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| The thesis that a complete description of the universe at one time and a complete statement of all the laws of nature together entail a complete description of the universe at every other time. |
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| Something that bypasses a person’s normal processes of deliberation and deciding. |
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| The belief that determinism isn’t true. |
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| The person or agent herself causes free actions, as opposed to anything the agent does or some event involving the agent or some state the agent is in. Further, nothing causes the agent to exercise this power. In particular, the agents reasons (their character, beliefs and desires) do not cause her to exercise her agent causal power. |
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| Principle of Alternate Possibilities |
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| the claim that a person is only morally responsible for what he has done if he could have done otherwise. |
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| the thesis that everyone is motivated only by his own self-interest. Colloquially, everyone is selfish, or everyone is out for himself. |
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| All together, an action A is right if and only if of all the actions open to the agent, A produces the greatest total amount of pleasure. |
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| a command. For example, “Close the door” or “ Sit down.” |
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| is the belief that Free Will and *Determinism* are incompatible. |
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| it states that Free Will and Determinism are compatible by means of *Constraint*. |
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| The Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism |
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a. No one has a choice about what the laws of nature are.
b. No one has a choice about what the distant past was.
c. If determinism is true, then the distant past and the laws together entail everything that everyone does.
d. If you have no choice about some fact F, and F entails some other fact G, then you have no choice about G either.
e. Therefore, if determinism is true, then no one has a choice about anything they do. |
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a. If *Indeterminism* is true, then when someone makes a choice, there is an alternative scenario that is exactly the same, except they choose something else.
b. If the scenarios are exactly the same, except for the choice, then nothing makes the difference between them; the difference between them is just a matter of luck.
c. If the difference between the scenarios is just a matter of luck, then the person has no choice about what happens.
d. Therefore, if *Indeterminism* is true, no one has a choice about what happens. |
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| The power to overcome the power of luck |
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| Pereboom doesn’t believe we have the power of *Agent Causation*, thus, we don’t have free will. If no one has free will, then no one deserves anything. No one deserves praise or blame, reward or punishment. How could we justify our practices then? Without free will, we lack the responsibility of our actions, while our justice system practices solely based on our responsibility of our actions. In Pereboom’s mind, the justice system bases its judgments on something that we as humans don’t have, free will. |
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| Form of punishment we should switch to |
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| Quarantine, as in, separate the criminals from the general population. |
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| The Ability to do Otherwise Conditional Analysis: |
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Definition
Consider the following:
(1)He could have done otherwise.
means the same things as:
(2) If he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise.
The Standard Objection: (1) and (2) are not equivalent because the person might not be able to choose to do otherwise.
Ayer’s suggested addition: *Constraint*. Ayer suggests that rather contrast ordinary freedom with Determinism, you must instead contrast it with *Constraint*. |
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| *Principle of Alternate Possibilities* |
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| Frankfurt’s Argument: Normally, when we believe that someone could not have done otherwise, it is because she has been coerced, or compelled or otherwise forced to do something. That is, the circumstances that make it the case that she cannot do otherwise also make it the case that she does what she does. However, these two things can come apart. That is, circumstances could be such that (1) it’s impossible for someone to do otherwise, but (2) that fact in no way explains her action. |
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| Jones decides to do something. He is then threatened in order to make him do the thing he has already decided to do, and then he does it. Is Jones responsible for what he does in this case? |
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Jones is the sort of person that does what he has decided to do no matter what happens. He’s indifferent to the threat that is made against him.
Result: Responsible because he was not coerced. Someone tried to coerce him but failed. |
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Jones is so gripped by fear at the threat that he forgets his decision and all the reasons he had for it, and decides (again) to do the thing on the basis of the threat.
Result: Not responsible because he only performed the action out of fear. He may be responsible for initially choosing the action, but not for performing it. |
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Jones is reasonably impressed with the threat and would have changed his mind had he not already decided to do the thing in question. As it stands, he does it on the basis of his earlier decision, not on the basis of the threat.
