Term
| 3-step "Core" of Kalam Cosmological Argument |
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Definition
1-Whatever began to exist has a cause. 2-The universe began to exist.
3-So, the universe has a cause. |
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Term
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Definition
| A collection of definite and discrete members whose number is greater than any actual number |
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Term
| Craig's Potential Infinite |
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Definition
| A collection that is increasing without limit but is at all times finite |
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Term
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Definition
| A Hotel with infinitely many rooms, each room accommodating 1 person. The hotel is full. |
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Term
| Problem with Hilbert's Hotel (1st argument against infinite) |
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Definition
| If an actual infinite is possible, then so is Hilbert's Hotel. But Hilbert's Hotel is not possible, so an actual infinite is not possible. No one, no matter how powerful, could create a Hilbert's Hotel. |
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Term
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Definition
| Existence is explained by facts about other things; sufficient reason of its existence is outside itself |
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Term
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Definition
| Contains the sufficient reason of its own existence |
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Term
| Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) |
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Definition
| There can be no fact real or unreal, and nothing true unless there is sufficient reason to believe so and not otherwise |
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Term
| Why does Craig say there must be a beginning? |
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Definition
| 1-An actually infinite no. of things cannot exist. 2-A beginningless series of events in time would require an infinite no. of things. 3-So, a beginningless series of events is impossible |
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Term
| 2nd philosophical argument against an infinite series of past events |
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Definition
| 1-The series of events in time is a collection formed by adding one member after another. 2-A collection formed by adding one member after another cannot be actually infinite. 3-So, the series of events in time cannot be infinite. |
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Term
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Definition
| Someone who has counted all the negative numbers, all the way down to zero |
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Term
| Why is an infinite counter impossible? |
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Definition
| 1-If the series of past events had no beginning, an infinite counter could exist. 2-An infinite counter is not possible because he should already be finished. 3-So, a series of events in time must have a beginning |
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Term
| Why is the Big Bang as the beginning a problem? |
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Definition
| We don't know enough about the physical laws of the "early" universe |
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Term
| Sufficient Reason for Existence of a world of contingent beings (Leibniz) |
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Definition
| God is perfectly good, God necessarily acts for the best, our world is better than no world, and it is the best of all possible worlds. |
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Term
| Why couldn't our world have failed to exist? (Leibniz) |
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Definition
| Since God had a sufficient reason for creating our world rather than any other possible one, it follows that God could not have failed to create our world. |
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Term
| Greatest Possible Being (Anselm's God) |
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Definition
| That than which nothing greater can be conceived. |
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Term
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Definition
| Possibility in a fairly weak sense |
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Term
| Structure of Anselm's Argument |
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Definition
| 1-Suppose God does not exist in reality. 2-Then there could have been a being greater than God, the greatest conceivable being.3-But that's absurd b/c nothing can be greater than the greatest conceivable being. 4-So 1 is false, and God does exist in reality. |
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Term
| Guanilo's "island example" |
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Definition
| Think of the most perfect possible island, which cannot only exist in our understanding, b/c it is the most perfect. If it only exists in understanding, then there can be an island which is more perfect. This is contradictory, b/c there cannot be an island more perfect than the most perfect one possible. |
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Term
| Anselm's Argument w/ necessary existence |
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Definition
| If something necessarily exists, then it is impossible for it not to exist. Suppose God doesn't exist in reality, then he lacks necessary existence. So, there could be a being greater than God, the greatest conceivable being, because it has all of God's traits plus necessary existence, which is contradictory. So, God must exist in reality. |
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Term
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Definition
| Wrongful action, evil intentions, morally bad character. |
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Term
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Definition
| Natural disasters, diseases, birth defects. |
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Term
| Physical pain vs. suffering |
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Definition
| You can sometimes have pain w/o suffering from it, and you can suffer from things other than pain. |
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Term
| Philo on God's benevolence |
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Definition
| A God who is benevolent in a humanly comprehensible sense would not allow his creatures to suffer. But we do suffer, so there is no way to show that God is benevolent in a human sense |
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Term
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Definition
| 1-If God is benevolent, then He prevents as much suffering possible. 2-If God is all powerful, then he can prevent all suffering. 3-But all of God's creatures are almost always miserable. 4-So either God is not all powerful, or God is not benevolent. |
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Term
| How Hume finds what God's moral properties are |
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Definition
| Look around the world and see what God has done, good and evil. |
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Term
| Cleanthes on God's Nature |
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Definition
| God's justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude are the same kind as the ones we aspire to. Calls P & D "mystics" b/c it is fantasy, mystical. |
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Term
| Philo & Demea on God's Nature |
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Definition
| God's moral attributes are mysterious and incomprehensible in our sense. Call C an "anthropomorphite" because he thinks of God in only human terms. |
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Term
| Concept of a "Morally sufficient reason" for allowing evil |
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Definition
| A reason that would morally satisfy us, the sort of reason God might have. Would be compatible with God's moral nature. |
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Term
| (Philo) If God fails to prevent suffering, then either: |
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Definition
| 1-He can't. 2-He doesn't care. 3-He does care, can prevent it, but has very good reason for not doing so, a reason compatible with his supreme benevolence. |
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Term
| Philo on God's MSR to prevent evil |
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Definition
| If God is omnipotent, he could not have a morally sufficient reason for evil. |
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Term
| Demea's response to Philo's claim on God's (lack of) MSR. "Big Picture Defense" |
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Definition
