Term
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Definition
| Mind and Body are distinct and different substances; they have different essenses. The mind is essentially a thinking thing; the body is essentially spatially extended. |
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Term
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Definition
| psychic phenomena, Epistemological argument:from introspection, epistemological argument: from Leibniz's law |
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Term
| Dualism - Psychic Phenomena Pros lecture one |
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Definition
1)'science' of parapsychology
2) The alleged phenomena of telepathy, mind reading, pre-cognition, telekenesis, clairvoyance
3) These seem hard to explain physically
4) can we infer dualism |
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| Dualism - Phychic phenomena cons lecture one |
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Definition
1) it is not clear that such phenomena are real
2) in laboratory conditions, they have never been confirmed.
3) what about out of the body experience?
where we seem to rise up out of our body and look down? near-death experiences also seem to be like this.
4) we may even seem to decide to return to our bodies |
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| Dualism- Psychic phenomena cons lecture one |
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Definition
1) Reincarnation? Many think they were once Napoleon? (can they all have been?) They seem to recollect a past life.
2) The fact that one seems to be looking down one's body does not mean that one is.
2)They are merely apparent physchic phenomena; so there is no good pro-dualist argument here. |
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| Introspection argument lecture one |
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Definition
1) We can be aware of my headache directly but not be aware of our brain states; therefore my headache is not a brain state.
2) But perhaps introspection does not reveal how things are. It reveals that I have a headache, not what it is. |
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| Epistemological argument from Leibniz's Law lecture one |
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Definition
1) Mental states are known immediately (my own at any rate)
2) brain states are not known immediately, but they are known scientifically, by observation
3) So, therefore..mental states are not brain states. |
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| Dualism - Arguments for continued lecture one |
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Definition
Many arguments for dualism turn on the way we know about the mind.
2) it seems like a general principle assumed..
3) X is F Y is not-F so X DOES NOT EQUAL Y
4) e.g. David cameron is wearing a hat; the man in front of me is not wearing a hat; so the man in front of me is not david cameron.
5) this argument form seems ok
6) Leibniz' law' is that identical things have alll their properties in common. Surely this includes the property of being known a certain way.
6) But in fact the inference is fallacious in belief or knowledge contexts.
7) e.g. Lois Lane knows that superman can fly,
Lois Lane does not know that Clark Kent can fly..therefore
Clark Kent is not superman -- no |
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| Dualism - arguments for continued lecture one |
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Definition
Water=H2O
I can know that there is water in the glass but not know that there is H2O in the glass.
2) So similarly.. it seems that its possible mind and body are known in very different ways.. yet that does not show that they are not identical.
3) There is more to this argument.. Descartes has a more subtle argument. |
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| Dualism - Arguments against and for materialism lecture one |
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Definition
We will spend most on the causal interaction argument.
Other arguments are..
..dualistic stuff is only negatively characterized. Mental substance is characterized by what it is not.. not spatial, not material etc. It seems ghostly, Are souls in space?
...dualism also has trouble with evolution; it seems that mind emerged from matter. |
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| Dualism- causal interaction arguement lecture one |
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Definition
If mind has no mass or place.. how does it interact with body?
This is a major arguement against descartes.. queen elizabeth of behemia.. causal interaction objection
2) Action, perception.. e.g. On bangs one's head, alcohol
if mind and matter are radically different substances with different essences. How can they interact?
How can brain damage affect mental functioning? if mental states are states of the brai, this is easily understood, if not, not. |
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| Dualism- dualist reply to the materialist argument lecture one |
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Definition
| its a mystery how the mind and body interact.. it is basic form of causal interaction just like gravity, which the materialist admits as basic.. something has got to be basic, so whats the problem? Like gravity, mind-brain interaction happens, and we cannot explain it in other terms , its basic |
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Term
| Causal closure principle lecture one |
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Definition
to say that some events in the brain are not caused by previous brain events.
But this conflicts with what is called the 'causal closure principle' -- that the causes of physical events are entirely physical; that physical events can be explained in purely physical terms. |
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| Why believe the causal closure principle? lecture one |
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Definition
It is said to be a very general scientific principle, that regulate sceince.. In science we look for physical causes of physical events.
This policy has been successful, in many areas of Science.
3) e.g. exploding toaster.. or rash on leg, no cause..or we just don't know it.
4) the causal closure principles seem to be at the heart of physical scientific theory. So dualism conflicts with a basic and well-tried principle of physical science. |
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Term
| What is Functionalism? lecture two |
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Definition
The doctrine that what makes somethine a thought, desire, pain (or any other type of mental state) depends not on its internal constitution, but soley on its function, or the role it playes, the the cognitive system of which it is a part.
A mental state is determined by its role in a cognitive system:
1. Look at the system in question.
2. Identify the function of the mental state within it.
For some – this implies that machines and robots can think… |
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Term
| What is Functionalism part 2? lecture two |
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Definition
Mental states are (=) functional roles in a cognitive system (a subject).So potential cognitive systems (with mental states) include…
All of these could have mental states in causal relationships with
environmental stimuli, other mental states and their bodily behaviour.
It does not matter if the cognitive system is:
o Material or immaterial.
o Biological or non-biological.
o Carbon- or silicon-based.
o Etc.
So, “How can non-human subjects have mental states?” is a mistaken question. |
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Term
| What is Functionalism part 3? lecture two |
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Definition
Functionalism characterises mental states:
o By reference to behaviour (if indirectly).
o In terms of their causal role in determining how the subject behaves in
different circumstances.
What kinds of causal relationships?
1. Environmental stimuli.
2. Other mental states.
3. Bodily behaviour. |
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Term
| What is Functionalism part 4? lecture two |
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Definition
1. Environmental stimuli:
Injury to one’s leg causes me to feel pain in it.
2. Other mental states:
When a feeling of pain in one’s leg causes one to believe that the leg has been
injured.
3. Bodily behaviour:
As when a belief that one’s leg has been injured, together with a desire to relieve
the consequent pain, can cause one to rub the affected part of the leg or withdraw
the leg from harm’s way. |
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Term
| What is Functionalism part 5? lecture two |
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Definition
The functional role of pain is to enable the subject to detect and respond to
injury.
“The functionalist might say that the causal role of a feeling of pain in one’s leg
is to signal the occurrence of a physical inquiry to the leg, cause one to believe
that such an inquiry has occurred, an thereby help to bring it about that one
acts in such a way as to repair the damage done and avoid any further injury of
a similar kind.” (Lowe 2000, p. 45)
NB. a mechanical way of thinking – “what does it do?” |
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Term
| What is Functionalism part 6? lecture two |
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Definition
A woman with an umbrella – why?
Attribution
belief “It is raining”
sensation
desire “Gotta stay dry!”
memory “I have my umbrella!”
hope “It should keep me dry!” |
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Term
| Minds, Brains and computers 1 lecture two |
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Definition
software state inputs outputs
units of info->keystrokes->visual display
Beliefs-> sensory stimuli->mental states/behaviour |
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Term
| Minds, Brains and computers 2 lecture two |
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Definition
How literally do functionalists take the computer metaphor?
“The biological function of the brain is to gather information from the body’s
environment, ‘process’ that information in accordance with certain
‘programmes’ which have been ‘installed’ in it either by genetic evolution or
else through processes of learning, and finally to use that information to guide
the body’s movements about its environment.” (Lowe 2000, p. 47)
NB. functionalism arose contemporaneously with computer science. |
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Term
| Minds, Brains and computers 3 lecture two |
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Definition
Functionalism: the brain is a computer, the mind is a program.
Given xyz inputs, a mind / brain generates xyz outputs.
o Computers do this.
o Minds do this.
o Thought – mental activity – requires just this – and nothing more.
Does this mean that computers can think? |
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Term
| Minds, Brains and computers 4 lecture two |
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Definition
Artificial intelligence: if one could build a robot with a sophisticated computer,
that robot could be described as intelligent, thinking.
That robot has and responds to:
o Environmental stimuli.
o Other mental states.
o Bodily behaviour.
Does that mean that the robot can think? (It does what we do…) |
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Term
| The Turing Test and the Chinese Room 1 lecture two |
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Definition
Artificial intelligence theorists argued, on the basis of functionalism, that a
computer could be described as thinking, intelligent. Critics objected.
