Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Anything good is only good by its relation to goodwill |
|
|
Term
| acting from the motive of duty vs. acting merely in conformity with duty |
|
Definition
| Acting because you must rather than by choice, aka law forces you to vs you would've chosen to anyway |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Only reason humans are subject to moral laws |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| compel actions in given circumstances: |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| denotes an absolute, unconditional requirement that asserts its authority in all circumstances, both required and justified as an end in itself. |
|
|
Term
| the Universal Law Formula of the CI |
|
Definition
| Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law. |
|
|
Term
| the Humanity (or End in Itself) Formula of the CI |
|
Definition
| So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means |
|
|
Term
| the value of persons vs. the value of things |
|
Definition
Anything that has only relative value/worth Kant calls a ‘thing,’ and anything that has absolute value/worth Kant calls a ‘person.’
The value of things and the value of persons are incommensurable—they cannot be measured against or traded for one another. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
(1) our behavior as rational beings is governed by universal laws of conduct, BUT …
(2) these universal laws are themselves willed by us.
In other words, as rational beings, we are self-governing. We are autonomous. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
Mill’s notion of dignity: a person’s refusal to give up higher pleasures, even in lesser quantity, for lower pleasures
Kant’s notion of dignity: the value a person has in virtue of her autonomy, in virtue of her capacity to act according to laws that she herself wills |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a cognitive bias whereby a moral agent is assigned moral blame or praise for an action or its consequences even though it is clear that said agent did not have full control over either the action or its consequences. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| concerns the consequences of actions and situations |
|
|
Term
| circumstantial moral luck |
|
Definition
| concerns the surroundings of the moral agent -- nazi germany |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| concerns the personal character of a moral agent. Blame for being selfish--result of surroundings |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| that actions are determined by external events and are thus consequences of events over which the person taking the action has no control. |
|
|
Term
| the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) |
|
Definition
| An agent is responsible for an action only if said agent could have done otherwise. |
|
|
Term
| Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP |
|
Definition
| Frankfurt suggests that it be revised to take into account the fallacy of the notion that coercion precludes an agent from moral responsibility. It must be only because of coercion that the agent acts as he does. The best definition, by his reckoning, is this: "[A] person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise." |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a trait or quality deemed to be morally excellent and thus is valued as a foundation of principle and good moral being. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
Not too much or too little of a particular trait
Cowardice-->courage-->rashness |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a person whose every action is as morally good as possible, a person, that is , who is as morally worthy as can be. |
|
|
Term
| Susan Wolf’s argument that they do not make good personal ideals |
|
Definition
Wolf’s Thesis: Although there are a variety of types of people that can be said to be moral saints, moral saintliness and moral perfection are not ideals that humans should strive for.
Humans should not aim to be moral saints, and moral sainthood does not provide an adequate model of well-being that humans should want.
It is not rational to pursue moral sainthood. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| gains happiness from the happiness of others, and devotes himself to others in this regard. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| focuses on the happiness of others at the cost of forgoing his own happiness. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| is the point of view from which we judge moral perfection and moral goodness in our individual lives. It is the point of view from which we recognize that in pursuing our interest we are one among a number of individuals whose interests must be taken into consideration. |
|
|
Term
| the point of view of individual perfection |
|
Definition
| is the point of view from which we judge what kinds of lives are worth living and what kinds of interests and talents are worth developing. |
|
|
