Two Broad Trends in Foreign Policy Making in China in the last 60 years

• Pluralisation
• Civil society has more space to operate within

• Highly centralised and ideological
• Rejection of IS and opposition to the superpowers 
• Isolationist with emphasis on the unfairness of China's external environment

• 1978 Four Modernisations
• Link between domestic and foreign policies
• New CCP configuration of technocrats and a new capitalist class
• Engagement with IS to avoid conflict

• Stability and conservatism in FP
• Separation b/w ideology and policy
• Stable periphery and improving relations with old adversaries

• 'Peaceful rise' and 'Harmonious world' 
• Greater transparency b/w FP architects and people 
• 'Charm offensive'

• Hierarchical structure of CCP but desire to prevent one-person rule
• e.g. Secreteriat, Politburo, CCP Standing Committee

• Rooted in Deng's 1978 reforms
• Pluralisation => increased int. interactions and responsibilities
• Actors have more space to act b/c economic reforms diminished the CCPs role in the economy
• More expansion of social organisations allowing for more views

• professionalisation e.g. peaceful rise 
• increased participation from other groups e.g. academics
• Interagency coordination and decentralisation of power 
• more actors, more powers

• power politics remain critical
• interagency coordination and decentralisation may be reaching their limits
• all FP-making based on individuals' own preferences

• public opinion has begun to demarcate the space within which the CCP can operate
• academia
• democratisation
• but China's civil society remains limited, lacking instiutionalisation and complete autonomy

• Nativism under Mao w/ rejection of outside world
• nationalism as a function of CCP legitimacy but CCP constrains it as best they can b/c reliance on economic growth for legitimacy
• Recently, more pragmatic nationalism

• Large-scale economic growth & bilateral trade links
• Diplomatic engagement 
• Non-interventionist, peaceful IS 
• Territorial integrity and unity w/ stable periphery
• Cultivate soft power

• Political preservation
• Economic prosperity give the CCP legitimacy
• Quell social unrest b/c inequalities
• Just the right amount of nationalism

• Not a hegemon but wields enormous international political power
• Large-scale, successful economy
• Ability to wield soft power
• Stable domestic situation

• preoccupied w/ domestic problems for most of the rule
• Starts to rise  by late 1960s w/ nukes and UN 
• 1970s reinvents itself as champion of the developing world

• China= socialist enroute to Communism
• Focus on liberal economic growth 
• Seeks global legitimacy for the CCP
• FP still ideological and opaque but China simply trying ot build up its strength

• Conservative but separation of ideology and policy
• Great power diplomacy especially in Asia
• more active engagement of IS
• Increased international status

• focus on economic growth and anti-poverty
• advances diplomacy beyond Asia
• more open to help from IC
• cultivates soft power 
• peaceful deelopment and harmonious world

• Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
• opposing imperialism and exporting the revolution
• alternative to USSR and USA
• underlying suspicion of foreigners

• Socialism with Chinese characteristics
• Minimal political reform at home
• Deep-seated fear of chaos b/c Cultural Revolution
• new ideology: pro-development, anti-interference and keen to keep control

• Cross-regional diplomacy and cautiously embracing globalisation
• Peaceful rise/development
• Conscious separation of ideology and policy

• Single dominating leaders to collective leadership
• Multiple ministries
• Diverse factions and desire for consensus building

• emergence of civil society
• increase in public discourse

• Legitimises CCP rule
• Move from victim mentality to great power awareness
• "Pragmatic nationalism" (LANTEIGNE)
• But too much nationalism is destabilising, so need to find a balance

• Secure the revolution and China's borders
• Export revolution
• Obsession w/ large military
• Self-defence

• Reform of PLA
• Primary threat=USSR but West opening up
• Striving for internal stability

• Broader definition of security
• Less worried about border conflicts
• Modernisation of the PLA
• Cultivation of soft power to make China more safe

• China more secure than it has ever been
• Old security concerns: Taiwan, separatists, preservation of power
• New security concerns: economics, energy
• Some dissatisfaction over China's military capabilities