Motivations:
1. Artificial intelligence researchers claim that machines could think.
2. Strong claims made that e.g. chess playing computers can think.
3. Speculation that future computers may match or exceed human
intelligence.
Look at the Turing Test, then the Chinese Room. |
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Term
| The Turing Test and the Chinese Room 2 lecture two |
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Definition
Alan Turing (1950) and the Turing Test:
o If a computer can pass for human in online chat
then we should grant that it is intelligent.
Or:
o Could a computer program pass as a human being?
o If so, it’s intelligent, thinking.
The Chinese Room is intended to demonstrate that a computer cannot think. |
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Term
| The Turing Test and the Chinese Room 3 lecture two |
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Definition
The Chinese Room is a thought experiment devised by John Searle (1980).
Imagine a native English speaker who knows no Chinese locked in a room full
of boxes of Chinese symbols (a data base) together with a book of instructions
for manipulating the symbols (the program). Imagine that people outside the
room send in other Chinese symbols which, unknown to the person in the
room, are questions in Chinese (the input). And imagine that by following the
instructions in the program the man in the room is able to pass out Chinese
symbols which are correct answers to the questions (the output). The program
enables the person in the room to pass the Turing Test for understanding
Chinese but he does not understand a word of Chinese. (Searle 1999)
Searle says that the person in the Chinese room understands:
o Syntax. (structure)
But not:
o Semantics. (meaning) |
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Term
| The Turing Test and the Chinese Room 4 lecture two |
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Definition
Searle on the point of the Chinese Room:
“The point of the argument is this: if the man in the room does not understand
Chinese on the basis of implementing the appropriate program for
understanding Chinese then neither does any other digital computer solely on
that basis because no computer, qua computer, has anything the man does not
have.”
What if we replaced the man in the Chinese Room with a computer? |
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| The Turing Test and the Chinese Room 5 lecture two |
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Definition
E.J. Lowe on the Chinese Room:
“Turing and his followers must hold that the Chinese speaker would be
justified in attributing intelligence to such a computer. And yet, it seems the
computer no more understands Chinese than did the English-speaking person.
Moreover, unlike the English-speaking person, there is surely nothing else that
the computer understands, so our conclusion should apparently be that the
computer understands nothing whatsoever. But can something which
understands nothing whatsoever be deemed intelligent?” (2000, p. 215-216) |
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Term
| The Turing Test and the Chinese Room 6 lecture two |
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Definition
Two replies.
1. The ‘Systems Reply’.
The man in the room does not understand Chinese. But the man is but a part of
a larger system – the books of instructions, symbols, etc. – and that complete
system that is required for answering the Chinese questions. While the man
running the program does not understand Chinese, the system as a whole
does.
Understanding is had by persons (systems), not by brains (parts). |
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Term
| The Turing Test and the Chinese Room 7 lecture two |
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Definition
Two replies.
2. The ‘Robot Reply’.
Put a computer in a robot body, with sensors and effectors so it can sense and
manipulate its environment so it can do what a child does, learn by seeing and
doing so it could attach meanings to symbols and actually understand.
But:
o How does the addition of sensorimotor capacities entail understanding? |
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Term
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Definition
1. Functionalists conceive of mental states in terms of their function within a
given cognitive system.
2. Cognitive systems include humans (for sure) and maybe machines.
3. Most functionalists are materialists.
4. But machines evidence no understanding (the Chinese Room).
5. Understanding is a necessary feature of thought, mental life |
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Term
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Definition
stubbing your toe, the smell of roses, the taste of liquorice, nausea.. emotions- regret, fear, love.
these states are often said to be a problem for materialism, identity theories or functionalism. |
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Term
| Thomas Nagel's 'What is it like to be a bat?' lecture 3 |
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Definition
1)there is something that is is like..
2) the subjective character of experience
3) the first personal point of view. Imagine licking my brain while I eat ice cream.
3. bats had sonar experiences. what is it like for them? We cannot know. But it seems that there is a fact about what it is like, a subjective fact, (qualia)
nagel argues that functionalists and materialists leave out this crucial aspect of our mental life.Do they?
3) consider the possibility of inverted and absent qualia. Two functionally equivalent systems that differ qualitatively. It seems that we imagine this.
4) Can there be zombies? (there is nothing it is like to be a zombie) surely yes. |
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Term
| Problems with Nagels 'what is it like to be a bat.' lecture 3 |
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Definition
Problems.. does imagination imply possibility?
It is unverifiable whether others experience colours as we do. So maybe it makes no sense to suppose they do?
But we can imagine being kidnapped, having an operation and waking up and seeing colours differently.. so it seems coherent and possible |
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Term
| Shoemakers reply to nagel lecture 3 |
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Definition
pain gives rise to the awareness of pain, beliefs about it.
2) so there cannot be inverted or absent qualia
3) and he argues that if these were possiblities, we couldnt know about qualia. |
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Term
| Smith and Jones lecture 3 |
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Definition
1) A possible response..in favour of qualia.. the 'PP' theory, as they call it..pains have intrinsic essences.
2) They cannot have functional (relational) essences. |
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Term
| The knowledge arguments against physicalism (F. Jackson) lecture 3 |
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Definition
Mary - brilliant vision scientist- knows everything about colour vision however she has never experienced colors (lived all life in monochrome)- one day mary goes out of monochrome environment and experiences a red flower.
she lacks knowledge of non monochrome experiences
hence materialism and functionalism cannot account for qualia. |
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Term
| Responses to Jackson's arguments against physicalism lecture 3 |
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Definition
1) some say she has knowledge of the facts, but not konwledge how.
2) some sat she knows the same facts in a different wat.. after release from the room, she knows colour in a direct way. There is no difference in the object of her knowledge. Others den that there is any qualia at all.
4) Are there facts graspable both in a first and in a third person way?
5) Materialists say 'yes', Nagel and Jackson say 'no.'-different facts here, they say, not one fact known in different ways.
comparison with 'indexicals', like 'I', 'now' and 'here'.
5) Large issues here..can we unify both our objective and subjective ways of thinking?
Is there one world that we represent, that can be represented subjectively and objectively?
Or is the subjective mode of thought ineliminable. |
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Term
| Eliminativism - Churchland |
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Definition
a claim about our commonsense consception of psychological states.
2) the 'theory-theory'
3) a predictive device.
4) postulates mental states and a network of laws
5) like theoretical terms in science
6) Structure of what FP says produces behavious. compare with:
Structure of what in brain produces behaviour. Is there an isomorphism?
The more similarity the more vindicationist; the more dissimilarity the more eliminativist. degrees of fit. |
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Term
| Arguments for Eliminativism |
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Definition
Folk psychology is an empirical theory..
Has its successes, so Fodr says.. But
2) Churchland says.. that it also has failings.. mental illness, sleep, imagination, intelligence
Reply? That shows FP is incomplete.
And it might be a good theory of what it does cover. |
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Term
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Definition
Generalisations of FP. Serious will explain why they hold.
Structure of FP and structure of 'cognitive science.'
folk psychology, is like folk biology, folk physics, fold astrology..
why think we should be so good at knowing about our own minds? |
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Term
| Stephen Sitch - continued |
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Definition
So it is possible that FP is false. Example: folk conception of earthquakes.. actually roling and tumbling are different.
Argument: FP hasn't changed for 1000s of years.
Reply?This doesn't show much. Longevity of theory because it is true?
Arguement: FP doesn't cohere with other fields, such as brain science, biology etc.
Reply?; what about history, economics, anthropology? |
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Term
| Arguments Against Eliminativism - Predictive success |
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Definition
1) makes it likely that FP is true, that the entities and laws it postulates exist (Fodor)
2) And.. there is isomorphism of folk functional roles with what brain science has discovered. |
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Term
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Definition
1) Not clear that the existence claims of FP are due, or entirely due, to predicting behaviour of other bodies.
2) We are not like scientists..instead we empathetically put ourselves in other's shoes. ('Simulation' theory.)
We do not use some sophisticated theory
Autism/ young children research |
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Term
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Definition
Elim. Is it self defeating? Baker It says:
There are no assertions?
