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| addresses questions like "what is a mind?", "could we make a machine with a mind?", "What is the relationship between mind and bodies?" |
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| investigates the nature of conscious mental life from first person point of view |
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| addresses a question like "What is knowledge?", "How can we justify our claims to knowledge?", "What can we know?" |
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| seeks to explain how we perceive, remember, reason, decide, and then act, by postulating internal processes <like computer programs> |
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| genuine thinking and understanding requires having a conscious mind |
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| both mental and physical things exist, but fundamentally distinct kinds of things |
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maintains that there is causal interaction between mind and body in both directions
mental>physical, physical>mental
(type of dualism) |
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| psychophysical parallelism |
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there is no causal interaction between mind and body.
mental and physical stay in sync but function independently
(type of dualism)
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there is physical tho mental causation, but no mental to physical causation
(type of dualism) |
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| fundamentally only one kind of thing exists; everything else can be accounted for in terms of the more basic thing |
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manintains fundamentally only mental things exist
(type of monism) |
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fundamentally only material or physical things exist
(type of monism)
also known as materialism |
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maintains that genuine thinking and understanding require having the right behavorial dispositions
(type of physicalism...which is a type of monism) |
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maintains that mental states and processes can be understood in terms of the functional role they play in mediating how input <which is sensations and internal feelings> interact with internal states <which are background beliefs and desires> to produce output <which is action or behavior>
(type of behaviorism.. which is a type of monism) |
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| if a declarative sentence is meaningful, then there must be ways to verify or falsify it |
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| property or set of properities whose posession is necessary and sufficient for counting as something of a particular type |
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| causal account of location |
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| causes are located wherever effects originate |
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| any activity where there is a systematic rule-governed use of words |
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| fallacious argument that is defective because it presumes the very conclusion it sets out to prove |
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| implicit assumption or supposition |
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| imaginary or hypothetical case that one conceives and asks questions about in order to analyze some concept or object to some view |
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| applying to any view or position similar to/inspired by Descartes |
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theory most people adopt in making sense of behavior of others
<beliefs, desires, thoughts, feelings, perceptions, memories> |
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| we usually use words and expressions rather than mentioning them; mentioned when we talk about them; in quotes |
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| problem that arises when a proposed solution creates a further problem |
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argument that preceeds by showing that a certain claim entails something false
Since you reduce that claim, you can find the opposite to be true. |
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<Daniel Dennett>
should continually use folk psychology for everyday purposes to predict and explain behavior of others |
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| sentence can be produced to precisely capture a functionalist theory using tools of second-order predicate logic |
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relies on common sense claim that machines can't speak
"Could we ever make a machine understand?" -no, understanding requires conscious mind
face epistemological problem |
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relies on the common sense claim that all we know about other people's minds we know from what they do
"Could machines ever really understand?"-yes, to understand is to behave as if you understand
face phenomenological problem |
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| created cartesian view of minds |
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1. dualist
2. you are your mind
3. your mind and your thoughts are the things you know best
4.the essence of a mind is to have thoughts while the essence of physical or material things is to occupy space
5. method of doubt |
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believe only what you can know with certainty
(what you cannot coherently doubt) |
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| the problem of other minds |
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| "what justifies our belief that other minds exist at all?" |
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| "how are we to explain the relations of a mind and body?" |
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| there is conflict between claim that the mind is not in space and exists, and the fact that there are causal interactions between the mental and the material |
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| private language argument |
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| came from Wittgenstein arguing against Descartes adn Hobbes' beliefs that a private language existed |
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| others can figure out your thoughts |
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| what you understand is private to you |
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| Wittgenstein's belief on private language |
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there must be a way to "check the system"
(behaviorism) |
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| Hobbes and Descartes' belief on private language |
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| there could be a purely private language |
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| Hobbes' thoughts on words |
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could be marks that allow one to remember and re-identify experiences
"twinge" |
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| higher-order thought (HOT) |
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| example of functionalist account of consciousness |
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| realist view of folk psychology |
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FODOR: argues folk psychology is "only game in town"
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| physicalist view of folk psychology |
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CHURCHLAND: argues neuroscience undermines folk psychology
STICH: argues cognitive pyschology, undermining folk psychology |
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| instrumentalist view of folk psychology |
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| DENNETT: argues for fold psychology to predict and explain behaviors of others |
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| Dennett's intentional stance |
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| instrumentally or operationally work on the assumption that people do have beliefs and desires of the kind folk psychology requires |
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| CHAPTER QUESTION: "Can machines have minds?" |
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CHAPTER QUESTION:
led to epistemological questions about how we know about our own minds and minds of others
led to metaphysical questions about the relationship between mental things |
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1. Do premises agree with each other and the conclusion?
2. Do premises portray truth? |
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