“The baby boom and its explanations.” The Sociological Quarterly, 24(3), 353-365.

2 main trends in fertility in the postwar era

1.  Increase in fertility through the late 1950s (baby boom)

2. Rise in frequency and effectiveness of contraception during the 1960s

Demographic features of the baby boom

- The TFR was about 2.2 during the mid-1930s, 3.6 during the baby boom, ad 1.8 during the mid-1970s

- Ryder (1980) demonstrated that the period fertility rate can change even if the cohort fertility rate remains unchanged

- He showed that the increase in period fertility was due more to the timing of births than the changes in quantum

- However, not a significant portion of the baby boom was still due to quantum

- Much greater proportion of women having two children (82% of 1933 cohort had at least 2 kids), rather than some families with at least two children going on to have more

In sum, the baby boom consisted of the following 4 phenomena:

1. Women marrying and having first births earlier after the war

2. A larger proportion of women having at least 2 kids

3. A larger proportion of women having families of the same size (2-4 kids)

4. A slight increase in average family size, owing to increases in unintended fertility

Explanations for these patterns

- Shift toward values of family and traditionalism

- Post-war economic prosperity

- Social-psychological effects of growing up during the depression (Elder)

- Easterlin hypothesis that cohort size affects relative economic status (small cohorts during depression)

“An economic analysis of fertility.” Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries. 225-256.

Objective of article is to develop an economic theory to explain variations in fertility in the US in the first half of the twentieth century

- The growth of knowledge about contraception gave parents more control over how many children to have

- Children can be thought of as a consumption good (like a car or house) in that they provide utility

- Parents decide how many children to have (quantity) and how much to spend on each child (quality)

- Becker predicts that a rise in individual income substantially increases the amount that couples spend on children and slightly increases the number of children desired

- Unlike Malthus, he does not believe that increases in income will lead to large increases in quantity of children

- Malthus did not recognize that couples would decrease their fertility in the face of reductions in child mortality

- Richer families spend more on children than poorer families; i.e. the rich have “higher quality children”

- Quantity is a close substitute for quality, therefore families with lots of kids spend less per child than families with fewer kids

Becker than examines his theory empirically

- At first glance, data suggests that wealthy families have fewer children than poor families

- Becker predicts that this may be due to poorer families’ lack of knowledge of contraceptive techniques, not to the preferences of rich versus poor families

- In fact, evidence suggests that rich families desire more children than poor families, although rich families tend to have fewer children

- Further evidence also suggests that as knowledge about contraception spread after WWII, the fertility of poor couples fell more than the fertility of rich couples

Thus, controlling for contraceptive knowledge and use reveals a positive relationship between income and fertility at the individual level (In 1960)

- At the macro level as well, cyclical variations in the business cycle correspond to changes in fertility

- When times are tough, fertility at the national level has fallen, and in times of prosperity it has risen

- However, one may argue that over time, per capita income in the US has risen while fertility has decreased

- Becker argues that this is attributable to a decline in child mortality, an increase in contraceptive knowledge, and a rise in the cost of children

- The cost of children has risen due to legislation prohibiting child labor and requiring education, as well as due to the movement of many families from rural to urban areas, where raising kids is more expensive

- In sum, “it seems that the negative correlation between the secular changes in fertility and income is not strong evidence against the hypothesis that an increase in income would cause an increase in fertility—tastes, costs, and knowledge remaining constant.”

“Toward a reinstatement of demographic transition theory.” Population and Development Review, 2(3/4), 321-366.