Result: This more difficult. Perhaps he was not coerced, since he did what he wanted to do because he wanted to do it, or perhaps he was, because he would have done it even if he didn’t want to do it. Either way, it seems he is responsible, because he did for his own reason, and not because of the threat. |
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| Argument for getting what we want: When a person gets what he wants, he gets pleasure or satisfaction from it. This pleasure or satisfaction is what is really motivating him, and he only does other things to get it. So he is selfish, because all he really wants is his own pleasure. |
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| Sometimes we don’t get pleasure or satisfaction when we get what we want. Consider the argument that because a ship always consumes fuel to travel, that the point of the trip is to consume the fuel. Basically, pleasure is not the only goal of doing what we want. |
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| pleasure is the only thing that is valuable. |
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| whether an action is right or wrong depends only on its consequences. |
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| the right action is the one that has the best consequences, i.e. produces the most value. |
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| intentions according to utilitarianism |
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| Suppose you are walking down the street and you see a man loading a heavy bag into a truck. Being the kind and generous human being you are, you help the man load the bag into the truck. You have apparently made the right choice, by benefiting both you and the man lifting the bag. However, later that day you turn on the TV only to see the man’s face along with the headline “A priceless artifact was stolen today…”. According to a strict sense of *Utilitarianism*, you made the wrong choice, as your decision resulted in a much larger loss of happiness, compared to the happiness gained by you and the thief. However, Mill writes “An action is right as it tends to promote happiness”, keep note of the italicized word ‘tend’. Mill also states that in judging an action one must be “strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator”. Thus, as a strictly impartial spectator, you did make the right choice, as your intention was to maximize pleasure. Following this train of thought, intentions are really the only thing that matter, because the results of actions can’t be determined until the choice has already been made. |
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| all pleasures are of the same kind, and differ only in quantity. |
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| some pleasures are better than others no matter the quantity of each. |
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| Mill’s Argument for Qualitative Hedonism: |
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| there is “no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect… a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.” However, he accepts that this is usually because the intellectual pleasures are thought to have circumstantial advantages, i.e. “greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc. In spite of human urge to give into certain desires, mostly sexual; our willingness to accept higher pleasure are more beneficial toward human health and mental satisfaction. Mills exacts certain opinions of humans lowering themselves into lower animals, yet he states that humans would not allow themselves to be looked upon as fools because, of their pride and emotions. |
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| Mill’s Proof That Pleasure is the only Intrinsic Good: |
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| actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure [ . . . ] Pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and [ . . . ] all desirable things [ . . . ] are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. |
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| Standard Objection to Mills argument |
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Definition
One familiar objection to hedonism claims that hedonism cannot give a good
account of what’s wrong with torture. The hedonist must treat it as an open question whether it would be worthwhile for Jack to torture Jill, just for the fun of it. On the one hand, Jane suffers; on the other hand, Jack gets pleasure. Hedonism must conclude that torture is worthwhile whenever the pleasure Jack gets is greater than the pain Jill suffers.
Take Note: I was not in class when we went over this, I am just assuming that this is the proof he was speaking of, as well as the objection. |
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| Hypothetical Imperatives: |
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| A hypothetical imperative is conditional. For example, “If you want coffee, go to a coffee shop.” A hypothetical imperative only commands those who satisfy the condition. In this example, if you don't want coffee, you don't need to do anything. |
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| A categorical imperative is unconditional. For example, “Go to a coffee shop.” A categorical imperative commands regardless of what the commanded wants. |
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| The Universal Law Formulation |
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| Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. |
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| Following the Universal Law Formulation, one must act as if everyone should act that way. Perhaps there is a man, Jerry. Jerry goes into a store, and steals some candy. Although not a huge deal, this action is morally wrong. For if his action were to become universal, and everyone stole things, economies would plunder, crime rates would skyrocket, there would be incalculable amounts of consequences, overall, pleasure would decrease. Let’s now consider a person, Tom. Tom is walking down the street, and notices some trash on the ground. Rather than ignore the trash, he picks it up and throws it out. If this became a universal law, thus making everyone pick up trash they noticed, the world would be a much cleaner and better place, resulting in increased pleasure. Thus, his action is morally correct. |
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| Humanity as an End in Itself Formulation |
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Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.
Explanation: Basically, always act in such a way that you don’t simply use people to attain your goal, but to benefit the people as a whole. |
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| Kant’s Claim for the relationship between the Universal Law Formulation and Humanity as an End in Itself Formulation: |
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| According to Kant’ the Humanity as an end in itself is a formulation of the Universal Law Formulation. Basically, if you treat humanity in such a way as to benefit the human population as a whole, that law would become universal, and would be morally correct. If you act in such a way as to detriment some of the population, that choice would become a universal law, bringing down all of society, and be morally incorrect. |
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| Kant’s Reasoning for Believing Humanity as an End in Itself: |
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| Respect for Humanity as an end in itself could never lead you to act on maxims that would generate a contradiction when universalized, and vice versa. |
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| Rationality is the distinctive function of man |
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| Function of a Man and *Eudaimonia |
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| A good man is one who performs his function(being rational) well, i.e. in accord with virtue, over his lifetime. This is *eudaimonia*. |
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| How Virtue is part of Eudaimonia: |
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| Consider this: A good man is a man who performs his function well. A good man who performs his function well over his life is considered to be in Eudaimonia. Virtue is what allows us to perform a function well. Thus, a good man is a virtuous man. A virtuous man is in Eudaimonia. |
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| A virtue and the doctrine of a mean |
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| a virtue is a mean lying between two extremes. For example, courage lies between cowardice and rashness. If one feels too much fear, one is a coward, but if one feels too little fear, one is rash. To feel just the right amount of fear and to fear just the right things, is to be courageous. A virtue is a disposition to have certain feelings from which we act to the right degree, not too little, and not too much. |
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| By habituation: we must start by acting as the virtuous person would act in the circumstances we find ourselves, from an early age. Over time, we will develop the traits of character. For example, we instruct children to share with others, and we hope that, in time, they will become generous themselves. |
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| A theory about the meaning of moral language. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms – for example, “It is wrong to torture an innocent human being” – are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as “wrong,” “good,” or “just” do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. |
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| The ethical theory of descriptivism argues that moral judgments are descriptive and not prescriptive - that is to say, they describe the way things are instead of prescribe the way things should be. To say that "killing is wrong" is to describe the act of killing as having the attribute "wrong" and is not saying that it would be nice if no one killed anyone else. |
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Expressionist:
-is abortion wrong
-not right or wrong, one agrees/not disagree vs. disagrees
-they FEEL differently
-similar to how one person being happy and another sad over the outcome of a sports game |
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