Term
| Meta Ethics: Key questions |
|
Definition
- In what sense can an ethical conviction be true?
- If it cannot be literally true, why does our language act as if it can be? |
|
|
Term
| Realism: Semantic, Metaphysical, Epistemological, Psychological |
|
Definition
- S: moral predicates describe moral facts. Moral judgments possess t-values
- M: there are MPs/Mfacts
- E: We can have moral knowledge
- P: Moral judgements expressive (motivationally inert) cognitive attitudes (beliefs) about the world |
|
|
Term
| Realism : Natural v non-Naturalism |
|
Definition
S: MPs have same meaning as NPs.
M: MPs metaphysically reducible from NPs
E: Moral knowledge attainable through empirical investigation |
|
|
Term
| Naturalism: semantic (analytic) v metaphysical (synthetic) |
|
Definition
- S: Mtruths have same meaning as Ntruths (supervenience explained in terms of semantic reducibility)
-M: MPs metaphysically reducible to NPs (same ref, dif meaning). Not all Ms are Ss |
|
|
Term
| Realism advantages (MJs as beliefs, Mlanguage as descriptive) |
|
Definition
- Explains why moral judgments behave like beliefs (they are beliefs)
- Explains why moral language behaves like descriptive language (it is) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
- Describes fact that a moral judgment cannot change if none of the underlying properties of the object changes
- That two items can't be morally distinguishible if they are not descriptively distinguishable (if A and B are identical, how can they have different moral worth?) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
- Describes fact that a moral judgement cannot change if none of the underlying properties of the object changes
- That two items can't be morally distinguishible if they are not descriptively distinguishable (if A and B are identical, how can they have different moral worth?) |
|
|
Term
| Naturalism: Ethics and science |
|
Definition
| There is an analogy possible between scientific/moral method. By observing and confronting facts, we come to agreement on their scientific/moral worth. This seems counter idea of normativity (that moral judgement is world-correcting ≠ world-corrected) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| identifying goodness with a natural property |
|
|
Term
| Open Question Argument (open v trivial, not synonymous, compositionality) |
|
Definition
- a) 'are pleasant things good' v b) 'are pleasant things pleasant.' a)= open b)= trivial
- a) and b) mean different things (otherwise knowledge of answer to b) would entail knowledge of answer to a))
- compositionality of meaning: good ≠ pleasant (they are only difference between a) and b)) |
|
|
Term
| Open Question Argument: who it applies to |
|
Definition
- S Naturalism: MPs do not mean the same thing as NPs (unless you adopt Fregean sense theory)
- MP Nat: Just because meaning is different, doesn't mean reference is (Hesperus=Phosphorus) (don't conflate meaning and reference) |
|
|
Term
| Non-Naturalistic Realism: Intuitionism (Moore) |
|
Definition
- Good denotes an unanalyzable prop. not derivable from/identical to any naturalistic/metaphysical prop.
- Knowledge of Good comes from a priori moral intuition ≠ empirical investigation |
|
|
Term
| Non-naturalism: MI and deducing facts |
|
Definition
| MI doesn't serve for all moral facts. some can be deduced from other moral facts (wrong to kill dogs from wrong to cause needless suffering) |
|
|
Term
| Non-naturalism: Supervenience and source of moral knowledge (rationalism v empircisim) |
|
Definition
- Supervenience relations are brute facts (explanation must end somewhere: irreducible)
- Moral knowledge attained through a priori reflection (rationalism v empiricism) |
|
|
Term
| Intuitionism Objection 1: Fallibility of intuition |
|
Definition
| If MI is fallible, we have no way of securing moral knowledge. If I doubt that I see something, I touch it to check it's there // If I'm not sure my utilitarian principle should apply in this instance, I appeal to my MI, but if I can't rely on it: I can't know |
|
|
Term
| Intuitionism Objection 2: Hume/Harman and explanatory impotence |
|
Definition
- Hume: There is nothing contained int he act of murder which we call vice. It is an internal feeling
- moral beliefs can be explained by psych/socio factors (naturalistic)
- so there are no moral facts to be intuited |
|
|
Term
| Intuitionism Objection 3: Mackie |
|
Definition
Anti-realist cognitivist: We talk about morality: moral principles have formal logical inferences but no substantive grounding in real world
Believes all Objectivism relies on MI faculty |
|
|
Term
| Mackie and argument from queerness 1: Epistemology |
|
Definition
- Moore: Moral knowledge obtained through metaphysical intuitive faculty
- Mackie: to posit a separate sense (≠ sensory perception or introspection) is very queer |
|
|
Term
| Argument from queerness 1: response (essence, truth: same faculty) and rejoinder |
|
Definition
- It is the same faculty to which we appeal for ideas of truth, essence, substance
- Mackie: either these can be accounted for on empirical grounds, or they are subject to same argument from queerness |
|
|
Term
| Argument from Queerness 2 a): Motivational internalism (Epistemic) |
|
Definition
- Epistemic: disputes over wrongness of killing cannot be resolved through empirical investigation ≠ physical facts (roses are red)
- unless we accept objective values/moral facts |
|
|
Term
| Argument from Queerness 2b): Motivational internalism (metaphysical) |
|
Definition
- These putative moral facts have inbuilt normative/motivational component: a normative pull is produced simply by knowing a fact (implicit: moral props motivate to action)
- no such facts exist
- there are no moral facts |
|
|
Term
| Argument from queerness 3: Supervenience |
|
Definition
- With Naturalism, we had a simple account of supervenience
- Now: how do we explain that moral properties supervene on some objects? (what makes killing wrong?)