• Yes in a broad sense
• Peaceful development, doesn't want to overstretch, consolidate economic gains
• But hard to tell what a long-term strategy may be
• Military modernisations to catch up w/ West
• Problems with the term 'grand strategy' 

• Historical experience v. influential
• Hostile b/c int. regimes seen as Western dominated
• Limited engagement overall but did assuage int. isolation by early 1970s
• Multilateral engagement viewed as zero sum

• China needs info and hard capital to advance
• Engagement necessary and beneficial
• Slow engagement w/ IMF and WB
• Desire to overcome negative images of China
• Multilateral engagement as postive sum

• Institutions help build partnerships and a stable periphery
• Move away from hard power and marks the beginning of mutually interested communities
• Regionalism also a move away from post-Mao isolationism
• Confidence building & charm offensive
• Will dig in heels re: Taiwan, Macau, HK as part of China
• More countries in Asia see China as a partner rather than adversary

• Consultative body for regional security issues
• Asia-based alternative to West
• soft regionalism & stable periphery
• platform for China's worldview
• Might be viewed as too shallow

• More informal
• Allows China to tackle issues it cannot unilaterally
• Willingness to create new security communities
• Consensus not alliance

• Greater integration into world economy
• China's role as buyer and investor v. attractive to region
• Closely links US and Chinese economies
• Growing multilateral influence and domestic stability for the moment

• Greater competition for resources
• What happens if China's economy fails?
• Threat perception by the West
• Growing trade surpluses
• Unchecked growth could be disasterous domestically

• One party rule w/ big role for SOEs
• Greater liberalisation fo trade
• Commercial diplomacy
• Engage smaller economies to gain market footholds

• Self-determination of development policy
• Rejection of per capita GDP as be all and end all
• Emphasis on innovation

• Dont want to reject Washington Consensus outright
• economic liberalisation w/o political reform will not be beneficial
• Rise in nationalism can backfire

• Currently, status quo power that favours peaceful development
• Engagement and Interdependence
• Still not entirely responsible e.g. human rights, political liberalisation
• Overall, better to engage with China than isolate it

• All to easy to assume China will continue to grow until it reaches the top of the IS
• China continues to be authoritarian
• China threat mentality all about perceptions
• Economic growth has slowed
• China not very stable domestically

• Desire to create a stable, peaceful periphery since the Deng era
• Cultivate soft power
• Present itself as an alternative to Western powers
• Resource diplomacy and energy security

• Relations more trade-based than about ideological identities
• Economic cooperation with all
• Cultivates soft power
• More and closer bilateral ties

• Japan: some territorial disputes unresolved b/c energy
• Taiwan still a flashpoint
• DPRK: continued missle/nuclear tests and fear of a meltdown

• Post-CW US dominance of the IS
• Containment
• Engagement
• Post-9/11 dramatic improvement in relations
• Still suspicion on both sides to an extent

• Unfairtrading practices and lak of respect for regulations
• energy diplomacy clliding
• competition inevitable
• BUT symbiotic trade relationship
• Encourages cooperation and multipolarity
• China wants to be a great power but NOT a hegemon

• Economically, yes but much of China still highly underdeveloped
• Militarily, no as PLA still growing
• Politically to an extent but currently to weak to engage the US
• Socially, no b/c China too focused on its own domestic problems

• Natural resource procurement
• Cultivating bilateral relationships and trading partners

• EU focused on domestic transition of China while US focused on China's military
• Sino-Eu relations less competitive
• Eu more trusting of China's intentions and are limited in their criticism of China

• Will begin to challenge the US without antagonising it
• economic and diplomatic engagement has increased its influence
• Red carpet treatment for visiting dignitaries

• Economic relations beneficial to both but could be a threat if China collapses
• Lax labour standards and environmental laws
• Steady increase in military spending but China still very much outgunned by US
• Soft power greater than the West

• Economic gain for both but serious trade imbalances
• Alternative to the West
• Soft power and tribute system towards developing countries
• But needs stability for its investments to work so could indirectly challenge destabilising regimes