feudal/rural - traveling priests= empty churches
• most people often illiterate (including the clergy!) = content not great
• not a lot of respect for priests & services
• belief prob. high, but not well-cultivated (limited institutional reach)

Secularization

Challenges to Secularization Theory

The United States

• US = highly modernize & heavily churched! (~95% belief, ~50-60% attendance)
• Bruce response: 
• Americans lie about attendance b/c of social stigmas
• American religion not really religion (more psychological self-help clinics)
• Too tolerant to be genuine
• Reli. Right not successful
• Federalist system allows religious people to find a niche and make a lot of "noise"
• Reponse: 
• pluralism -> learning, not relativism
• To Trinity U's ARIS survey: diff. b/w belonging and believing

Secularization

Challenges to Secularization Theory

Believers vs. Belongers

• definitional issue: public vs. private belief
• supply vs. demand side issue
• Gill: higher % of people believe in God than attend church regularly
• bigger "god gap" = unsatisfied demand? - not being well-served by church services

Secularization

Challenges to Secularization Theory

Global Religious Revival

Are Religion & Rationality Really Antithetical?

• fundamentalism (esp. 1979 Iranian Rev. - also in Lat. Am., Africa, Asia)
• Trained scientists & well-educated people still believe in God - slightly less so, but not by much

Religious Economic Model

Micro Level

Religious Capital Def. & Notes

• religious capital - stockpile of knowledge & practice one accumulates
• type of "consumption capital" - the more you use, the more you enjoy it
• snowboard problem (suppliers need to bring you back until you actually LIKE their product)

Religious Economic Model

Micro Level

Religious Capital/Findings

(7 main pts)

• Iannaccone: the more churched people are, the less likely they'll be to switch religions
• Religious switching will be among more familiar/similar traditions
• The "unchurched" are the most likely to convert to exotic sects/cults
• Young are more likely to convert than old
• Conversions and religious growth are most likely to occur among social networks
• Religious intermarriage less common
• not an efficient use of resources
• tends to lead to people lose their religion, or the less religious spouse switches, usually the man
• Time-intensive (youth & retirees) vs. $-intensive (middle-aged)

Religious Economic Model

Meso Level/Organizational

Credence Goods (6 pts.)

• Religious goods are "credence goods" - a good wherein the quality cannot be determined until after it is purchased
• have to consider the message they're sending you

  ---

• focus on public testimony/witness (personal & w/grand buildings)
• sacrifice & martyrdom
• sacrifice: vows of poverty & chastity (televangelist paradox)
• martyrdom: must be good if  somebody is willing to die for it! (could have an opposite effect, too)
• trustworthy clergy
• economies of scale
• lots of clients = lots of people trust them
• ornate shrines (televangelist paradox resolved) - can send a signal that the religion is successful & God is smiling on them
• state support (coercion)

Religious Economic Model

Meso Level/Organizational

Religion as a collective action problem

(Paradox)

• How to get people to contribute to the supply of an intangible good that is difficult to establish property rights over?
• mostly voluntary contribution (some exceptions)
• Free riding is comparatively easy (depending on theology - won't necessary go to Hell if you don't pay up)
• Solution is a paradox! Strict churches tend to be the most dynamic denominations
• most partcipation, most mem.s,  fastest growth
• As you raise the cost (to a certain pt.), participation tends to increase!

Religious Economic Model

Meso Level/Organizational

Sacrifice, Stigma, & Exclusivity

• Reciprocal relationship b/w degree of lay commitment & degree of exclusivity in reli. orgs.
• They have solved the collective action problem!
• Religion is also a "club good," can be prevented from entering/leaving
• Sacrifices & stigmas weed out the free riders & improve quality of the club good (including welfare services)
• Strict religion is a good bargain - costly to get into but lots of benefits
• Mother Theresa & Vatican Council II
• Exclusivity creates a close social network w/in the church, enhancing reli. cap.
• Enhances monitoring for behavioral restrictions (Friday night basketball league)
• However, too much strictness will cut off other outside opportunities, thus the most strict churches have difficulty recruiting new members (Amish)