No beliefs?
Nothing is rationally acceptable?
Reply by churchland
Analogy with 'life' and 'vital spirit'? |
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Term
| Lynne Baker.. Eliminativism |
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Definition
Eliminativists say that it is question begging to use the old terms to express an objection to the theory.
Problem with dispensing with rational norms.
Perhaps one could think that another person has no beliefs,. and has no reason to believe anythign.
Not of oneself..
This argument doesn't seem question-begging. |
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Term
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Definition
The issue, the Options
Choice
I think “Hmmm, should I do some work or go to the pub?”
Either is open to me.
I try to decide what to do, to determine what I will do.
It is up to me. |
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Term
| Freel will lecutre 6 - could have done otherwise |
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Definition
Could Have Done Otherwise
The CHDO principle: that free will implies that I CHDO.
But …
The thesis that previous states of the world fix what happens later, including what we do.
So whether I raise my right or my left arm was determined centuries before I was born.
So, determinism means … that I could not have done otherwise.
So … we are not free… |
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Term
| Compatibilism - lecture 6 |
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Definition
Compatibilism
However, maybe we can be both free and determined.
How could this be?
A. J. Ayer… argues that actions flow from me, my character… ‘free’ contrasts with ‘constrained’… something outside me was compelling me to do something.
Hard Determinism
Soft determinism |
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Term
| Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument - lecture 6 |
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Definition
Initial conditions
Plus
Laws of nature
… Determine what we do.
So, we could not have done otherwise.
So we are not free.
(An anti-compatibilist argument) |
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Term
| compatibilist replies..(1) 'can'? - lecture 6 |
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Definition
What about the CHDO principle?
Move: direct attention to the exact meaning of ‘can’… or ‘would’.
Perhaps all it means or implies is:
If I had chosen differently then I would have acted differently… |
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Term
| (2) Frankfurt (Harry)- lecture 6 |
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Definition
The neuro-surgeon example.
Like two hit-men going to do a crime.
He argues that there are intuitive cases of responsibility, such as these, where the CHDO principle fails. |
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Term
| (3) Dennett (Dan)- lecture 6 |
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Definition
| “Here I stand I can do no other” (Luther). |
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Term
| Compatibilism:Problems and Developments lecture 7 |
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Definition
Compatibilism…review the usual idea…
Freedom is freedom from constraint. One does as one desires…
But…what about addiction? Hypnosis.
These seem like internal constraints.
Yes, there is an absence of external constraints…?
But what about ?….
phobias, obsessions, neuroses, compulsive behaviour (e.g. hand-washing), kleptomania.
These inhibit one’s freedom.
The compatibilist tries to deal with these cases.
It seems that more is necessary for free action than usual compatibilist accounts.
Drug addicts. Why are they not free?
Answer?: lack of control.
The idea is that those with self-control are free.
But what does this mean? |
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Term
| Frankfurt and Second-order desires- lecture 7 |
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Definition
Frankfurt… second-order attitudes.
The drug addict (the ‘wanton’)…
He desires not to desire drugs. But acts on his first-order desires.
So he is not in control. |
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Term
| Problems with Frankfurt’s account - lecture 7 |
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Definition
A) But if second-order endorsement of his addiction? Would that make him free? (The ‘Jo Jo’ example.)
B) What’s so special about 2nd-order desires? Why not third-order ones? Etc? Perhaps one’s highest order desires must be effective.
C) Suppose one’s higher-order desires are there due to hypnosis? Then they are not mine, in some sense? |
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Term
| Gary Watson’s Alternative - lecture 7 |
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Definition
Desires that are in accordance with one’s value beliefs.
When we act we act on reasons. Something seems to be good about the action.
Yes we can ask: and why do you take that to be a reason? Still… something one values.
Does this work? Watson’s view fits with idea of us an valuing animals.
Acting against one’s better judgement is weak will.
Acting on one’s better judgement … is free will. Is this right?
But? Weak will is not lack of free will.
And what should we say about someone with stupid value beliefs?Another idea: the kleptomaniac/drug addict etc… are free.
No problem? |
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Term
| Education or brainwashing?!- lecture 7 |
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Definition
Is education indoctrination? !
How can we distinguish them?
Maybe freedom is a matter of degree? |
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Term
Ultimate
Responsibility? - lecture 8COMPATIBILISM: DEVELOPMENTS - lecture 8 |
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Definition
Idea: that freedom implies
CHDO principle, or PAP
(Could have done otherwise… or principle of alternative possibilities.) |
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Term
| Recall Frankfurt cases….- lecture 8 |
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Definition
Pre-emptive over-determination.
A decides to do X. But if they had decided not to B would have intervened and made A do X. In fact A decided to do X.
Here we see a separation of causation from possibility (a metaphysical point).
Some reply that there is nevertheless a ‘flicker’ of freedom in such cases. So… even in Frankfurt cases, we can will otherwise… |
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Term
| Agent causation- lecture 8 |
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Definition
Some say that the person is the cause, not some event. We bring things about.
We have an active power. When we exercise it, we are free.
The action is not caused by anything except us. Not by our psychological states…
We act for reasons… we have a rational power.
Therefore, many have said, the self, us, is an uncaused cause. An unmoved mover.
This seems like a libertarian position.
Or can such a rational self be an emergent entity, ultimately subject to the physical laws of nature? That is, can an agent-causation picture be compatibilist?
You decide! |
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Term
| Source incompatibilism: - lecture 8 |
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Definition
Consider this revised Van Inwagen argument:
I think of myself as the source of my actions.
But my actions are determined by events before my birth.
I had no control over those events.
Therefore I am not free.
… because I do not have ultimate responsibility.Recall the compatibilist account… external constraints…rule out freedom. But it seems that internal constraints do too.
Skinner’s Walden 2… world of brainwashed people, conditioned since childhood.
Some Marxists and feminists say that this is our world.
Political sense of freedom, idea of true freedom, not merely the lack of external constraint. Idea of merely ‘negative’ freedom from external constraints, which is critiqued by Marxists/feminists. The idea of ‘inner freedom’. Are there ideas inserted by social conditioning.
The Jojo example… the son of dictator, who self-endorses his own brutish desires. Susan Wolf says he is not free.
Conformist societies… less free? |
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Term
| Susan Wolf (the Jojo example) Education vs Indoctrination? - lecture 8 |
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Definition
Education is supposed to open possibilities. Unlike indoctrination, which closes them down.
But can this distinction be made? |
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Term
| The idea of ‘Ultimate Responsibility' - lecture 8 |
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Definition
One idea: FW implies open possibilities?
Another: FW implies that the source of the action lies in us.
The origin of the action is in us…in our minds.
UR = ultimate responsibility.
If our character issues in the action, and it is a free action, surely we must be responsible for our character… ? Jojo thinks he is free. But what of his father’s influence? He determines Jojo’s character.
‘Brain-washing’. .. |
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Term
| Agent-causation Again - lecture 8 |
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Definition
The agent-casuation idea contrasts with the compatibilist idea that mental states cause actions…. This seems to misse the idea that …
I cause them. Not my mental states.
Compare this with an object causing something, and its properties.
But…Does one do what one does because of one’s character or nature…? So if one is truly responsible one must be responsible for what one is. (An existentialist idea?) The idea of UR is at work here.
Or does this generate some kind of regress?
Is real freedom, a kind of God-like self-causing?
We think: it is up to us… not one’s parents, education etc. |
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Term
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Definition
But if one were in a different culture one’s second-order desires or values might be in line with one’s first-order desires.
It seems … that… some desires, at some order, … must be unreflective.
This is arbitrary, at some level. |
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Term
| Value of Free Will - lecture 8 |
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Definition
FW is something we care about. Dignity/responsibility…
Consider the agent-causation idea that I am the cause not my desires or character… Does this imply contra-causal freedom?
What would freedom have to be for us to think it valuable? Would we value contra-causal freedom?
Or …. The freedom of acting in a way that flows from me and my character, my mental life, however that got there.
How that came about is not up to me… is that enough?
Or do we need to be self-creating mini-Gods?
That’s the issue on which the free will issues seems to rest. |
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Term
| Dan Dennett (raises the value question)- lecture 8 |
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Definition
What conception of free will would be such that it would be worth wanting and valuing?
