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Poly Sci Test #3
Study Guide
36
Political Studies
Undergraduate 2
04/04/2011

Additional Political Studies Flashcards

 


 

Cards

Term
1.Use the preference orderings shown in the question to fill in the matrix in Figure 8.4. Using the numbers 4, 3, 2, 1 indicate the payoffs each player receives for Civil War (Sunnis: Radical Approach; Shiites: Radical Approach).
Definition
Box 1: 2
Box 2: 2
Term
2.Using the preference orderings shown in the question fill in the matrix shown in Figure 8.4. Using the numbers 4,3,2,1 fill in the outcome payoff for Limited Democracy (Sunnis: Moderate Approach; Shiites: Moderate Approach).
Definition
Box 1: 4
Box 2: 3
Term
3.What is the Nash Equilibrium for the game presented in Figure 8.4 with the preference ordering used for the last two questions?
Definition
A) (Radical Approach; Radical Approach)
Term
4.Which outcome would both groups prefer to the expected outcome?
Definition
C) Limited Democracy
Term
5.Using the new preference ordering for the Shiites and the same preference ordering as before for the Sunnis, fill in the matrix shown in Figure 8.4.Some form of consolidated democracy --- limited or full -- is a possible equilibrium in this modified version of the democratic consolidation game.
Definition
A) True
Term
6.Solve the subgame on the left of Figure 8.7, where the Challenger is weak, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the expected outcome?
Definition
A) Status quo
Term
7.Solve the subgame on the right of figure 8.7, where the challenger is strong, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the expected outcome?
Definition
C) Party, no coup
Term
8.If the regime believes that the challenger is weak with a probability of 0.75 will it choose to do nothing, launch a party, or be indifferent?
Definition
Do Nothing
Term
9.If the Regime believes that the challenger is weak with a probability of 0.25, will it choose to do nothing, launch a party, or be indifferent?
Definition
B) Launch a party
Term
10.If the regime believes that the challenger is weak with a probability of 0.50, will it choose to do nothing, launch a party, or be indifferent?
Definition
C) Be indifferent
Term
11.Solve the subgame on the left presented in figure 8.8. What is the expected outcome?
Definition
C) Democratic consolidation
Term
12.It the regime believes that the religious party is moderate with a probability of 0.8, what action will they take?
Definition
A) Hold elections
Term

2-1 If the leader were to spend all of the tax revenue on providing private goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be for each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all receive the same amount? Fill in the blank with NUMBERS ONLY.

($1 billion in tax revenue, public goods worth: $2000, size of winning coalition: 250,000)

Definition
Box 1: 4000
Term
2-2.Would the leader prefer to provide only public goods or only private goods in this situation?
Definition
A) Private Goods
Term

2-3.If the leader were now to spend all of the tax revenue on providing private goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be for each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all receive the same amount? Fill in the blank with NUMBERS only

($1 billion in tax revenue, public goods worth: $2000, size of winning coalition: 750,000)

Definition
box 1: 1333
Term
2-4.Would the leader prefer to provide only public goods or only private goods in this new situation?
Definition
B) Public Goods
Term

2-5.If the leader were to spend all of the tax revenue on providing private goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be for each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all receive the same amount? Fill in the blanks with NUMBERS only

($1 billion in tax revenue, size of selectorate: 50 million, winning coalition: 250,000)

Definition
Box 1: 4000
Term
2-6.How much are private goods worth to someone who is not a member of the winning coalition? Fill in the blanks with NUMBERS only.
Definition
Box 1: 0
Term
2-7. What is the probability that a member of the selectorate will be a member of the winning coalition? Fill in the blank with NUMBERS only
Definition
Box 1: .005
Term
2-8. What is the probability that a member of the selectorate will not be a member of the winning coalition? Fill in the blank using NUMBERS only.
Definition
Box 1: .0995
Term
2-9 Suppose that you, as a member of the winning coalition are thinking of defecting to the challenger. What is the (maximum) expected value of defecting to the challenger in terms of private goods? Fill in the blanks with NUMBERS only
Definition
Box 1: 20
Term
2-10 Based on your answer to the previous question, how much does the political leader have to give each member of the winning coalition in terms of private goods to ensure that the members remain loyal? Fill in the blank with NUMBERS only
Definition
Box 1: 20
Term
2-11 What is the difference between how much the political leader could give each member of the winning coalition and how much the political leaders needs to give each member of the winning coalition to ensure the members loyalty?
Definition
Box 1: 3980
Term
2-12 Now suppose that the size of the selectorate is just 1 million. Keeping everything else the same answer the following question:What is the probability that a member of the selectorate will be a member of the wining coalition? Fill in the blanks with NUMBERS only
Definition
Box 1: .25
Term
3-1 In the problems at the end of Chapter 4 you were asked to consider the children's game of Rock, Paper, Scissors. In this game, two children simultaneously choose "rock", "paper", or "scissors". Rock beats scissors, paper beats rock and scissors beat paper. Lets say that you prefer the winner in each of these pair-wise comparisons. That is you prefer rock to scissors, scissors to paper, and paper to rock. Is your preference ordering complete?
Definition
A) Yes
Term
3-2. Is your preference ordering transitive?
Definition
NO
Term
3-3
How many pairwise contests does each of the finalists win? Answer with NUMBERS ONLY
Definition
Box 1: 2
Term
3-4
Which voter is the median voter? Put in the letter.
Definition
Box 1: D
Term
3-5
What is the median voter's ideological position? Put in the NUMBER
Definition
Box 1: 4
Term
3-6
Does the result from median voter theorem stating that parties will converge to the position of the median voter depend on whether political parties are office seeking or policy seeking?
Definition
NO
Term
3-7
Suppose that some event occurs that causes several voters to adopt more centerist positions. The new distribution of voters is shown in Figure 10.12. Where will parties P1 and P2 locate in the left-right space, given the centrist nature of the electorate? Answer with a NUMBER ONLY
Definition
Box 1; 5
Term

3-8 Given that the status quo is at 2, what is the range of policy outcomes that the president prefers to the status quo?

(SQ:2, L:4, P:7)

A) 2 to 10

B) 2 to 3

C) 4 to 7

 D) 3 to 7

Definition
A) 2:10
Term

3-9 Given that the status quo is at 2, what is the range of policy outcomes that the legislature prefers to the status quo?

 (SQ:2, L:4, P:7)

A) 3 to 7

B) 4 to 7

C) 2 to 6

D) 2 to 10

Definition
C 2 to 6
Term
3-10
Do the ranges of policy outcomes that the president and legislature prefer to the status quo overlap?
Definition
Yes
Term

11.Given that the status quo is 2, what is the range of policy outcomes that the president prefers to the status quo?

(SQ:2, P:4, L:7)

A) 2 to 10

B) 4 to 7

C) 0 to 2

D) 2 to 6

Definition
D) 2 to 6
Term
3-12
If the legislature propose a new policy and its implementation needs the president's approval, what level of public goods provision do you think the legislature will propose? Fill in the blanks with NUMBERS
Definition
Box 1: 6
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