Main argument of paper is that fertility behavior is economically rational; i.e. that fertility is high or low as a result of the economic benefit to couples, individuals, or families

There exist 2 types of fertility regimes

1. No economic gain from restriction of fertility

- Wealth flows from children to parents

- This is common in agricultural societies where children can help tend to the farm

- Also common in smaller, primitive communities, where the size of one’s family may determine one’s share of political representation

2. Economic gain from restriction of fertility

- Wealth flows from parents to children

- A shift from the 1^st to the 2^nd type of regime can only occur after the emotional and economic nucleation of the family

 Some factors that may have contributed to the nucleation of the family in Western countries include:

- The feudal system, which was inherited from the urbanized empires of the ancient world

- Protestantism, which emphasizes self-sufficiency

- All in all, Caldwell admits that he doesn’t have a good idea about why the family was economically nucleated in the West

- Shift from 1^st to 2^nd regime in the developing world primarily the result of social change rather than the result of modernization

- Acceptance of Western values have led parents in developing countries (particularly in Africa, where the data for this paper comes from) to invest more in their children

- The mass media has played a large role in the transmission of Western values

- However, Caldwell notes that it’s not as if all pre-transition societies have as many kids as possible and all post-transition societies have zero kids; factors other than pure economic rationality due play a role (psychological, physiological, social, etc.)

 “The Decline of Fertility in Europe since the Eighteenth Century as a Chapter in Demographic History.” In The Decline of Fertility in Europe.  Edited by Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins.  Guildford, Surrey: Princeton University Press.  Ch. 1.

Summary of the historical context of fertility decline that prompted the Princeton Fertility Project

- For the majority of human history, growth rates were near zero

- Since 1750, growth rates have increased dramatically; only since about 1970 have the begun decelerating

- Coale believes that various homeostatic mechanisms have kept birth rates roughly in line with death rates throughout human history

- Malthus proposed various positive checks to population growth, such as more contagion, more contamination, and less adequate nutrition

- Although some demographers have postulated that pre-transition fertility rates must have been quite high to offset death rates, Coale finds that fertility rates at this time were actually quite moderate (in the realm of TFRs of 4-6)

- What factors contributed to moderate fertility in pre-transition populations?

- Henry (1961) distinguishes between non-parity specific fertility measures (measures that serve to reduce births but are unrelated to number of prior children) and parity specific fertility measures (measures used to reduce births after desired number already born)

- Coale argues that non-parity specific measures—specifically low proportions of married women—contributed to moderate fertility in pre-transition populations

- In contrast, reduction in fertility during the transition was due to parity specific measures, including abstinence w/in marriage, birth control, and abortion

- Uses the Coale and Trussel (1974; 1978) model of marital fertility to provide evidence for this argument

- The Coale and Trussel model expresses marital fertility at age ‘a’ r(a) as a function of M, the ratio of actual marital fertility at age ‘a’ r(a) to expected marital fertility at age ‘a’ in the absence of parity-related limitations n(a), and m, a measure of the extent to which parity-related limitation affects age-specific marital fertility rates

- Lower values of m indicate less of an effect of parity-specific measures on the reduction of marital fertility, whereas higher values of M indicate less of an effect of parity-specific measures on reduction of marital fertility

- Coale recognizes, however, that select pre-industrial populations were using parity-specific measures to reduce fertility (for instance, the nobility in France, England, and Italy, the Jews in Italy, and the rural population in France)

- While pre-industrial populations exhibit a decent amount of variation in fertility rates, fertility rates in developed societies are much more similar

- Differing marriage rates explain most of the variation in fertility amidst pre-transition societies

- Marriage acts as a sort of homeostatic mechanism to regulate population size in good and bad times

Martial fertility declined in Europe

France was way ahead

Marriage rates fell, delayed marriage and more nuns/spinsters

(what time period?)

1983 - US law against sharing obsense, lewd, lavious material in the mail.

Keeps porn out of the mail, but also keeps info about controception and methods

(French secret)

“Population policy dilemmas in Europe at the dawn of the twenty-first century.” Population and Development Review, 29(1), 1-28.

Discussion of political and social problems inherent in Europe’s population predicament

- The intrinsic rate of growth in Europe based on current levels of fertility and mortality is -0.0146

- Such a decline would bring the population to half its current size in 47 years

- Comparison of growth between 1950 and 2050 in Russia and Yemen reveals drastic nature of this phenomenon

- Russia projected to decline by 40 million people between 2000 and 2050

- Yemen projected to increase by 81 million people between 2000 and 2050

- This would bring its population to 102 million, which is more than 24 times its size in 1950!