Is what we have enough for a relatively valuable kind of freedom? Is a non-self-creating kind of compatibilist freedom enough?
Or does our valuing freedom imply a more demanding kind of contra-causal agent causation, which seems to lead to incompatibilism (and therefore to either libertarianism or hard-determinism). |
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Term
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Definition
What is epistemology?
Scepticism
Different varieties |
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Term
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Definition
384BC - 322BC
Greek
Student of Plato
Teacher of Alexander the Great
'All men by nature desire knowledge” |
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Term
| lecture 9 - Sir Francis Bacon |
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Definition
1561-1626
English
‘Father of empiricism’
First philosopher of science
'Knowledge is power” |
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| lecture 9- What is epistemology? |
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Definition
Theory of knowledge
What is knowledge?
What needs to happen for us to have knowledge?
What can we know?
Do we know as much as we think we do?
Do we know anything at all?
scepticism |
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| lecture 9- Scepticism (senses) |
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Definition
“Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.” (Med I)Descartes
1596-1650
Meditations (1642) |
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| lecture 9 -Scepticism (senses) |
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Definition
| “Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.” (Med I)Descartes |
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Term
| lecture 9- Scepticism (senses) |
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Definition
Sceptic’s claim: we know the senses go wrong sometimes, so we can’t be absolutely certain they ever get anything right.
Not convincing!
“[A]lthough the senses sometimes deceive us with respect to barely perceivable and distant objects, one finds that concerning many other matters no reasonable doubt is possible.” (Descartes, ibid) |
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Definition
| “Suppose then that I am dreaming, and that these particulars – that my eyes are open, that I am moving my head and stretching out my hands – are not true.” (ibid) |
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| lecture 9 -Scepticism (dreaming) |
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Definition
Objection: we can tell when we’re awake!
“As I think . . . more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep.” (ibid)
Objection: sensory experiences whilst awake are infinitely more vivid
Imagination can’t possibly compare with the effects of the external world on our senses |
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Term
| lecture 9 - Scepticism (dreaming 2) |
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Definition
We smell with the brain/mind, We see with the brain/mind, Conclusion: we don’t need the external world to have extremely vivid sensory experiences
If the brain is doing the right thing, we’ll have those experiences
Premise 1: Something would have to cause the brain to do all those things
Premise 2: It can’t be us (our imagination) that is doing it, because we experience many things that we couldn’t possibly imagine
Conclusion: When we’re having those vivid sensory experiences, we’re not dreaming! |
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| lecture 9 -Scepticism (dreaming 3) |
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Definition
Sceptic: But you can’t be certain!
Perhaps our imagination is better than we realise
Is there really anything around you that you couldn’t possibly imagine?
Perhaps there are two different types of dreaming (one hazy, one vivid)
Perhaps you’re not dreaming, perhaps there is some external cause, but it might be nothing like what you think... |
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| lecture 9 - Scepticism (brain in vat) |
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Definition
Premise 1: If the brain is made to do certain things, then we will have perfectly vivid experiences of things
Premise 2: It’s possible that a super-intelligent alien race (humans in 10,000 years?) could learn to manipulate brains in the required way
Premise 3: So it’s possible this is happening to us now
Conclusion: You don’t know you’re in a lecture theatre right now |
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| lecture 9 -Scepticism (brain in vat) |
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Definition
Response: There are still lots of things I do know
Maths
Geometry
A priori truths (eg. logic)
Question: what is it possible to know, without relying on the senses at all? |
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| lecture 9- Scepticism (evil demon) |
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Definition
| I will suppose therefore that . . . some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgement. I shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all these things.” |
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| lecture 9- scepticism (evil demon) |
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Definition
| “I will suppose therefore that . . . some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgement. I shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all these things.” |
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| lecture 9 - scepticism (evil demon) |
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Definition
| “I will suppose therefore that . . . some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgement. I shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all these things.” |
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| lecture 9 - scepticism (evil demon) |
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Definition
| Problem: perhaps the evil demon can also mess with our non-sensory information? |
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| lecture 9- Scepticism (evil demon) |
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Definition
If the brain exists, then that could be what constitutes me.
But why do you think the brain exists?
Sensory information
Might only be a mind
And all mental activity might be being manipulated by evil demon (including reasoning)
What then? |
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| lecture 9- Scepticism (evil demon) |
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Definition
“[Suppose] there is some unidentified deceiver, all powerful and cunning, who is dedicated to deceiving me constantly. Therefore, it is indubitable that I also exist, if he deceives me.
“And let him deceive me as much as he wishes, he will still never bring it about that I am nothing as long as I think I am something.”
“I must in the end maintain that this proposition, I am, I exist, must be true whenever I mention it or conceive it in my mind.”
(Descartes, Med.2) |
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| lecture 9- Scepticism (evil demon) |
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Definition
Problems even here:
Descartes’ reasoning might seem perfectly sound, but the evil demon might have just manipulated my mind to make it seem perfectly sound when in fact it is not.
Maybe there are just thoughts, but no ‘me’.
We don’t know the ‘I’ that exists is the same ‘I’ from one moment to the next (Hume). |
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| lecture 9- Scepticism -Underdetermination of theory by evidence |
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Definition
| “The problem of skepticism about the external world, or Cartesian skepticism, has its roots in the underdetermination of theory by evidence. We each adopt a body of common-sense beliefs about the world which answers to our sensory experience. In principle, however, the beliefs we base on that experience are subject to underdetermination, and we can devise radical alternatives to the common-sense account. Such alternatives take the form of skeptical hypotheses, like Descartes’s fiction that his experiences are caused by an evil demon.” (Vogel) |
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Term
| lecture 9- Underdetermination of theory by evidence |
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Definition
| “The problem of skepticism about the external world, or Cartesian skepticism, has its roots in the underdetermination of theory by evidence. We each adopt a body of common-sense beliefs about the world which answers to our sensory experience. In principle, however, the beliefs we base on that experience are subject to underdetermination, and we can devise radical alternatives to the common-sense account. Such alternatives take the form of skeptical hypotheses, like Descartes’s fiction that his experiences are caused by an evil demon.” (Vogel) |
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| lecture 9- Scepticism Concluding thoughts |
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Definition
Several different levels of doubt
Unreliability of senses
Dream
Brain in vat
Evil demon
Starting to look like we don’t know anything
Or that we know so little, that the sceptic has basically won |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii) |
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Definition
Apparently, we don’t know anything.
Depends how you define ‘know’
Popular account: ‘You know if you have a true, justified belief’
True you’re in a lecture theatre
You believe you’re in a lecture theatre
You’re justified in believing you’re in a lecture theatre
Therefore: You know you’re in a lecture theatre! |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)- where do we go from here |
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Definition
Sceptic: This is just playing with words
You ‘know’ according to this definition that you’re in a lecture theatre
But you don’t really know you’re in a lecture theatre
That is, you’re not absolutely certain that you’re in a lecture theatre
It’s true (let’s say), but if you don’t know whether it’s true or not, then you don’t know
This is what ‘know’ really means |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)- Playing with words? 1 |
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Definition
But is that what ‘know’ really means?
Depends on your theory of meaning.
Popular view:
Ordinary language philosophy
If everybody uses a word in a certain way, then that defines what the word means
Use trumps dictionaries (and philosophers)
Eg. “I’ll be literally two minutes...!” |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)- playing with words? 2 |
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Definition
Cf ‘know’
‘We now know that humans evolved from apes’
‘Do you know what time it is?’
‘Know’ has come to mean something like ‘have very good reason to believe’ or to express ‘beyond reasonable doubt’
Eg. ‘We wouldn’t put him in jail for life if we didn’t know he was guilty!’ |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)- playing with words? 3 |
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Definition
Sceptic:
This is still playing with words!
In this case, everything we ‘know’ is still in doubt
If you’re going to insist on using ‘know’ in this way, then let’s talk about ‘absolute certainty’ instead.
There is nothing you’re absolutely certain about!
Response: can pull same trick with ‘absolutely certain’?
Not so obvious...(?) |
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Term
| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)- playing with words 4 |
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Definition
Sceptic:
This whole debate just shows that we can’t even be absolutely certain as to what our words mean!