| God has a MSR for evil, but we are not smart enough to know what it is. God sees the big picture. |
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Term
| Cleanthes' response to Demea's "Big Picture Defense" |
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Definition
| We need to base our opinions on God's moral attributes on solid, empirical grounds. We need to notice the good. |
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Term
| Philo's 3 responses to Cleanthes |
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Definition
| 1-Pain is more intense and durable than pleasure. 2-Why is there any misery at all in the world?. 3-Even if it's logically possible that God is benevolent, you (Cleanthes) haven't discharged your responsibility. |
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Term
| Philo's 4 hypotheses in Part XI |
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Definition
| 1-Pure benevolence. 2-Pure malevolence. 3-Competing powers of good & evil. 4-Indifference. |
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Term
| How we should evaluate Philo's pts. in pt. XI |
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Definition
| 1-We don't have to decide which is correct, we should probably suspend judgment. 2-Of the 4, the indifference hypothesis is the least unlikely. Too much bad for 1 (benevolence), too much good for 2 (malevolence), we would see signs of conflict if 3 was true. So, 4 is the least unlikely. |
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Term
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Definition
| Probability of data given the hypothesis. |
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Term
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Definition
| Probability of the hypothesis given background information. |
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Term
| What does Philo mean when he says that "mixed phenomena cannot prove unmixed attributes?" |
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Definition
| Looking at the mixture of good and evil in the world, you probably will not think God is benevolent or malevolent. |
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Term
| "Evil is needed as contrast" defense |
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Definition
| Sometimes people say that in order to appreciate the good things of life, we need evils with which to contrast them. |
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Term
| Morally Significant Freedom |
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Definition
| Freedom to choose between good & evil. It is good because it adds to human dignity, and it's required for moral responsibility, which is required for the best kind of moral goodness. |
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Term
| 2 limits to Freedom (FWD) |
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Definition
| Physical and Psychological |
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Term
| Why shouldn't God limit the freedom of evil people? |
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Definition
| Any person's particular freedom isn't valuable enough to outweigh their evil. If God has a reason to prevent one person from doing terrible things, he'd have the same good reason for preventing every other such persons. If God was continually messing with us in this way, no one would have morally significant freedom. |
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Term
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Definition
| We can have free will and be wholly determined by antecedent causes (outside one's control). |
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Term
| How a compatibilist would handle the case of a drug addict who needs another "fix" |
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Definition
| You are not acting freely when you act "out of character" b/c you are overwhelmed by some irrational desire. |
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Term
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Definition
| You are acting of your own free will when you are doing what you want b/c you want to |
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Term
| When are you acting freely (Combatibilist view) |
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Definition
| When your decisions flow from your deepest values and preferences, the ones with which you most closely "identify" |
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Term
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Definition
| In order for you to have real alternatives, there must be a "gap" somewhere that leads up to the action. This gap is right here and now, exactly as things are now w/ my personal values, desires, etc. |
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Term
| "Consequence Argument" against Compatibilism |
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Definition
| 1-I act freely when I have real alternatives. 2-When my act is the casual consequence of antecedent conditions outside my control, I lack real alternatives. 3-So I never act freely why my act is the casual consequence of antecedent conditions.4-If compatibilism is true, 3 is false. 5-So compatibilism is false. |
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Term
| Why is incompatibilism incompatible with free will? |
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Definition
| You could choose to act in ways that are completely out of character, not acting in free will |
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Term
| Why is freedom fraught with anxiety? (Sartre) |
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Definition
| I can hurt/kill myself at any point by changing my morals; conversion. Ex: walking along a cliff, I can realize that I can throw myself over. |
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Term
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Definition
| An attempt to display God's justification for allowing evil. |
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Term
| What is evil? (Augustine) |
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Definition
| A "privation" of created goodness. It has no reality of its own, it is the absence of good, not created by God, not an independent reality that threatens God. |
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Term
| Where does evil come from? (Augustine) |
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Definition
| Free will & the Fall: of (some) angels, of human beings (original sin). Pride yields an evil will which yields disobedience. |
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Term
| Why did God allow evil? (Augustine) |
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Definition
| He knew he would be able to bring good out of our evil: good of punishment, redemption (for some sinners), and making goodness shine more brightly in contrast to evil. |
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Term
| 5 consequences of original sin (Augustine) |
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Definition
| 1-Physical death. 2-spiritual death (humans lost ability to resist evil). 3-Loss of conscious control over various bodily functions. 4-Nature cursed. 5-2nd death, everlasting punishment in Hell |
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Term
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Definition
| First human sin (of Adam); the sinful state in which all humans are born; inherited guilt |
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Term
| How does Augustine explain the first sin? |
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Definition
| "This falling away was spontaneous"...Adam and Eve were already wicked, mysteriously fell away from a perfect nature in a perfect situation. |
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Term
| Hick's objections to Augustine's theodicy |
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Definition
| 1-Scientific, no proof for Adam & Eve. 2-Moral, we are held responsible for other's actions. 3-Psychological, motivation of first sin, there was already an evil will. There never was any such perfect situation. |
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Term
| Main difference between Hick's theodicy & Augustine's |
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Definition
| Unlike Augustine, Hick sees suffering and death as part of the original human condition |
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Term
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Definition
| Goodness achieved through a risky process that involves free choice in response to challenges & difficulties and yields character building. |
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Term
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Definition
| All finite persons will eventually be fashioned into the finite likeness of God and enter His Kingdom |
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Term
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Definition
| People are eternally separated from God and His people, doomed to stay in hell forever. |
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