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| rational choice assumptions |
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Definition
1) leaders have preferences over oucomes
2) leaders try to achieve their objectives
3) choice and consequences as interdependent |
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| world views that underlies the theory of a particular subject |
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| logically consistent set of statement trying to explain some sort of phenomena |
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| level of analysis- transnational |
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| across, not between states, crossing states aka green peace |
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think states care about security and power, bargaining and coercion
zero sum gain. |
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| international systems have no central authority that can make and enforce laws |
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| example of rational choice view. vietnam war |
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| kissinger, continue military action, if we lose cambodia, then loas then thailand... as china grow stronger, everyone else grows weaker |
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idea of open markets. wealth is the dominant state objective
international: cooperative world.
why don't we just get together and make another pizza |
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| cares about economic cooperation, we can all work together to make a new pizza |
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Interests are dependent on context
sometimes we work together, sometimes we fight
-Creation of Norms of Human Rights that go across soceity
Persuasion not change |
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Trying to change how states behave, have to change the way they interpret their interests
we can change hte came if we talk about our interests |
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| Why did the US Intervene in Libya- realist, liberal, constructivist |
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Definition
Realist: to expand power, trying to combat a threat
liberal: wealth, oil is key to stability
constructivism: trying to difuse, motivated by norms of democratization |
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Definition
interests matter.
states and leaders have preferences, preferences matter
interactions matter- there is going to be an interdependce in people's discussion making
instituionts- some set of rules that are shared and known by the community of states that structure political action |
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INTERESTS, SECURITY, POWER. STATES HAVE CONFLICTING INTERESTS
INSTITUTIONS: ANARCHY |
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INSTITUTIONS PROVIDE INFORMATION.
interests= wealthier, interactions= cooperation |
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preferences are not hard wired, shaped by society in which you live
institutions are very important
institutions shape norms, also are mechanisms for power |
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| legal principal that states have legal and political supremacy within territorail borders |
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| central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws, rules and decisions wihtin a specified territory |
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| non governmental organizations- red cross, amnesty international, greenpeace, catholic church |
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| ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes |
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| two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off relative to teh status quo without making others worse off- pareto |
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| one better off at the expense of the other actor. 0 sum game |
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| driving on the road, actors benefit from all making the same choice, no incentive to defect |
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| cooperation: collective action problems |
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| PD: have incentives to not comply |
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| sitution in which no player can be made better off without making the other worse of |
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| all of the points that lie along the pareto eficient line |
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| alternatives for reaching a negotiated solution.. can use this as leverage (the threat to leave for a better deal)-- US removing Sadam Hussein |
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| going back to market competition |
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| 3 key elements of power affecting bargaining outcomes |
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Definition
| outside options, coercion, agenda setting power, proposal power |
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more attractive reversion outcome
lower net costs of coercing others
more attractive their outside optoins are
greater agenda setting power |
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| cooperation more likely if |
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Definition
small incentives to defect
smaller the group of actors
more interactions are repeated or linked
more clear information |
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| first mover advantage---- agenda setting power---- proposal power |
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Definition
you get 601 and 301 or nothing...