Response: this sort of extreme scepticism is incoherent
If we don’t know what our words mean, then the sceptics can’t even be sure about what they’re saying! |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)playing with words 5 |
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Definition
‘Global doubt’ incoherent?
“I know nothing”
But then it seems I know something, namely that I know nothing
Just to think about doubt I’m assuming I know what various words mean, some basic logic, etc.
Could it be the case that I know nothing, but that I don’t even know I know nothing?
But then scepticism is still incoherent, since we don’t know what words like ‘scepticism’ and ‘know’ mean |
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Term
| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)playing with words 6 |
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Definition
Don’t we necessarily know what our words mean?
Eg. we can’t be wrong when we say ‘there is a chair in front of me’ (if this isn’t a dream, I’m not hallucinating, etc)
That statement has been invented by human beings precisely for situations like this
Whatever is ‘really happening’, that statement is true (Bouwsma) |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)Hilary Putnam |
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Definition
If we’re all brains in vats, we can’t refer either to brains or to vats, because the utterances of the words don’t bear the appropriate causal relation to brains and to vats – they aren’t caused by brains and vats, but by the mad Professor.
American, b.1926
If we’re all brains in vats, we can’t refer either to brains or to vats, because the utterances of the words don’t bear the appropriate causal relation to brains and to vats – they aren’t caused by brains and vats, but by the mad Professor.
So we can’t refer to brains or vats, so we can’t ask whether we’re brains in vats. So the brain-in-vat doubt makes no sense. |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)playing with words 8- hilary putman 2 |
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Definition
Surely we can refer to vats?
Surely the brain in vat doubt makes sense?
Conflict with ordinary language philosophy?
If everyone intends to refer to brains and vats, then that’s what these words mean?
Putnam: No. Causal theory about how people are using language, just like ordinary language philosophy
If we’re brains in vats, then our ‘vat’ talk is caused by what we call images of vats, not by vats |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)where are we now? |
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Definition
Radical scepticism defeated(?)
Incoherent to say we know nothing
Incoherent to doubt logic too
And we must know what our words mean(?)
What about mild scepticism?
Eg. we know nothing about the external world
We can just accept that we can’t be absolutely certain about the external world?
We can claim that just short of absolutely certain is good enough!
But are we ‘just short’ of absolutely certain? |
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Term
| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)IBE |
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Definition
IBE: Inference to the best explanation
UTE: Our experience (the evidence) doesn’t determine how things are.
Could be external world
Could be demon
Could be brain in vat
Strictly underdetermined, but we can confidently assert that the ‘external world’ explanation is much, much better, and therefore almost certainly true(?) |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)IBE 2 |
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Definition
Criteria for explanatory goodness:
More explanatory power
Explains more things
Explains more deeply
More coherent
Internal coherence
Fit with other theories
Simpler
Ockham’s Razor |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)IBE3 |
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Definition
Vogel 1990 article
RWH: Real World Hypothesis
CSH: Computer Skeptical Hypothesis
“All that there is to the world is your brain in a vat, and a computer that is connected to your brain. Your tactile experiences are caused by the realization of a computer program that simulates wind [say], and your visual impressions are caused by the realization of another program that simulates a paper blowing off a desk [say].” |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)IBE - COHERENCE |
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Definition
CSH lacks internal coherence?
‘Why does the computer operate the way it does?’
‘Where did the computer come from in the first place?’
Same questions for RWH!
In RWH the wind causes the paper to move, not so in the CSH
Wrong, CSH can have corresponding feature |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)- IBE Simplicity |
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Definition
Which explanation is simpler?
Could argue that CSH is much simpler
Only three objects: brain, vat, and computer!
At best, it looks like they are equally ‘simple’
Feature of computer in CSH corresponds to every feature of the world in the RWH
Not really clear what ‘simple’ means
Ockham’s Razor not so helpful |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii)- IBE - explanatory power |
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Definition
| Vogel, p.663: “The ascription of specific spatial properties to objects does explanatory work within the RWH (e.g., accounting for why oranges roll easily and bricks do not). Since |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii) IBE - explanatory power 2 |
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Definition
| Vogel, p.663: “The ascription of specific spatial properties to objects does explanatory work within the RWH (e.g., accounting for why oranges roll easily and bricks do not). Since the CSH posits objects with altogether different spatial characteristics - we are assuming that its objects are just portions of a computer disk - the CSH will have to account for the relevant phenomena in some other fashion. But by bringing in these additional explanations (whatever they may be), the CSH runs the risk of taking on a more elaborate explanatory apparatus than the RWH.” |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii) IBE explanatory power 3 |
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Definition
| Vogel, p.663: “The ascription of specific spatial properties to objects does explanatory work within the RWH (e.g., accounting for why oranges roll easily and bricks do not). Since the CSH posits objects with altogether different spatial characteristics - we are assuming that its objects are just portions of a computer disk - the CSH will have to account for the relevant phenomena in some other fashion. But by bringing in these additional explanations (whatever they may be), the CSH runs the risk of taking on a more elaborate explanatory apparatus than the RWH.” |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii) IBE explanatory power 4 |
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Definition
Vogel, p.666:
“[Y]ou incur an added explanatory burden if you suppose that something lacking a particular spatial property still behaves as though it had it.”
So RWH has more explanatory power(?)
And CSH is less simple after all(?)
So RWH much, much more likely to be true(?) |
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| lecture 10 - Scepticism (ii) concluding thoughts |
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Definition
Certain types of scepticism make no sense
Many of those that do make sense can be ignored
When we say ‘know’ and ‘I’m sure’ we don’t mean ‘absolutely certain with no possible room for doubt’ (do we?)
IBE one way to argue that the commonsense worldview is the truth
But not easy to do!
What makes for a ‘good explanation’?
And why does that mean it is true? |
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Term
| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 1 |
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Definition
Nothing needs to justify my belief that I am having a ‘seeing lecture theatre’ experience for me to be justified in believing it
Or:
My having that experience (an action/event) justifies my belief that I am having that experience (and an action/event doesn’t need justifying!)
Claim: all justification ultimately reduces to these sorts of ‘basic’ beliefs |
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| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 2 |
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Definition
Roderick Chisholm
American philosopher
1916-1999
‘The Myth of the Given’ (1964)“When we reach…an experiential statement such that to describe its evidence ‘would simply mean to repeat the experiential statement itself’…we have reached a proper stopping place in the process of justification”
Crucially, in such circumstances what we believe is something we can’t possibly be wrong about
Thus we have a firm foundation for our knowledge. |
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Term
| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 3-Descartes |
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Definition
Descartes - “Those long chains, composed of very simple and easy reasonings, which geometers customarily use to arrive at their most difficult demonstrations, had given me occasion to suppose that all the things that come within the scope of human knowledge are interconnected in the same way.
“...we refrain from accepting as true anything which is not, and always keep to the order required for deducing one thing from another.” |
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| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 4 - Justification and inference |
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Definition
Wilfrid Sellars
American philosopher
1912-1989
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956)
To justify is to make an inference:
I can infer that I am in a lecture theatre from my belief that I am seeing a lecture theatre
I don’t infer that I am having a ‘seeing lecture theatre’ experience from my having a ‘seeing lecture theatre’ experience
An experience can’t justify a belief
It can only cause a belief(?) |
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Term
| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 5- Possible response |
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Definition
Could reject the claim that justification must be inferential?
Notion of non-inferential justification
Seems natural to say that my ‘seeing a lecture theatre’ experience justifies my belief that I am having such an experience
BUT this makes the fallacy of jumping from it being a ‘seeing a lecture theatre’ experience, so my recognising it as such an experience |
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Term
| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 6 -Sense data |
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Definition
Claim: Ultimately my experience is just of certain shapes, colours, etc.
Just sense data
It takes cognitive work on my part to apply concepts to that data and turn it into ‘seeing a lecture theatre’
It would be impossible to infer anything about lecture theatres from the pure sense data |
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| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 7-Sense data 2 |
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Definition
But then there is a justificational gap
Nothing justifies the application of my concepts to the pure sense data of experience
It just happens
So the most ‘basic’ beliefs I form are not justified
Do they need to be?
