Term
| When deciding to issue summary judgment, what must the court decide? |
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Definition
| if there is only question of law, no questions of material fact |
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Term
| joint liability v. several liability |
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Definition
| joint - all parties combine liability, several - each party is completely liable |
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Term
| ___ is claim preclusion - a matter that has already been judges |
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Definition
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Term
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Definition
| interpret statutes and agency rules, hear prior cases, decide issues of equity |
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Term
| in ___ cases, the plaintiff must establish injury, causation, and negligence |
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Definition
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Term
| a ____ action may be broguht against a person who unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of another person's land |
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Definition
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Term
| tort/nuisance/common law -- what order do they go? |
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Definition
| tort is a subset of common law, nuisance is a subset of tort law |
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Term
| 3 requirements of standing to sue |
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Definition
| injury in fact - already happened, provable injury :: causation - must prove the defendant's actions caused the injury :: Redressibility - plaintiff must present strongest case for relief/remedy, usually compensation |
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Term
| in this case, the supreme court held that the plaintiffs couldn't sue because they did not prove that they had suffered personal injury by the building of a disney park in mineral king valley |
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Definition
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Term
| in this case, the supreme court held that a state did have standing because they were looking out for their people and that the EPA did have authority to regulate GHG but that they were not required to do so as long as they provided adequate reasons for not doing so (which in this case, they did not) |
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Definition
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Term
| the issue in this case was about interstate commerce. the court in this case held that the town's flow control ordinance was unconsititutional because it violated the commerce clause |
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Definition
| C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown |
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Term
| in this case,the plaintiffs sued under EPCRA (Community right to know) because the defendants failed to file their EIS. court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because ___? |
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Definition
| Steel Company v. CBA -- failed to prove the third requirement for standing (redressilibity) |
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Term
| 2 steps of chevron deference |
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Definition
| did congress explicitly speak on the issue in the statutory language? if not, is the EPA's construction of the regulation permissible by law? |
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Term
| the actual meet of the Chevron case had to do with what? |
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Definition
| the bubble concept - EPA decided to allow states to group stationary sources that "pollute the same ambient air" together and regulate them under a bubble -- supreme court upheld this decision, and Chevron deference was born |
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Term
| Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. |
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Definition
| Public nuisance case - Boomer tried to enjoin the cement factory and receive damages for the illness it had caused him. the court held that the financial implications of enjoining the plant outweighed the damages, so they had ACC pay Boomer for past and future damages and not be enjoined. |
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Term
| ____ is law for which there is no basis and emerges from actual court cases. |
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Definition
| common law --- once it is defined in statute, it is no longer common law |
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Term
| this case illustrated "coming to the nuisance" |
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Definition
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Term
| Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. |
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Definition
| states have a quasi-sovereign right to protect their citizens, which gives them standing to sue. |
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Term
| this case involved the statute of limitations and established that a suit must be filed within 5 years of the offense, not 5 years of the agency discovering the offense (TSCA case) |
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Definition
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Term
| in order to sue under FIFRA, what is the pivotal thing that one must prove? |
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Definition
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Term
| FIFRA labeling requirements |
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Definition
all labels must contain specific instructions for safe use.
"General use" - can be used by anyone.