- How do we come to know how putative moral facts supervene on objects? Moore: intuitive faculty |
|
|
Term
| Motivational externalism, AfQ and Hume |
|
Definition
Mackie suggests that Hume should use AfQ in his is/ought distinction.
- if only some facts can be used to obtain normative claims, this is very queer (as is the faculty required to derive those claims) |
|
|
Term
| Mackie: Error Theory 1 (anti-realist cognitivism) |
|
Definition
- Moral properties exist in language: when we speak of moral principles, we presuppose a notion of objectivity
- This presupposition is false: all moral judgments are false
- M: second order moral skeptics must adopt error theory |
|
|
Term
| Mackie: Error theory 2: Why do we have moral language? (Hume, Mackie) |
|
Definition
- Hume: human tendency to 'spread itself on external objects
- Mackie: 'patterns of objectification,' or reading our feelings into objects themselves ('pathetic fallacy') |
|
|
Term
| Mackie Error theory 3: problems (nihilism) |
|
Definition
| Second order ET tends to first order nihilism (if any moral assertion is false, we make none in order to avoid inconsistency - 'torture is wrong'- so everything is permissible |
|
|
Term
| Error theory: 4: existence of moral discourse |
|
Definition
| ET can account for it: Moral props have formal logical inferences, but no substantive grounding in reality |
|
|
Term
| Moral Internalism v externalism |
|
Definition
I: conceptual link between a sincere moral judgment and the motivation to act in accordance with it
E: no conceptual link between the 2 |
|
|
Term
| Moral Externalism: Hume's theory of motivation |
|
Definition
Beliefs and desires are qualitatively different:
beliefs: mind-to-world fit (belief true iff represents world correctly)
desire: world-to-mind fit (desire satisfied iff world realises that desire |
|
|
Term
| Internalism v Externalism (akrasia, amorality) |
|
Definition
- akrasia (weakness of will): act against one's better judgement (smokers)
- amoralism: possibility of indifference refutes internalism |
|
|
Term
| Internalism v Externalism: responses |
|
Definition
| - akrasia: weaken thesis (to some extent motivated by fact. contingent conceptual link between judgment and motivation) |
|
|
Term
| Normative v motivational distinction |
|
Definition
Williams: you have a normative reason to do something if you see it as moral
Parfit: no normative reason
motivational issue cuts across this |
|
|
Term
| So Where does Naturalism stand |
|
Definition
| semantic naturalism disproved (OQA), non naturalism disproved (Hume,Mackie), so we're left with synthetic naturalism |
|
|
Term
| Where Realism needs to go |
|
Definition
Naturalism (avoid Error theory and Harman)
non-analytic naturalism (avoid OQA) |
|
|
Term
| Cornell Realism (synthetic naturalism) |
|
Definition
| Water rigidly designates H20: just because water doesn't mean H20, doesn't mean they don't refer to the same thing // moral concepts, they aren't reducible to a natural concept, that doesn't mean they have natural properties |
|
|
Term
| Cornell: Natural properties realise moral properties (substantive normative theorising) |
|
Definition
X is good iff X has natural property N that bears on human flourishing, typically leads to promotion of X..