Yes, because they are not inevitable, given my sense experience
They are shaped by concepts in a particular way |
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Term
| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 8- Perception as conceptual |
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Definition
Perhaps there is no ‘mere sense data’ in our conscious experience
What reaches our mind has already been conceptually structured
Some classic examples here... |
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| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 9 - objection to perception as conceptual |
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Definition
Perhaps in each case, it’s not that what meets the eye is the same, but our concepts structure it differently
Instead, what meets the eye is different, because our focus of attention changes
Duck/rabbit case and Necker cube case
We see them differently, depending on where exactly we are focusing (even if we don’t realise it) |
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Term
| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 10 -- fodor |
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Definition
Fodor: ‘Observation Reconsidered’
What we perceive not affected by the concepts we possess
“Why ... doesn‘t knowing that the lines are the same length make it look as though the lines are the same length?”
Fodor: because our concepts don’t affect what we see |
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Term
| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 11 - objection: 'meduse' example |
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Definition
You’re sat on a beach, and hear lots of babbling in foreign language
You go to the sea and notice jellyfish in the sea
You look up ‘jellyfish’ in dictionary
Suddenly, you realise that lots of people around you are saying the word ‘medusa’
They were saying it before, too!
Example of an actual change in what you’re hearing?
After all, can’t focus attention in hearing in same way we can focus the eye
If an actual change in what we’re hearing, then looks like our concepts really do affect what we perceive (at least sometimes...) |
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Term
| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 12 - taking stock |
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Definition
Foundationalist needs to tell a story about what exactly happens to establish the ‘foundations’
If we receive mere ‘sense data’, and then this gets conceptually interpreted in a separate step, then there is the question of how this step is justified
If we receive conceptually interpreted information, then:
If it is shaped by our concepts then it is not properly foundational
If not then the foundationalist has a possible defence... |
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| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 13 - Modest foundationalism |
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Definition
Don’t need to be certain our ‘basic’ beliefs are true
It’s enough if they are highly likely to be true
So not a firm foundation, but a good foundation
Our network of beliefs remains justified
Can now use perceptions shaped by our own concepts as foundation
(assuming these are trustworthy, even if not infallible) |
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| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 14- Objections to modest foundationalism |
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Definition
Weakens the account, since foundation is not as secure
How do we know whether the conceptually structured basic beliefs are ‘highly likely’ to be true?
If our judgement of this is based on other beliefs, then we haven’t really got a foundation at all
Perhaps what we really have is a network of mutually supporting beliefs... |
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| lecture 11 - Foundationalism 15- concluding thoughts |
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Definition
Some difficult issues
‘Basic’ beliefs can’t properly justify our other beliefs
They are purely about our personal, ‘inner’ experiences
Or, if they’re not, then they themselves are not properly secure
Problems with ‘modest’ foundationalism too
Perhaps we need a radically different theory of justification... |
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| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 1 - internalism |
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Definition
Justifiers are (in some sense) “internal” to subjects
“…the epistemic justification of a person’s belief is [solely] determined by things to which the person has some special sort of access” (Feldman and Conee, ‘Internalism Defended’)
Especially other beliefs and memories
Typically, this “special sort of access” is supposed to be introspection.
Strong: conscious access necessary
Weak: in mind somewhere, but could be ‘subconscious’ |
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| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 2 - internalism |
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Definition
Example
You say John Lennon died in 1980
I ask how you know
What supports that belief?
What justifies that belief?
If you say you have no idea how you know, I might want to say that you don’t know it
If you say you have a vivid memory of reading it recently on the internet, I might think this is sufficient justification
Internalist, because memory is internal to you |
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| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 3 Problem of stored beliefs |
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Definition
“At any given time, the vast majority of one’s beliefs are stored rather than occurrent or active” (Goldman)
But the small number of conscious mental states one is in will justify very few of one’s beliefs.
Strong internalism: “Only facts concerning what conscious states an agent is in at time t are justifiers of the agent’s beliefs at t” (Goldman) |
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| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 4 Problem of stored beliefs |
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Definition
Move to weak internalism:
“Only facts concerning what conscious and/or stored mental states an agent is in at time t are justifiers of the agent’s beliefs at t” (Goldman)
But what if I can’t even access those stored mental states when I need them...? |
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| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 5 Problem of forgotten evidence |
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Definition
I ask how you know John Lennon died in 1980
You say you have no idea
I want to say you don’t know it then
You say “oh, but I do know it – the justification for my belief is in my memory somewhere”
Convincing?
Do you take yourself to know things, even when you’ve forgotten your reason for believing them?
Anyway, which forgotten memories count as ‘in the subconscious somewhere’? |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 6 Externalism |
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Definition
Justifiers can be “external” to subjects (in some sense)
Plausible idea: whether or not a belief is justified depends on how it was caused
For example, beliefs caused in the following ways aren’t justified:
• by wishful thinking
• by a decision to believe propositions expressed by sentences written on slips of paper randomly pulled out of a hat
• by a notorious pathological liar’s testimony |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 7 Externalism |
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Definition
What these beliefs have in common: they are caused in “strange or unacceptable” ways (Goldman, ‘What is Justified Belief?’)
in particular, such processes do not reliably cause true beliefs.
Reliabilism about justification (first try):
“The justificational status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the process or processes that cause it,
where (as a first approximation) reliability consists in the tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false” (Goldman) |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 8 Externalism |
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Definition
Clarifications:
• Process: an operation that maps inputs (e.g., experiences, beliefs, desires, emotions) to outputs (beliefs)
e.g., reasoning processes (beliefs to beliefs), memory processes (beliefs or experiences to beliefs), perceptual processes (states of the environment/receptor stimulations to beliefs)
• How reliable must a process be in order for beliefs caused by it to count as justified?
No precise answer
This won’t quite do: some processes are reliable, but they will tend to generate false beliefs when the inputs are false beliefs. |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 9 Externalism |
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Definition
Belief-independent process: a process none of whose inputs are belief-states
Belief-dependent process: a process some of whose inputs are belief-states
A process is conditionally reliable “…when a sufficient proportion of its output-beliefs are true given that its input-beliefs are true” (Goldman) |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 10 Externalism |
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Definition
Reliabilism about justification (second try):
S’s belief that p is justified means either:
(a) it is the result of a belief-independent process that is unconditionally reliable, or
(b) it is the result of a belief-dependent process that is at least conditionally reliable,
and the beliefs that are inputs to the process are themselves justified. |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 11 Externalism |
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Definition
Why is this ‘externalism’?
One might be justified in believing that p in virtue of one’s belief that p being caused by a reliable process,
but one might not be in a position to know that the process is reliable
(and thus not in a position to know that one is justified in believing that p)
So you can have a true, justified belief – and thus knowledge – without knowing that you know it |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 12 - Externalism |
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Definition
What about Gettier problems?
Case 1: Smith is applying for the job, and has very good justification for believing that the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket
He’s been told Jones will get the job
He happens to know Jones has 10 coins in his pocket
Actually he has got the job, and by complete coincidence, he just happens to have 10 coins in his pocket |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 13 - Externalism |
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Definition
But perhaps not justified according to the reliabilist
Seems to be justified (based on what is internal to him)
But if we look at what is happening externally
In particular how his belief was caused...
...then (perhaps) not justified
So not a true, justified belief (given externalism about justification)
and not knowledge (because of our intuitions)
So we are free to maintain that knowledge = JTB!
BUT...
Perhaps not so obvious this works in the ‘fake barn’ case
Externalist has to say that this is a case of knowledge(?) |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 14 - Nozick |
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Definition
Reliabilist, but different theory of ‘reliability’
‘Tracking’ account
If the barn were fake, you wouldn’t realise it
Your beliefs here don’t ‘track’ the truth
So belief is not justified after all |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 15 - other problems |
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Definition
Problem of forgotten evidence, again
I ask why you believe John Lennon died in 1980
The reason for your belief has completely disappeared from your memory
not in conscious or subconscious
Belief could still be justified for externalist
If belief originally caused in the right way |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 16- more problems |
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Definition
So, cases similar to Gettier cases can still crop up, apparently.