Religious Economic Model

Meso Level/Organizational

Other Organizational Issues

• To the extent that the clergy's professional incentives are tied to directly serving the flock, the organization will tend to be more dynamic
•    - whereas, when they are devoted on a day-to-day basis to advancing their own careers, the flock will flounder
• congregational (decentralized) org.s will be more successful than episcopal (hierarchical) org.s
•    - success has to do with how much is given to the cong.
•    - hierarchical: clergy get money from above, don't have to be tied to the congregation as much (Catholic Church = exception)

Religious Economic Model

Meso Level/Organizational

Why Mainstream Churches Decline (3 pts.)

• (mainstream clergy see less participation)
• increasing size leads to greater bureaucratization & a professional clergy, reducing exclusivity & hence commitment (starts at ~70-100 members)
• *policies standardized & renegades punished (now have to keep everything/one in check)
• *incentives of professional ecclesiastics altered (worry about their career, respond less to the congregation - at the *margin* - more intellectualized & elite faith - more conformity w/surrounding culture)
• *=schism likely, Church of Power

Religious Economic Model

Macro Level/Market

Definitions & Assumptions

• Religious market: the environment in which all religious "firms" compete for members
• market structure - pluralistic/monopolistic - affects incentives of reli. firms & corresponding level of societal religiosity
• reli. market structure largely determined by gov. policy
• assumption: religious preferences are naturally pluralistic

Religious Economic Model

Macro Level/Market

Pluralistic Religious Economies

• generate higher levels of religious participation/capital
• Different faiths/denominations satisfy different people's interests
• clergy need to work harder to avoid defections to other faiths (0-sum aspect of competition)
• clergy are inspired by the actions of other churches (learning from each other)

Religious Economic Model

Macro Level/Market

REM Scholars on Secularization (Summary)

• supply side question, demand pretty constant (secularization says constant supply, decreasing demand)
• reli. monopolies will not satisfy every demand, will not work as hard to maintain members, do not learn from other institutions of religion
• religious monopolies will seek to sacralize a society
• need government assistance (easy to start up a new religion - competition)
• both look at pluralism, but sec. theorists see that as something that will decrease demand for religion- REM theorists say it'll increase competition/overall quality --> fulfilled demand

Religious Economic Model

Macro Level/Market

The Church-State Bargain

• religious org.s tend to be vulnerable to competition (low start-up costs, easy to free ride, difficult to satisfy all)
• religious org.s will seek state protection (raise barriers to entry)
• gov.s see benefits in religious firms' moral authority and collective action potential
•    - collective action: if there's a group that can bring people together, you don't want them working against you!

• non-interference from other groups
•      - unless: sects rely on interference to get the word out
•      - state-supported religions
• freedom to practice
• core values (beliefs that promote adherence to faith, personal gains [spiritual or monetary])
• (mostly) codified rules - member accountability: punishment/raise funds to pay clergy or help community
• protect adherence from competition
• well-being of members 
• MAX members & activity (true believers)!
•      - measured by church attendance and money given (as a % of income)/time also works, depending on means

• political survival (Mancur Olson)
• collect taxes/conscription
• be developed not backwards - economic growth!

• self-interest & rational choice
•      - discount rate: how much you value your FUTURE, especially in relation to the present
•      - could extend the discount rate to beyond your life

Why do Reformations occur?

Definition

Assumptions

Logic of Arg.

• Reformation: efforts to restore or renew standards of religious belief & practice to a more demanding level, within a religious organization (Stark pg 16)
• Assumptions: SQ faiths tend toward laxity
• 3 main reasons: y=[X1*X2*X3]+c
• x3: royal self-interest - C-B analysis
• x2: responsive gov. - autocratic gov.s don't listen to public desire (Prot. = popular)
• x3: Catholic weakness - lack of public support from mass conversions
• c: theological appeal (doesn't really vary)

Church of Power vs. Church of Piety

313 CE - Opposing Viewpoints (4 pts.)

• State for establishment: moral authority, collective action potential (war & taxes!)
• State against establishment: not interested in piety except insofar as it will help you attain taxes & conscription - but it'll just be lax again in 2 generations, after Xtianity becomes top-down like Paganism became
• Church of Power/for establishment: more power and $, can influence policy w/church values & incorporate them into society, can be protected against other religions
• Church of Piety: church will become more hierarchical, not as many actual converts and less active participation - if state fails, church fails

Factors Influencing Christian Growth

(List, 5 pts.)