Determining what N realises X: substantive normative theorising |
|
|
Term
| Cornell and Moral Twin Earth |
|
Definition
- in world A, substantive normative theorising could reveal that M is property of maximising overall pleasure
- in world B, M picks out property of not treating people merely as means |
|
|
Term
| Cornell Objection: MTE and relativism 1 |
|
Definition
| People on A say euthanasia is morally acceptable, on B say it isn't. Cornell: talking past each other: moral disagreement is impossible |
|
|
Term
| Cornell Objection: MTE and relativism 2 |
|
Definition
| // Hesperus/Phosphorus. If I show both people that they refer to Venus, disagreement ends. This doesn't hold for morality: saying they hold utilitarian/kantian standpoints doesn't resolve dispute. beliefs don't reconcile attitudes (shift towards Ayer) |
|
|
Term
| Cornell Rejoinders: relativism and analytic naturalism |
|
Definition
- accept relativism between worlds: this goes against the spirit of relativism
- retreat to analytic naturalism: OQA |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
- Naturalism without OQA (MPs don't mean the same thing, but are derived from NPs)
- Realism without queerness (no MI) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
S: moral sentences have no descriptive meaning, primarily expressive meaning
M: no moral facts/properties
E: No moral knowledge
P: Moral judgments are non-cognitive mental states (desires, intentions) ≠ beliefs |
|
|
Term
| Non-cognitive moral propositions |
|
Definition
| Do have descriptive content, but primarily expressive function |
|
|
Term
| Non-cognitivism: benefits (moral facts) |
|
Definition
Avoids
- queerness argument
- need to find a natural prop identical to moral props
- error theory: moral discourse not based on error, moral statements don't have truth values |
|
|
Term
| Non-cognitivism: drawbacks (moral discourse) |
|
Definition
| if moral properties don't express beliefs, how did our language evolve the way it did (as if there was moral truth, fact, knowledge)? (but see Hume/Mackie on patterns of objectification) |
|
|
Term
| Ayer's emotivism: logical positivism |
|
Definition
- all meaningful statements are analytic of empirically verifiable
- ethical statements are neither: they are not meaningful/truth-apt |
|
|
Term
| Ayer: descriptive/normative ethical symbols |
|
Definition
| - 'x is wrong' as stating sociological position' v 'x is wrong regardless of society in which it is uttered' |
|
|
Term
| Ayer and meaningful moral disagreement |
|
Definition
| Not possible normatively. 'Stealing is wrong' is truth-apt in sociological context, but normatively, there is on empirical justification possible |
|
|
Term
| Stevenson: meaningful moral disagreement (beliefs v attitudes) |
|
Definition
| Either we disagree over beliefs, or our views are just incompatible. If disagreement is not reducible to beliefs (and hence solvable), debate is not possible (we disagree over attitudes) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| - Pro-life and pro-choice, if they agree over the sanctity of life, but not the age as which a foetus constitutes life, this is a disagreement in belief. When scientific discovery as to when that is, they will agree ≠ disagreement in attitude |
|
|
Term
| MacIntyre: Intuitionism and Emotivism |
|
Definition
-Emotivism as a theory of use: natural historical successor to intuitionism
- intuit.: objective moral standards, but insolvability of epistemological pb (queerness)
- emotivism secures implicit acceptance indirectly (acceptance that there are no objective moral claims) |
|
|
Term
| MacIntyre: Stevenson and Nietzsche |
|
Definition
- if E is true as timeless theory of meaning, why did moral language evolve differently (to differentiate in emotive content 'this is bad'/'i disapprove')
- N: manipulation: benefits certain sphere of soc if people are made to believe there's a difference, that there are objective standards |
|
|
Term
| Carnap and Prescriptivism |
|
Definition
| moral judgments are equivalent to simple imperatives ('stealing is wrong' 'don't steal!'). so no moral knowledge/error |
|
|
Term
| Hare's Prescriptivism: moral supervenience |
|
Definition
- X and Y cannot have different moral status if descriptively similar
- to make a moral prescription is to commit oneself to judge same over all similar actions
- shows how moral language governed by rules of linguistic meaning: consistency
- descriptive meaning exists (the props on which moral props supervene), but secondary to prescriptive meaning |
|
|
