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that which initiates a movement or that from which there is the principle of movement (Aristotle) |
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tendency that comes “from within” the subject that tends; an inclination to a good | Its immediate source is a form in the subject—the natural form or a known form. Every being has appetite: it is disposed in such a way that if it is possesses its own good, it rests in the that; if it does not possess it, it tends toward it |
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(1) The tendency to the good in things without knowledge; (2) The appetite a being has according to its nature; the intellectual nature has natural appetite in an intellectual way, i.e. according to the will | It is common to every nature to have some inclination; it exists differently in different natures, each according to its mode |
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The irascible and concupiscible powers of the soul, on which the passions are based. | The tendency to a particular good, which is also accompanied by the pleasure of possessing it. |
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| Immanent / Transitive Act |
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| Immanent acts are acts that remain in the same faculty and result in the perfection of the agent (e.g. when I see something, what is seen is not changed, but the agent who is seeing). Transitive acts are those that pass to external matter. They are not the perfection of the agent, but of the thing moved (they transfer perfection from one faculty to another). |
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· An act that is complete in itself. | There other types of activities that are perfect activities. These are acts of knowing or appetite. For example: to see. While I am seeing something, I have seen it while I am seeing. With the act of constructing a house, on the other hand, the house is not constructed. With the simple act of seeing, the act is complete. It is not in itself a process (even if it can form part of a process). If there was not such a thing as perfect activity, God could not have activity. There must be acts that are not movements. |
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| An act completed by another faculty but commanded by the will |
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an act that proceeds immediately from the will itself, like desiring or choosing |
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A free act, an act over which man has mastery; and this is an act that proceeds from a deliberate will. Acts which man does as man. |
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desirable or appetible; that toward which everything tends and that which we desire |
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| the voluntary investigation concerning that which is fitting to the end (i.e. the means) |
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| something could be otherwise / not be; not necessary |
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the absence of choice; lacking the possibility of moving oneself to accept or reject one thing or another |
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the use of a faculty, i.e. its acting or not acting |
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The faculty by which we are inclined towards things. | A passive faculty, naturally moved by the thing apprehended. |
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A power of the soul. The higher, spiritual, cognitive power of the soul by which we have the capacity for understanding and thought. A power of apprehension and knowing. In short, the intellect. |
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the highest good / perfection of the intellect. The operation concerning the total good, that which has in itself every perfection. |
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The rational agent’s cognitive power. The capacity for understanding and thought, apprehension and knowing. |
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| causa sui. This can be understood in two senses: (1) cause of that which is his; (2) cause of himself; end to himself; not only an instrument or means for another. | In broad terms: not constricted, not necessary, not dependent; the opposite is slavery. Unlike the slave, the free person is he who works and exists for himself. | The most adequate expression might be “self-determining” but this is not found explicitly in STA. Can go in several directions as opposed to 'determinate ad unum' |
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| The appetitive power whose proper act is choosing between various goods. | Will in that it is capable of choosing and intellect in the deliberation that permits that choice. Implies a choice (not necessarily between good and evil, but between two things). Free will concerns that which is directed to (the means) to the end. |
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Freedom of Exercise
Freedom of Specification
Freedom of Rectitude |
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Freedom of exercise: the possibility of acting or not acting, choosing or not choosing. | Freedom of specification: The possibility of choosing this or that. | Freedom of rectitude: the possibility of choosing in a way not fully in agreement with one’s own rational nature; it is not essential to free will and is an imperfection of freedom |
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| Movement (in the strict sense) |
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Passage from potency into act. Movement is a type of activity, but there are types of activity that are not movements. Movement is: the act of that which is in potency in that it is in potency. E.g. heating water. Requires heat in potency. It is not yet warm, and it can be warmed. The act is to warm – when it has something of heat, but is not yet warm. This is why ST says it’s an imperfect, incomplete act, because when it is finished, the act no longer exists. |
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| Aristotle’s definition of nature / physis: the first intrinsic principle of movement and rest. It coincides with the essence of the thing. | “that which befits a thing in respect to its substance” | By extension, we have begun to call the essence of every thing its nature. Thus we speak of the nature of the triangle. But the triangle does not move itself. |
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| That which befits a thing with respect to its substance; that which is per se in a thing |
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that to which an act tends | the formal principle of an act according to which an activity is configured
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The act of a rational potency; the acceptance of one thing and the rejection of another | An act of the will in relation to the means. | It is principally an act of the appetitive power. A desire proceeding from counsel, or deliberated or counseled desire. |
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the slave is one who works for another, basically exists for another. |
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an act in which the principle is outside the agent and without the concurrence of him who suffers the violence | when the principle of movement is external to the thing moved and is contrary to its nature (e.g. I move the stone upward – this is violent. When the stone moves downward, the principle of movement is in the stone itself.) |
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means that an action proceeds from an intrinsic principle and that there is knowledge of the end. (This does not mean that there are not also external principles.) |
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