"Restricted use" - must be used under the supervision of a certified applicator |
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Term
| The seedless watermelon case! What was the holding in this case? |
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Definition
| Bailey Farms v. Nor-Am Chemical. EPA was reasonable in it's suspension of alderin and deldrin bc all the EPA has to prove is "substantial likelihood of harm" and therefore Bailey/Shell's argument under the economic loss doctrine did not stand. |
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Term
| the holding in this case was that FIFRA preemts states labeling laws that are "different from or in addition to" FIFRA requirements for any chemical listed under FIFRA. this is due to what clause in the Consititution? |
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Definition
| Macdonald v. Monsanto -- Supremacy clause |
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Term
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Definition
| "Cradle to grave" control of hazardous waste - generation, transportation, treatment, storage, disposal. |
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Term
| in this case, the court held that the EPA should try to list sites under RCRA first instead of CERCLA, but that in this case, the EPA was correct in listing under CERCLA because the chemical at issue (nitrates) was not included on RCRA's list. What is another case that the court also held that RCRA listing should happen before CERCLA? |
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Definition
| US v. Waste Industries -- Apache Powder Co. v. US |
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Term
| in this case, the court held that a state's hazardous waste program under RCRA was not preempted by listing on the NPL under CERCLA, |
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Definition
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Term
| in this case, the court held that an ongoing release did not constitute a new violation |
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Definition
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Term
| 2 response categories under CERCLA |
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Definition
| removal (short term, immediate danger) and remediation (permanent remedy) |
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Term
| in order for a site to be listed on the NPL, it must have a score of at least ___ on the ____. |
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Definition
| 28.5 on HRS (Hazardous Ranking System) |
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Term
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Definition
| current owners or operators, previous owners or operators, generators or those who arranged for disposal, knowledgable transporters |
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Term
| 3 possible methods of cleanup (where the money comes from) under CERCLA |
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Definition
| private party cleans it up and then sues PRPs for costs, EPA orders PRP to clean it up, EPA uses Superfund money to clean it up and then sues PRPs to reimburse the superfund |
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Term
| who has the burden of proof in deciding PRPs under CERCLA? |
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Definition
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Term
| 3 liability exclusions under CERCLA |
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Definition
| acts of God, acts of War, acts or omissions of a 3rd party |
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Term
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Definition
| under CERCLA, any fraction of crude oil that is usable for further steps in the production process and is not specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance is excluded from CERCLA |
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Term
| The holding in this case was that crude oil tank bottoms are not entitled to the CERCLA petroleum exclusion. In addition, the court held that there is no threshold level for carcinogens under CERCLA, if any carcinogens are present, the site is listed. |
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Definition
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Term
| in US v. NEPACCO the court held that what about liability under RCRA v. CERCLA? |
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Definition
RCRA does not apply retroactively but does impose liability for current and future conditions incurred by past violations.
CERCLA does apply retroactively and the EPA may sue for pre-enactment response costs |
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Term
| this case was implicated in both state nuisance law & CERCLA |
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Definition
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Term
| the holding in this case was that PRPs can recover response costs under CERCLA from other PRPs |
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Definition
| US v. Atlantic Research Corp |
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Term
| this case held that transaction of hazardous materials does not constitute liability under CERCLA. (a company released toluene from a product bought from a manufacturer, and is now trying to sue the manufacturer for response costs) |
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Definition
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Term
| In this case, the EPA removed Cornell from a list of PRPs, but another PRP sued them anyway. The court held that the EPA's exemption did not completely save them from responsibility.. the only way that can happen are acts of god, acts of war, or acts or omission by a third party |
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Definition
| US v. Alcan Aluminum Corp |
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Term
| ___ is a federal, though mostly state-administered permit program that grants point sources the right to dispose of pollutants into navigable waters |
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Definition
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Term
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Definition
| any discernable, confined, and discrete conveyance including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, container, rolling stock, or floating craft from which pollutants are or may be discharged. |
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Term
| this case held that citizen suits for civil penalties for wholly past violations do not apply under CWA |
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Definition
| Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation |
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Term
| This case held that the Adminsitrator does not have the authority to exempt classes of pollutants from the NPDES program |
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Definition
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Term
| this was the "fish guts" case. what was the holding in this case? |
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Definition
| NWF v. Consumers Power Co. -- plant counted as point source bc it was "adding" a pollutant to the water by transforming the fish into unusable, lifeless entities |
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Term
| this case held that rainwater runoff that had been modified or collected could be regulated under CWA |
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Definition
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Term
| this case held that the district court could not insert its own wetland determination for the EPA's and also that the clearing of wetlands constitutes the discharge of a pollutant and requires an NPDES permit |
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Definition
| Avoyelles sportsmen's league v. Marsh |
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Term
| 6 categories of water covered under the CWA |
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Definition
| waters affecting interstate commerce, interstate waterways, intrastate waterways that affect interstate commerce, territorial seas, any tributary to the above, and any wetlands adjacent to the above |
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Term
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Definition
| public owned treatment works |
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Term
| in the CWA, what is the interplay between federal and state permitting systems? |
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Definition
| federal regulations are the floor, the state may make higher ones |
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Term
| this case held that the EPA may not consider cost effectiveness or economic variance in setting BPTs... only for BAT |
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Definition
| EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn |
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Term
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Definition
BPT (best practicable control technology) is floor standards and cannot consider economic variance.