Can have justified true belief that we don’t want to call ‘knowledge’
But now because we think that if we have no idea why the belief is justified, then we can’t say we ‘know’ it
Can’t know it, without knowing we know it(?) |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 17 |
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Definition
Plantinga, - Case of a brain lesion, causing you to have all sorts of weird false beliefs
Also reliably causes you to believe you have a brain lesion
Externally justified true belief, but not knowledge?
Problem for reliabilist/externalist? |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 18- conceptual analysis |
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Definition
Lecture 14: could be a whole family of different concepts that come to be called ‘knowledge'
Two (or more) kinds of knowledge?
Internally justified true belief
Externally justified true belief
No question of which is right?
Both useful analyses?
Q: Do you know that John Lennon died in 1980?
A: It depends what you mean by ‘know’, and there is no one, ‘right’ meaning of ‘know’
(and stop putting ‘know’ in italics, as if there is) |
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Term
| lecture 17 - Internalism versus Externalism 19 - concluding thoughts |
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Definition
Problems with both internalism and externalism
Many problems disappear if we accept that there are two types of knowledge here
‘Knowledge1’ and ‘Knowledge2’
Apparently some cases of true beliefs which are both internally and externally justified, but don’t seem to be ‘knowledge’...
(Perhaps appeal to Nozick’s ‘tracking account’?) |
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Term
| lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology |
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Definition
Armchair Philsophy- Descartes:
Lock myself up in a room and just think my way to truth...??
Objection:
Can’t expect to acquire true beliefs about the world without actually examining that world
Scientific method much more reliable than this sort of philosophy
Metaphysics never gets us anywhere! |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
Quine on knowledge and evolution |
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Definition
Evolution theory teaches us that human beings have evolved to react positively to their environment
This necessarily means knowing things about the external world
How else would we manage to perform so effectively?
Traditional epistemology completely overlooks this
Argument for externalism about knowledge? |
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Term
| lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology- quine objections |
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Definition
Objections
Natural selection doesn’t ensure knowledge
In some cases, it ensures falsity
Why?
Some false beliefs can help us lead our lives more effectively
Eg. Belief that all fungi are poisonous
Eg. Placebo effect
Eg. Belief that God is on your side |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
Quine on knowledge and evolution |
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Definition
Worse: why should the sceptic accept the theory of evolution in the first place?
Theory of evolution end of a very long line of reasoning
Observation
Experiment
Theories about history
Theories about biology |
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Term
| lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology |
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Definition
Lessons from science for epistemology
Strong
Traditional epistemology wrongheaded
Should be replaced by science (especially psychology)
Weak
Science can help traditional epistemology answer traditional questions |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
‘Quinean Replacement Naturalism |
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Definition
The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology? (Quine, 1969: 75)
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. |
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Term
| lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology |
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Definition
| Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input – certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance – and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. [...] a conspicuous difference between old epistemology and the epistemological enterprise in this new psychological setting is that we can now make free use of empirical psychology. (Quine, 1969: 82-3) |
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Term
| lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology |
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Definition
| Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input – certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance – and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. [...] a conspicuous difference between old epistemology and the epistemological enterprise in this new psychological setting is that we can now make free use of empirical psychology. (Quine, 1969: 82-3) |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
Quinean Replacement Naturalism |
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Definition
BUT...
Isn’t Quine just urging us to concentrate on different questions?
That is, giving up on questions of justification and knowledge, and concentrating on questions of causation and beliefs?
But then the old questions remain, surely?
Quine isn’t arguing that they are non-questions, is he?
‘What is the colour of love?’
‘Is water an acid?’ |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
‘Cooperative Naturalism’ |
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Definition
Epistemologists need to make use of results from science:
Physics
Nature of light, electric signals in the brain, etc
Biology
The eye, the ear, etc
Psychology
How we think and reason
"...my position is a naturalistic one; I see philosophy not as a ... groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat—a boat which, to revert to Neurath's figure as I so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while afloat in it. There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy.“ (Quine 1969)
"How could our psychological and biological capacities and limitations fail to be relevant to the study of human knowledge?" (Kitcher, 1992: 58) |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
‘Cooperative Naturalism’ |
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Definition
"Epistemology is concerned with the foundations of science." (Quine 1969)
Epistemology should be a scientific enterprise.
Circularity?
How can we question the foundations of science (in an unbiased way) using science itself?
Quine: we can’t assess the foundations of science ‘from first principles’
No such thing as ‘first principles’
Quine’s holism:
If we find something wrong with our beliefs (eg. a contradiction), all of those beliefs are candidates for rejection
Including what are sometimes called ‘first principles’
Even the ‘law of non-contradiction’!
So we assess our beliefs as a whole |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
‘Cooperative Naturalism’ |
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Definition
So Quine a type of coherentist
Circular in a sense, but not viciously circular
Everything helps to justify everything else
No simple claim that A justifies B, and that B justifies A, and that’s why A and B are justified
No linear concept of justification
Questions about what we should believe?
“The normative is naturalized, not dropped” (Quine 1990)
Claim now seems to be that we should interpret the traditional normative questions of epistemology in a naturalistic way
Eg. it is natural science which teaches us that we should “mistrust soothsayers and telepathists” (1990)
Thus it apparently teaches us about justification |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
Natural and non-natural facts |
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Definition
Traditional epistemologist asks, what makes our beliefs justified?
Suppose we define ‘belief’ as a particular type of brain state
And we define ‘justified’ in terms of ‘reliably caused’ (externalist)
In other words, we define everything in terms of natural facts
That is, things that scientists study |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
Natural and non-natural facts |
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Definition
What about ‘truth’?
A brain state can’t be ‘true’! (can it?)
Suggestion: By a ‘true belief’ we just mean a brain state which brings us to interact appropriately with the external world
We have a ‘true belief’ that the table is square when that brain state causes us to navigate our way around the table, put things on the table, etc. |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
Natural and non-natural facts |
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Definition
So our question becomes:
‘What causal relations hold between the table and our brain, such that we come to have brain states that in turn cause us to navigate our way around the table effectively, put things on the table effectively, and so on?’
Our original philosophical question has become a scientific question (?) |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
Natural and non-natural facts |
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Definition
Objection
This isn’t what we mean by ‘belief’
Brain states are one thing, beliefs are another
‘True’ not to be interpreted in terms of interaction with the world
If a belief is true, then that belief accurately represents the world
Claim: epistemology is (largely) about non-natural facts
Thus largely independent of scientific questions
Especially if we are internalists... |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
Natural and non-natural facts |
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Definition
Claim: Naturalists should acknowledge that epistemology is largely about our private mental world, and (perhaps) about its relationship with ‘natural facts’
Assume close relationship between brain states and beliefs
Eg. beliefs supervene on brain states
Causal relationship between table and brain state may still be highly relevant to questions of justification, knowledge, and truth |
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Term
| lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology - Eliminativism |
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Definition
Eliminativism about ‘knowledge’...??
What about ‘justification’?
Cf. Nozick’s ‘tracking account’ of knowledge
Tracking =
You tend not to believe things that are false
You tend to believe things that are true
You might well not know whether your beliefs are tracking the truth |
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Term
lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology
Natural and non-natural facts |
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Definition
Tracking not as an account of justification
Not what we mean by justification (or should mean by justification)
Justification left out of the account altogether
Tracking defined in terms that are scientific
Eg. how our beliefs are caused
Can be investigated scientifically
Science of the senses, psychology, etc.
What of the question ‘Is my belief that p justified?’
Suggestion:
This might be a bad question, because based on a confused and unhelpful concept: justification
Instead ask whether you know that p
Which will mean asking questions like ‘how was the belief that p caused?’ |
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Term
| lecture 18 - Naturalized Epistemology- concluding thoughts |
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Definition
Replacement naturalism possible if we make some very strong (unpopular?) claims
Eg. ‘belief’ refers to a brain state
Eg. ‘true’ should be interpreted in terms of successful interactions with the world
Cooperative naturalism more reasonable
Extent of cooperation will depend on various things
Internalism vs externalism
Role of causation in our account
Relationship between brain states and beliefs |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge- 1
terminology |
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Definition
A priori – prior to experience
A posteriori – after experience
A priori concepts?