can decide what you are going to talk about |
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| a bargaining interaction in which at least one actor threatns to use force in the event that its demands are not met ---IE THREAT OF FORCE |
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| use of threats to influence bargaining interaction |
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| a [status quo that a will challenge] p-a p p+b [status quo that B will challenge] b |
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| an effort to CHANGE the status quo through the threat of force |
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| an effort to KEEP THE STATUS QUO through the threat of force |
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| lack information about interests or capabilities |
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| willingness to endure costs |
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| tradeoff between better deal and avoiding war |
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| believability [target's beliefs, not the states intentions |
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| incentive to misrepresent |
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| hide strong cards or hide weakest cards |
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| take actions to increase the risk of accidential war... in hopes that the other actor will blink and act first, APPROACH THE BRINK OF WAR |
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| negative things for not following through on a threat |
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| make a strong threat, no way to back down .... bush saying that the conquest in kuwait will not stand |
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| not trusting a states's promise to not use force to alter a deal in the future |
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| war to prevent an adversary from becoming stronger in the future..... |
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| military tech, strategies, geography give a signficant advantage to strike first |
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| war because you think the other side will attack soon (imminent threat of attack) |
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| a good that cannot be divided.. but you usually can introduce more things to bargain over ($$, resources) |
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| Ways to Make War Less Likely |
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Definition
1) raising the costs of war (nuclear, trade partners)
2) increase transparency- reduce the danger of miscalculation
3) outside enforcement of commitments - repeated interactions, WTO
4) divide indivisible goods- joint control, compensation on another issue |
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| ways to think about war- 5 |
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Definition
1) willingness & ability
2) communicate resolve: credible, brinkmanship
3) indivisible good, future bargaiing power,
4) if power is expected to change- preventive war
5) first striker advantages
6) indisible goods |
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| rally around the flag affect- public opinion goes up after declaring war... can put some of the blame on the enemy |
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| why would public opinion go up? |
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Definition
1) patriotism
2) diversion (leaders try to trick voters)
3) scapegoating
4) build up internal support by building an external enemy |
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| start international crisis to rally public support at home |
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| leaders make decision to manipulate public opinion |
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gambling for resurrection
example |
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leader takes a costly gamble... do anything to stay in power
clinton and kosovo, monica lewinksy scandal... NATO bombs kosovo |
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Term
| military industrial complex |
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Definition
einshower... power and influence of the military business
more likely to go to war if never saw combat |
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| interest groups- economic and ethnic |
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Definition
| economic [united fruit company in guatamal, oil companies promoting peace, and ethnic [israel] |
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| examples of interest groups |
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Definition
armenian lobby
cuban americans
j street
aipac |
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| why are small groups so powerful |
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Definition
specialized experience
political mobilzation
collective action problem |
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| why are democracies less likely to go to war!!! [important] |
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Definition
accountablility
transparency- voters
credible commitments- larger audience costs
trade, economic incentives to maintain status quo
common policy preferences |
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Definition
| strategy for states to join forces with the stronger side in a conflict |
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| problems with balance of power theory |
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Definition
1) bandwagoning, sometime they join alliances to make an alliance even stronger, offset balance of power even more
2) states can often choose many potential partners to balance.. doesnt explain why certain ones are chosen
3) not all strong powers provoke similar balancing response |
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Definition
| signal common interests to other, communicate resolve |
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Term
| how alliances establish credibility |
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Definition
1)make it more likely to fight than before alliance
-- lower costs of war, increase benefits of fighting, increase the costs of not fighting
2) convince rivals that they will fight, shape rival state's expectations |
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Definition
yield too much
demand too much
--both underestime the value that the opponent gets from the outside option |
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Term
osirak attack
anticipated threat |
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Definition
| Preventive war (OSIRAK, IRAQ PURCHASED A NUCEARL POWER GENERATOR AND ISREAL LAUANCES AN AIR ATTACK] want to prevent an adversary from growing stronger in future |
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Term
six day war
imminent threat |
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Definition
PREEMPTIVE WAR - neither state will make consessions
first strike advantage situtations
build up of egyptian troops on border, IMMINENT THREAT- isreal launches 6 day war. preemptive |
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large membership
peace and security broadly thought ot
general goals: peace and security for UN |
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limited membership
common specific threat
specific military goals |
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| collective security details |
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Definition
intervention in conflict
enforce agreements
neutral observers (reduce incentive to deviate)
mediation |
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| major challenges in collective security orgs (CSO) |
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Definition
collective action [no power to tax, no military]
joint decision making |
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Definition
security council
general assembly
economic and social council
secretariat (beaurcracies)
ICJ
Trusteeship council (abolished) |
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Definition
| 15 members, P-5 = US, UK, France, China, Russia |
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Term
| Does peacekeeping keep the peace? |
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Definition
without PK, conflict recurs 20%
with PK, conflict recurs 50%
BUT selection effects |
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Definition
| providing insurance against bad outcomes encourages people to take risks.. aka israel |
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| a situation in which the military capabilites of two stares or groups of states of groups are roughly equal |
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Definition
| a strategy in which states join forces wiht the stronger side in a conflict |
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| how do you establish credibility? |
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Definition
| alliances decrease the cost of fighting, increase the benefits of fighting, increase the costs of not fighting |
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Definition
| only honored 75% of the time.. are institutions... |
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Definition
| 1) strength of the common interests 2) ability of the alliance to alter the members preferences (fighting will be better than abandonment) 3) effectivemenss of the alliance in convicning the adversary of this fact 4) limit the risk of entrapment |
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| austro-german-italy (feared the rise of russian power |
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