Term
| What is the problem that casts doubt on – or seems to undermine – the ordinary concept of the will? |
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Definition
| Many feel that addiction is controversial tot the Will. They feel that if an addict “freely” destroys himself, then there’s a problem there, because not all of them really want to destroy themselves. So , in the ase of the addict, is it really their Will making their decisions |
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Term
| is behavioral incontinence? |
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Definition
| Your ability to control your actions. Some people are not able to control their behavior |
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Term
| What makes Aristotle an internalist about intentions? |
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Definition
- An action bears an INTERNAL relationship to your purpose, goal, or intention (it’s your view of what is best to do)
- An action is only YOUR action if it’s expressed by YOUR intentions…if not, your free will must be impaired (This is why people claim temporary insanity.) |
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Term
| What is Aristotle’s practical syllogism? |
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Definition
Practical Sylogism: It governs action determines what’s good
1) Universal premise (UP): in situations like “X”, the virtuous agent does “Y”
2) Particular premise (PP): my situation is like “X”
3) Therefore, I should do “Y” |
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Term
| What is the difference between strong and weak characters, according to Aristotle? |
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Definition
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Term
| In what sense did Aristotle claim that Socrates was right about incontinence? |
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Definition
o An agent (person) acts akratically if and only iff…
a) He does X intentionally (see Note)
b) He sees the alternative, Y, is also available
c) He judges that, all things considered, Y is best
- Note: Why would you freely or intentionally do what you see is inferior???
There could be a short term/long-term trade off, maybe |
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Term
| what sense did Aristotle claim that Socrates was wrong about incontinence? |
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Definition
DENIAL: their passions throw them into grips with denial about their problems.
a) Bob drinks intentionally
b) Bob sees that not drinking is an option
c) Bob thinks not drinking is best |
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Term
| Why is Akrasia, as it is typically defined, impossible? |
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Definition
The Internalist thinks the above (a through c) is impossible.
You can’t do all 3 things at the same time. You can either:
a) Change your mind… you think X is best given the circumstances, therefore making c) false in this circumstance.
b) You could say a) is false when you act, you’re not REALLY free |
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Term
| What is the difference between internalism and externalism, according to Watson? |
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Definition
- Internalist: He says self-control is a virtue
o Self-control is necessary for certain desires, like food, alcohol, drugs, sex, etc.
- -Externalist When you suffer from Akrasia, you lack self-control with respect to certain desires
- People like Bob don’t drink intentionally, they just lack control in certain areas. |
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Term
| What is Watson’s objection to the externalist? |
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Definition
| That your will is your practical judgement |
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Term
| What does Watson mean when he refers to the will as executive control over one’s actions? |
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Definition
The will just has executive control over your actions/ YOUR WILL IS YOUR PRACTICAL JUDGMENT
o *Your Will is what allows you to guide your action in light of your judgment.
o *Your Will is not something that acts independently of your judgment. |
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Term
| What is weakness of will according to Watson? |
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Definition
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Term
| What, according to Watson, are the appropriate moral attitudes towards akratic agents? |
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Definition
| Acratic people are like the football player. They have weak wills in certain areas relative to their pears. Like some people are better at not judging others, some people are better at not being lazy, some people are better at being nice or kind |
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Term
| ++++ How is determinism a secularized version of Paul’s view of the will? |
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Definition
| Determinism states that there is no way we’re free everything that happens is determined by the events preceding it. |
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Term
| Why does Paul think that the bondage of sin is tied up with embodiment? |
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Definition
Its problematic because pleasure is powerful and once you experience it, you want more of that same kind f
o Pleasure is geared towards repetition
- Can easily result to BONDAGE or a “slavery to sin” |
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Term
| Why does Paul claim that the law is not enough to protect us from sin? |
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Definition
1) The Law is Temptation ( if your told not to do something, you do it)
2) If you have to command yourself, then you must be divided |
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Term
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Definition
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Term
| What are the implications of Paul’s view for human responsibility? |
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Definition
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Term
| According to Frankfurt, what is the will? |
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Definition
Your Will= the strongest first-order desire
1st order= a desire that moves you to act; makes you want to act |
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Term
| What is Frankfurt’s definition of a person? |
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Definition
| Your 2nd order desires define you as a person |
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Term
| What is a second-order volition? |
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Definition
| A desire about my 1st order desires |
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Term
| What are the two ways in which one can have a second-order volition? |
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Definition
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Term
| How does Frankfurt define a wanton? |
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Definition
| It’s someone who doesn’t have second order desires. They don’t want to want anything; they don’t not want to want anything. They just do whatever their strongest desire is and don’t take a stance on anything at all. (e.g. Animals, Small Children) |
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Term
| What, according to Frankfurt, is an unwilling addict? |
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Definition
| You’re a slave to your desires, and are essentially out of control. Therefore, you are not responsible for your addiction. Implicitly, that means that you don’t control your desires. They control you. |
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Term
| How does Frankfurt define moral responsibility? |
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Definition
| Responsibility is identifying with the desires that you have. It’s when your second order desires are consistent with your first order desires. |
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Term
| is the incontinent agent responsible for his actions according to Frankfurt? |
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Definition
| You’re a slave to your desires, and are essentially out of control. Therefore, you are not responsible for your addiction, according to Frankfurt. (Determinist) |
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Term
| For the internalist, how is the relationship between intention and goodness analogous to that between belief and truth? |
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Definition
| Intention is to goodness as belief is to truth. |
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Term
| What is the main difference between internalism and externalism? |
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Definition
In externalism, under every condition, you are responsible for what you do, because your will is absolutely under your control. So you’re free
The internalist (Watson) says you’re responsible whenever your action expresses your judgment. |
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Term
| What is the “alternate possibilities” view of responsibility? |
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Definition
| That means you’re responsible for that action only whenever you could have done otherwise |
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Term
| According to Scotus, everything that happens has its source in one of the following two things: |
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Definition
1) A natural cause.