• Role of Virtue, Ethnicity, & Epidemics
• Network Conversions
• Class & Gender Basis
• Persecution & Martyrdom
• Organization + Religious/Political Opportunities

Rise of Christianity

Role of Virtue, Ethnicity, & Epidemics

• universal theology based on compassion for all (transcends ethnicity unlike the 12 tribes of Judaism)

• Hellenized Jews found Christianity appealing b/c it allowed them to avoid following strict Judaic law but still retain some cultural authority
• Offers Gentiles (incl. God-Fearers & Pagans) a monotheism w/out having to subscribe to Judaic law
• opens door for active proselytizing

• 2 major plagues plus several smaller ones
• Pagan response was to flee, Christian one was to nurture
• Built up immunities & established credibility

Rise of Christianity

Network Conversions

Class & Gender Basis

• Jewish apostles used connections to preach in synagogues until they got kicked out (think religious cap. in Judaism!)
• Differing mortality rates b/w Christians and Pagans alters ratio of Christians to Pagans and likely leads to greater social bonds b/w the two

• wealthy & women
• wealthy have the luxury of time to go listen to preaching & think about what's been said
• early Christianity survived largely because of wealthy benefactors
• Also had the ear of Constantine/other emperors
• Christianity was a good deal for women, too
• Pagan culture promoted male promiscuity, abortion (imposed and dangerous!), and female infanticide
• Christian women were more likely to marry a few years later
• Woman played a SIGNIFICANT role in early Christian leadership, until it became political and the Church of Power took over
• Women converted their husbands, suddenly more $ not being philandered & gambled (but w/a glass ceiling)

Rise of Christianity

Persecutions & Martyrdom

Organization + Poli/Reli Opportunities

• willingness of Christians to accept persecution & to WILLINGLY become martyrs sent a signal that this religion was worth it

• 2 important factors for success:
• 1, degree of state regulation of religion - lots of ways a gov. can control the religious market & Christianity got its foot in the door while the market was relatively free
• 2, vigor of pre-existing religious org.s - Paganism grew increasingly weak, increasing reliance on state support with less public support

Stark

Chapter 3, Witch Hunts

• main arg: Protestantism/monotheism --> witch hunts
• 3 reasons witch hunts happened: 
•    - 1, inst. threat to church by Satanists
•    - 2, religious conflict (Reformation)
•    - 3, weak governance
•    - constant: prevalence of non-Church magic (b/c it was at least as effective as Church magic)
• most witch "crazes" happened on the outskirts where the central gov. was weak & couldn't quell it
•    - why did they want that? High costs! And you don't want the Satanist stuff/conflict to spread

Rational Choice Theory

Criticisms

• sociological/cultural approach: people are influenced by their cultural and societal forces, not by their calculation of rational choice
• biological/psychological approach: people are incapable of making rational choices (Kahneman & Tversky) so you have to look at the way neurons and things work

Stark

Chapter 3, Witch Hunts

8 "Incorrect" Explanations

• real witches (orgies & ass kissing were perceived and didn't really happen)
• sexism (large numbers of men were also tried)
• fanatical clergy (inhibited sexual desires... ?)
• need for solidarity (creates a common enemy/need for a scapegoat... but Stark says this isn't true b/c solidarity was a constant need so it would have made sense to unite against murderers or bigamists)
• greed (the accusers didn't get much of the executed people's property, only some was taken and it went mostly to the state)
• mental illness (actually used as a basis for acquittal, also didn't just pop up then)
• social change (happened gradually, not in spikes)
• psychohistory (... ?)