Kant: a priori knowledge
“knowledge that is absolutely independent of all experience” (Critique of Pure Reason, 1787)
Claim: if no a priori concepts, then no a priori knowledge
By ‘a priori knowledge’ let us mean:
Knowledge independent of experience beyond that needed to acquire the concepts required to understand the proposition at issue
“My dad is in Cleethorpes”?
“My dad is my mum’s husband”?
“Whales are mammals”?
“2+3=5” |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 2
a priori analytic |
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Definition
Other examples:
‘murder is wrong’
‘murder’ = ‘wrongful killing’
‘wrongful killing is wrong’
‘Every effect has a cause’
‘effect’ means ‘something caused’
‘everything which is caused has a cause’
‘Bachelors are unmarried men’ |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 3
a priori analytic |
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Definition
Dancy: At different times we treat different beliefs as a priori
Eg. ‘whales are fish’ was once a priori and analytic
The word ‘fish’ was used to refer in a different way
The concept fish used to be different
Now ‘whales are not fish’ is a priori and analytic
Concepts change over time
Given the change in concepts, these statements are not in conflict |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 4-
A priori synthetic? |
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Definition
Claim: analytic truths are a priori knowledge
But some a priori knowledge is not analytic
It’s ‘synthetic’
Possible examples
(1) Every event has a cause
(2) There are an infinite number of integers
(3) If something is red, then it’s not green |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 5
a priori synthetic? |
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Definition
(1) Every event has a cause
‘Effect’ defined in terms of cause, but ‘event’ not so defined
But perhaps not true...
Eg. Radioactive decay
Some events seem to have no real cause
(Or at least have only weird, probabilistic causes |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 6
a priori synthetic |
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Definition
(2) There are an infinite number of natural numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, ...
Obviously true
Impossible to experience it, and no need for experience to ‘see’ its truth
Not true in virtue of meanings of the words used(?)
BUT what is this knowledge of?
Anything in the world?
Not at all obvious what the word ‘number’ refers to... |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 7
a priori synthetic |
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Definition
(3) If something is red, then it’s not green
Definition of ‘red’ doesn’t seem to contain ‘not green’
We don’t define red as ‘a colour which is not green, and not yellow, and not blue, and...’
We don’t need to go looking at all red things to check they are not also green
A priori, but not analytic? |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 8
a priori synthetic |
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Definition
BUT
Possibly depends on your theory of concepts (recall Lecture 14)
Concepts generally not thought to be definitions
So doesn’t matter that not part of the definition
Concepts prior to language
Perhaps the concept ‘not green’ is part of the concept of red
So perhaps it is an analytic truth after all...(?) |
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Term
| Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9 - kant |
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Definition
Must have some synthetic a priori beliefs
Otherwise we couldn’t even get started with learning from experience
Must have some beliefs prior to experience to be able to learn anything from experience
Kant: beliefs about space, time, number, causation, and logic
Just beliefs? |
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Term
| Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9 - kant |
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Definition
A priori synthetic knowledge?
Claim: these beliefs are more about what’s useful to us than what’s true
So not necessarily knowledge
Cf. causation, space, and time
But sometimes truth and usefulness go hand in hand
Eg. logic
Even if true, not clear that we know these things without experience
True beliefs, prior to experience, but not justified true beliefs until experience shows them to be true(?) |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9 -
where we've got to |
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Definition
We seem to definitely have some a priori knowledge
Analytic
But not a very impressive sort of knowledge!
Reduces to claims such as ‘all mammals are mammals’
Can we do better? Synthetic a priori knowledge? |
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Term
| Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9 - where weve got to |
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Definition
Two cases to watch out for:
(i) synthetic, a priori true beliefs, but not knowledge
Hardwired into us by natural selection, and only become justified through experience
(ii) knowledge, but only about things which ‘don’t really exist’
Or only exist in our heads, as abstractions
Eg. numbers, laws of logic, etc. (?) |
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Term
| Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9 - quine |
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Definition
No real difference between analytic and synthetic beliefs
Nothing true simply by virtue of the meanings of the words being used.
Eg. cats are animals
Claim: Could turn out that cats are sophisticated robots put on earth by an alien race to spy on us
So could be false that cats are animals!
So not true merely in virtue of the words being used.
True partly because of the way the world is |
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Term
| Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9 - quine |
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Definition
Objection:
If what we call ‘cats’ are really robots, then there are no cats
‘Cats are animals’ is still true
BUT
Surely implausible to suggest that there are no cats
‘Cat’ must refer to our pets, whether they are really animals or they turn out to be robots |
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Term
| Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9 - quine |
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Definition
Harder examples:
‘laws’ of logic
Quine’s holism (recall previous lecture)
When we come up against a problem with our web of beliefs, everything is a candidate for revision
Eg. quantum phenomena may bring us to reject ‘classical logic’ in favour of ‘quantum logic’
N.B. Euclidean geometry has already been rejected as the ‘truth’ of physical space in the face of modern physics... |
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Term
| Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9 - empiricist view |
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Definition
If Quine is right, then all knowledge depends on experience
Empiricists: We can’t know anything about the world a priori (all knowledge ultimately comes from experience)
What about maths?
Platonist: numbers exist as abstract entities (in Platonic realm), and symbols like ‘2’ refer to these entities
Empiricist claim: maths not really about ‘the world’
Maths a mere logic-game, sometimes useful as a tool for thinking about the world |
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Term
| Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9 - empiricist view of Maths |
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Definition
We get concepts of ‘thing’ and ‘things’ from experience
We see that a thing added to another thing gives us a pair of things
Works whatever the ‘things’ are
‘1+1=2’ and ‘2+3=5’ are shorthand for our empirical knowledge about grouping things together in certain ways
Plausible? |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9
empiricist view of maths |
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Definition
Tricky cases:
(i) I know that 3 whales plus another 3 whales will give us 6 whales, but I’ve never seen a whale.
(ii) I know that 352 things plus 200 things will result in 552 things, but I’ve no experience of such ‘groups of things’.
(iii) I know that 8 – 10 = -2
(iv) I know that x+d |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9
empiricist view of maths |
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Definition
“I know that 3 whales plus another 3 whales will give us 6 whales, but I’ve never seen a whale.”
But you do know from experience that 3 things plus 3 things will give you 6 things
And you know that whales are things
Eg. from experience of pictures of whales, people talking about whales, etc.
So not an example of a priori knowledge |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9
empiricist view of maths |
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Definition
“I know that 352 things plus 200 things will result in 552 things, but I’ve no experience of such a case.”
Claim: from our experiences with small numbers of things we learn some symbol-manipulation rules
These rules help us to think about numbers of things where the numbers are hard to imagine
We can rely on the rules to reveal truths about large numbers of things, because the rules are essentially the same for small and large numbers |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9
empiricist view of maths |
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Definition
“I know that 8 – 10 = -2”
In this case, we’ve stepped outside the ‘natural numbers’ 1, 2, 3, 4, ...
Again, we’re playing a symbol manipulation game, but this time the game is not a tool for helping us to think about groups of things
It really is ‘just’ a game
Mistake to think that ‘8 – 10 = -2’ is true in any real sense |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9
empiricist view of maths |
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Definition
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9
empiricist view of maths |
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Definition
I know that ”
Again, this is just a symbol manipulation game we’re playing
It has some use as a tool for thinking about things
It doesn’t expresses a truth, but can be thought of instead as a definition of ‘pi things’, where we can think in terms of a fraction of a thing, such as a cake we’re cutting
In fact, much of maths can be thought of in terms of stipulated definitions, which can be interpreted as rules in the symbol manipulation game we’re playing
Eg. think not “1+1=2 is true”, but instead:
‘2’ is shorthand for ‘1+1’
‘2’ is defined in terms of ‘1’ |
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Term
Lecture 19- a priori knowledge 9
concluding thoughts |
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Definition
There seem to be things we know a priori, just in virtue of understanding the concepts in play
But quite boring knowledge, and perhaps even this depends on experience (Quine)
A priori synthetic knowledge more interesting, but harder to come by
May depend on our theory of concepts
Mathematics often thought of as obviously a priori knowledge
But empiricist interpretations are possible |
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