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No common power that performs the standard functions of a domestic government |
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Contains a notion of degree or variation |
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A variable with a set number of values (i.e. types of government) |
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Infinite number of values (i.e. income) |
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What you're trying to explain |
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What explains the variation in the DV |
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Delay mobilization: Democracy delays decisions by the executive to use force; reduces propensity for war Voter mechnism: Leaders want to remain in office; voters will remove belligerent leaders Information mechnism: In democracy there are "audience costs" to backing down, therefore threats will be more credible, thus democracies can better deter opponents |
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-In democracies leaders solve disputes peacefully -Leaders "externalize" their internal norms -States ext. norms, regardless of their opponent -States ext. norms, conditional of their opponent -Dem. states try to export their norms -Democratic norms take time to develop -Democratic norms are not upheld everywhere |
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-Collect data -Operationalize variables -Make concrete -Obtain a sample -Describe the data Analyze relationship between data
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Using a bunch of small observations to build a theory; start from data
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Start from theory and pull out implications and test the theory
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Characteristics of Interstate War
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-2 or more sovereign states -Exclude: colonial, civil, tribal wars, accidents, rogue commanders, unresisted invasions |
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-Political participation -Executive recruitment -Diffuse power -Excludes civil and economic liberties |
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-Translated Thucydides -Published Leviathan -The natrual condition of mankind (state of nature) is a state of war -State of nature=condition of anarchy -State of war: Known disposition to fight; needs only to be willing to fight -3 principle causes of quarrel -Glory -Some will fight to "stand above" others -Goverment is the "king of the proud" -Competition -Fundamental desire for self-preservation -Scarcity of resources -Diffidence -no dominant strategy in assurance (stag hunt) -War due to lack of trust
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-Independent action by one state to increase its security could make all states less secure and lead to war -Military buildup sends ominous signal -Interpretations depends on prior beliefs -Misperceptions can easily arise -Also possible to signal peaceful intentions -Security dilemma largely depends on the cost of being exploited -Security dilemma is not constant
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| Preventative vs. Preemptive |
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-Preventative: Farther in the future; spiraling misperception -Preemptive: Response to imminent near-future threat |
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-Deterrence: the use of threats to convince another party not to take some course of action -Highest expected payoff: A probability-weighted average of benefits and costs -Stake reputation -Establish a tripwire -Delegate to trigger happy -Appear irrational -Defender could also make war less attractive to attacker; make backing down more palatable
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-Rests on a credible threat of retaliation -Must be able to shoot back -Improve your response time (watch for attack, spot missiles, launch-on-warning) -Make your weapons hard to hit (disperse weapons) -Intercept your opponent's forces (missile shield, SAMs, attack subs) -Must be willing to shoot back
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-Indivisibility -Rulership -Holy site -Solutions=concede on another issue, take turns, allocate randomly -Overconfidence: both sides have private info; think they can win -Reputation: If you fight, you have a rep. for toughness, more concessions in the future -Preemption: Leaders have incentives to strike first -Promise breaking: Leaders may be inclined to break promises
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-States can benefit from cooperation -Fighting on the same side of a war -Better chance of winning -Enhanced deterrence -Peaceful resolution among members -Arms control -ISOs can: punish cheaters, foster trust, reduce transaction costs, link issues
-Obstacles to cooperation: temptation to cheat, lack of trust
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-State interests always win out -Lack of enforcement leads to weak compliance -Definitions of alliance failing -2 alliances fail when 2 allies don't fight together in a war (simple def.) -2 alliances fail when 2 allies do not fulfill the terms of their agreement (sophis. def.)
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-Maintain international peace and security -Self-determination among nations -Promote international cooperation -Encourage human rights observance
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-Multi-dimensional peacekeeping -More complex -Non-military elements -Intra-state -Traditional peacekeeping -Interstate -After something is signed
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Pr(win)xPayoff(win)+Pr(lose)xPayoff(lose) |
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-Extended Deterrence
-Deterring a nation through another (i.e. US deterring Russia through Georgia (failure)) -NATO article 5=important -Limited Deterrence -bargaining through violence -more common -i.e. Russia-Georgia war; Russia didn't want Georgia in NATO
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| Challenges for Terrorist Deterrence |
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-Retaliation may not be credible -US doesn't want to bargain -Hard to divide the prize -Problem of "asymmetric warfare" -Reprisals against terrorists may be counterproductive
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-Positive:how things actually are -Normative: how things ought to be
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| 3 Types of Moral Skepticism |
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-Amoralism -No normative facts -Extreme form of skepticism -Moral diversity -There are many different moral traditions -We can still reason with people who share our premises -Political realism -Morality in IR is utopian -States in IR are like gladiators -Moral behavior is dangerous and irresponsible -Moral rhetoric is hypothetical and pointless
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-An action or policy is morally right if it produces the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness (utilitarian standard) -Consequentialist -The moral value of an action/institution lies in its consequences -Hedonist -Pleasure/happiness is the ultimate good -Benthams hedonic calculus: intensity, duration, extent -Nonconsequentialism -Extreme: consequences are irrelevant to ethics -Moderate: consequences aren't the only ethical standard -Libertarianism: Fundamental right to liberty; duty of nonaggression
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Problems with Utilitarianism
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-Problem of incomparable goods -Things that are good for some but bad for others -Problem of greedy preferences -Possibly solved by diminishing marginal utility -Problem of special duties -Duties to promises -Family and friends -Citizens of our country -Are consequences all that matter? -Should we evaluate lying, killing etc only by their consequences
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Util. Counterarguments to the Bomb
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-Lives saved predictions overemphasizes American lives -War might have ended without an invasion (Japanese weaker, Soviets about to enter war) -Invasion might not have been so deadly -There were more humane ways to use the bomb (military target, rural target, allow civilians to evacuate)
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