- This comparison is emblematic of future global demographic picture; Europe projected to shrink while countries in North and West Africa (Europe’s southern hinterland) expected to grow by enormous amounts

Potential policy responses

1. Do nothing and embrace reduced population size

 - Has the benefit of easing strain on natural resources

- However, large population size may also be linked to political and military power, so Europe may not want to let these go

2. Governments could also attempt to raise fertility

- However, this goes against a long tradition of laissez-faire  governance, where governments stayed out of personal decisions

- The most common “pronatalist” policy today is to make participation for women in the labor force compatible with raising children

- These types of policies could backfire if they result in the devaluation of parenthood and ultimately serve to lower fertility

- Governments have also tried to provide monetary incentives to parents, but these do not appear to have had large effects of couple’s fertility decisions

3. Finally, governments could embrace immigrants

- Although there has been a lot of resistance to embracing immigration, Demeny thinks that continued immigration is inevitable

- Although this may not be enough to halt the current population decline in Europe, it will moderate it considerably

“Two kinds of preindustrial household formation systems.” Population and Development Review, 8(3), 449-494.

Objective of paper is to compare 2 types of hh formation systems: simple versus joint

- Simple hh systems prevalent in preindustrial NW Europe

- Joint hh systems prevalent in preindustrial India and China

3 hh formation rules in simple hh systems

1. Late marriage for both sexes

2. After marriage, couples become head of hh

3. Before marriage, young people work lesser amounts

3 hh formation rules in joint hh systems

1. Earlier marriage for men and women

2. Newlywed couple not usually head of own hh

3. Households with many couples often split to form 2+ hhs, often still containing multiple married couples

- Hajnal uses historical census data from Denmark in the 1700s and India/China in the 1950s to provide evidence for arguments

- Despite different hh systems, average hh size very similar in NW Europe and India/China

Extra ppl are servants in Europe and relatives in India/China

- Moreover, later age at marriage in Europe means that fewer new hhs are formed, thereby increasing mean size of hhs

- The institution of service in simple hh systems helped delay marriage in times of economic strain and control population growth

- Joint hh systems lacked this mechanism

“Conclusions.” In The Decline of Fertility in Europe.  Edited by Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins.  Guildford, Surrey: Princeton University Press.  Ch. 11.

The two goals of the European Fertility Project were:

1. to create a quantitative record of fertility in each of the several hundred provinces in Europe during the period of major decline and

2. to determine the social and economic conditions that led to this decline

- Because demographic transition theory is supposed to predict future patterns in developing countries, the project also wanted to examine whether or not these patterns held in all or most of Europe

- Watkins distinguishes between nuptiality and marital fertility when describing declines in fertility

- Creates and index of marital fertility I_g and an index of nuptiality I_m  to compare rates of fertility and nuptiality to the Hutterite population in the United States (population with highest observed levels of fertility)

Summary of major findings from the European Fertility Project

- Original fertility rates lower than originally believed

- Large fluctuations in pre-transition fertility (primarily driven by fluctuations in nuptiality)

- Decreases in fertility rates during the transition mostly due to decreases in marital fertility

Some major explanations for fertility decline

- Decreases in infant and child mortality, increased urbanization, changing roles of women, increased education

- However, evidence for these explanations was surprisingly weak

- Watkins argues that local norms were the primary drivers to fertility decline

- Many of the researchers on the European Fertility Project found that clusters of provinces went through the transition together, even though some of the provinces had not yet experienced modernization

- This was especially true of provinces that shared a language, culture, etc.

- Stark similarities in nuptiality and marital fertility rates in geographically and culturally similar provinces

- Thus, certain economic and social conditions may have been necessary for fertility rates to begin to fall in some provinces, but once this decline in fertility rates started, it quickly spread to nearby provinces even if they hadn’t experienced these social and economic changes