BAT (best available control technology) - is the gold standard. it is for toxic pollutants and non-toxic, non-conventional pollutants, the effects of which are not certain. can consider economic variance.
BCT (best conventional control technology) - is a SUBSET of BAT, for conventional pollutants and is not as strict as BAT. |
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Term
| in this case, the court held that EPA had the authority to impose TMDL on rivers polluted by non-point sources under the clean water act |
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Definition
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Term
| this case implicates both nuisance law and was a precursor for the clean air act |
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Definition
| boomer v. atlantic cement co |
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Term
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Definition
| Best Available Control Technology - under CAA |
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Term
| Pollutants covered under NAAQS |
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Definition
| ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, lead, particulate matter |
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Term
| which came first, CAA or EPA? |
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Definition
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Term
| primary implementation of the CAA is done by who? |
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Definition
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Term
| the ___ amendments to the CAA tightened standards and extended deadlines, also created new visibility requirements |
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Definition
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Term
| in this case, the SIP was rejected by the state court, but the EPA still decided to enforce it, which it has the right to do. |
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Definition
| Duquesne light company v. EPA |
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Term
| which court has the authority to review mandatory, non-discretionary agency decisions? which court has the jurisdiction to review discretionary agency decisions? |
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Definition
Dist Ct - non-discretionary.
DC Circuit court - discretionary |
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Term
| What section of the APA covers the scope of judicial review of agency actions? |
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Definition
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Term
| this case outlined which Administrator actions can be decided in which case (discretionary/nondiscretionary) |
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Definition
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Term
| difference between primary and secondary standards under the CAA and which case was this outlined in? |
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Definition
primary - meant to protect human health.
secondary - meant to protect public welfare.
American Petroleum Institute v. Costle |
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Term
| this case distinguished between primary and secondary ozone standards and decided that the CAA does not allow the EPA to cosider cost analysis in setting standards. |
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Definition
| American Petroleum Inst. v. Costel |
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Term
| this case addressed the issue of emissions offsets in non-attainment areas. what was the case, and what was the issue? |
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Definition
| Citizens against the refinery's effects (CARE) v. EPA -- emission offset program - cannot construct a new polluting source in a non attainment area unless there is another source that reduces their emissions enough to offset the new emissions |
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Term
| CAA and non-attainment areas |
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Definition
| CAA establishes a moratorium against plants in non-attainment areas... no new polluting sources can be built until the area is in attainment |
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Term
| this case held that the EPA has the right to issue conditional approval on a SIP, but it cannot lift a non-attainment moratorium until the SIP is actually met. |
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Definition
| Connecticut Fund for the Environment v. EPA |
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Term
| This case discussed the doctrine of non-delegation and the fact that the EPA may not consider costs in setting CAA standards |
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Definition
| Whitman v. American Trucking Assn |
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Term
| ___ was an especially good example of chevron deference. what was the holding in the case? |
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Definition
| Arco Oil and Gas v. EPA -- the EPA's decision to exclude CO2 in the definition of "natural gas" was a permissible interpretation of the statute because congress did not specifically speak on the issue in the SDWA |
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Term
| Cases that employ chevron deference |
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Definition
3M v. Browner
American Mining Congress v. EPA
National Assn of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife
NRDC v. EPA |
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Term
| This case held that EPA had no authority under RCRA to control secondary materials that were not discarded or abandoned in the same way as solid waste |
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Definition
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Term
| This case held taht the EPA need not consider the ESA before it grants states authority under CWA |
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Definition
| National association of home builders v. defenders of wildlife |
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Term
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Definition
| boomer v. atlantic cement, Spur industries v. Dal E. Webb, New York v. Shore Realty, |
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