2) Or a Will |
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Term
| Scotus claims that the will by definition has no underlying cause. Why is this claim weak? |
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Definition
| It’s an assumption. it’s not even an argument. It doesn’t explain why the Will doesn’t have a natural cause, it’s just an assumption. |
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Term
| Why does Scotus claim that the will cannot be coerced? |
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Definition
| Your will is determined by the forces beyond your control |
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Term
| What is Scotus’ position on akrasia? |
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Definition
So you either change your mind about what you’re going to do, or you lack the self-control to overcome your desire for the cigarette.
So you CAN’T act against your better judgment. Not intentionally. If you act against your judgment, that means you’ve either changed your mind or you lack self-control. |
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Term
| What does Wallace take to be the greatest strength of Frankfurt’s view? |
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Definition
| helpful because he helps us understand the nature of estrangement, which is doing something that you don’t fully identify with. |
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Term
| What does Wallace take to be the greatest weakness of Frankfurt’s view? |
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Definition
| second order desires. He says this is a very artificial account of deliberation. |
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Term
| Wallace argues that we don’t identify with 2nd-order desires but rather the following: |
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Definition
| We identify with devalutive judgments. |
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Term
| Why does Wallace argue that a desire can’t bring deliberation to a suitable conclusion? |
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Definition
| a. They’re only thinking about themselves. Frankfurt portrays deliberation as if it’s nothing but a consideration of my own desires. |
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Term
| . According to Wallace, in what sense do desires have reasons embedded in them? |
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Definition
Our desires our important, but they’re not just our animal feelings, they are articulate. They come bearing considerations that count in consideration with acting on them. They come with reasons.
That’s why Wallace says we don’t identify with desires, we identify with reasons. |
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Term
| When does deliberation occur and what is its task, according to Wallace? |
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Definition
| You think about what you should do and determine what you should do based on the reasons that you have. |
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Term
| What does Wallace mean when he says that deliberation points outward? |
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Definition
| Deliberation is not just about the self. It is about what you SHOULD desire not what you desire |
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Term
| Jean-Paul Sartre’s phrase, ‘You’re condemned to freedom’, is another way of expressing the core belief of which view? |
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Definition
| Sartra- libertarian (liber=liberty=freedom) |
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Term
| According to Strawson, even if determinism is true, what feeling can I not escape in the present? |
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Definition
| The universe is a big domino game of cause and effect. |
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Term
| What does Strawson think that the Basic Argument shows? |
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Definition
| How you are is ultimately a function of nature and upbring. |
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Term
| How does the Basic Argument work? |
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Definition
| Bad people can’t help being bad people, they are just created that way. |
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Term
| If there are random or indeterministic forces in the universe, why doesn’t that imply any greater responsibility for ourselves? |
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Definition
1) You do what you do because of the way you are
2) To be responsible for what you do, you have to be responsible for the way you are
3) You can’t ultimately be responsible for the way you are
4) *Therefore you can’t be responsible for what you do
People are going to object to 3, because they’re going to say “Why can’t I be responsible for my character??” |
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Term
| . In his third version of the Basic Argument, Strawson shows that we can’t be responsible for our own mental character because such responsibility would embroil us in the following: |
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Definition
1) *Acting for a reason is a function of your mental character
a. ** It’s absurd to think you’re responsible for your own existence. |
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Term
| is this argument analogous to Paul’s claim that we are not free to choose God? |
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Definition
| Whether you say yes to Him or no it is not up to you. You are not responsible for whether or not you say yes or you say no, because you don’t choose your desires. God gave them to you. |
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Term
| What sort of absurd self-contradiction would a human need to be in order to be ultimately responsible for his or her actions? |
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Definition
| Libertarian (liber=liberty=freedom) |
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Term
| Strawson’s position is compatible with which of the following views – Internalism, Grace/Determinism, or Externalism? |
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Definition
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Term
| is Ian McEwan’s reply to Strawson’s argument? |
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Definition
| I see no necessary disjunction between having no free will (those arguments seem watertight) and assuming moral responsibility for myself. |
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