Term
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Definition
| Something aimed at; the end or goal; something useful for an end; sometimes something which functions well, as a good dog or a good hammer. The good for a human being depends on the function of a human being and the excellence of that function. As a rational being, a human is distinguished from other entities by the ability to reason which is an essential function by which humans are defined. Excellence of reasoning is an essential part of the human good. |
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Definition
| Excellence. In moral philosophy, virtues of character (justice, temperance and so forth) concern excellence in action. In that context virtue is a state of character involving decision, consisting in a mean relative to us, defined by reference to right reasoning as a prudent person would define it. Virtues of thought such as understanding, scientific knowledge and wisdom are also human excellences which play important roles in the highest form of happiness for Aristotle. But the virtues of thought do not aim at action. That is reserved for prudence which is excellence of thought and judgment with respect to practical matters. Prudence, then, is an excellence of thinking and judgment which plays an essential role in virtue of character. |
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| In a broad sense (general justice), this encompasses all the virtues of character. The narrower sense of justice (special justice) concerns excellence of social interaction with other human beings. Aristotle mentions four forms of special justice: justice in distribution, justice in rectification, justice in exchange and political justice. |
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| A lack of sufficient and consistent control over the non-rational part of the soul which is able to listen to reason. Incontinence is the answer as to why it is that otherwise good people sometimes fail to act properly while for the most part continuing to be good. Aristotle describes the mechanism of incontinence by means of the practical syllogism and failures regarding universal or particular propositions in the practical syllogism which guides human beings in their deliberation and decision regarding moral actions. |
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Definition
| This is a vice concerned with pleasures and pains. It is lack of proper moderation. |
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| This is an excellence of the rationally calculating part of the soul which functions to assist in the process of discerning and carrying out proper (good) moral actions. It requires experience which contributes to its deliberation and decision-making. It concerns particulars and the community and aims at the human good in action. |
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| In Book 6 Chapter 7 Aristotle explains that this is an excellence of intellect which provides the best kind of knowledge and which employs science which is knowledge of what is eternal and unchanging |
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| This is the object of appetite regarded as a good to be sought after. Pleasures in themselves are neither good nor bad for Aristotle but rather their goodness or badness depend on the activities which give rise to the pleasures. |
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| Human fulfillment in the fullest sense. This involves virtue and pleasure but is not fully in a person?s control since it also involves external goods and good fortune. For Aristotle human happiness has human rationality and its exercise as essential elements in happiness. Happiness in the highest degree involves excellences or virtues of thought (intellect) as well as excellences or virtues of character. The second best kind of happiness is that of the good citizen of good moral character. |
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| The goal at which something or someone aims. The end or goal is related to the function of a thing. The end of a hammer is to function well as a hammer. |
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| This is the study of the TELOS or end, goal or purpose. Aristotle held that all things have their ends and that all reality is subject to teleological analysis. The TELOS of a human being is happiness. |
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| This is a name for theories of ethics which are dominated by a concern for human excellence and see moral fulfillment in that excellence. Aristotle?s ethics is a virtue ethics. |
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This is another name for Aristotle?s ethics but this name stresses that his ethical thought is about the attainment of happiness or human fulfillment. EUDAIMONIA is the Greek term which is usually translated Happiness.
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| Study of human beings and what they do. This is the a posteriori part of ethics. |
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| The rational part of ethics from which moral obligation arises a priori. This is the primarly focus of KantÃs moral philosophy. |
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| the only thing that is good without qualification. We value the effort represented in the good will regardless of whether or not the good end or outcome sought by the person of good will in his or her actions is achieved. |
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Term
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Definition
| “The WILL is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational; freedom would be the property of this causality that makes it effective independent of any determination by alien causes. Similarly, natural necessity is the property of the causality of all non-rational beings by which they are determined to activity through the influence of alien causes.” 446 |
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| “What else, then, can FREEDOM OF THE WILL be but autonomy, i.e., the property that the will has of being a law to itself? The proposition that the will is in every action a law to itself expresses, however, nothing but the principle of acting according to no other maxim than that which can at the same time have itself as a universal law for its object. Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality. Thus a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.” 447 |
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Definition
| the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law. |
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Term
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Definition
| Self-law, the human rational ability to determine right or wrong rationally and to chose to act in accord with the moral law. |
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Definition
| Other-law, the human ability to be controlled by things and actions external to the rational self and its good. Here the external things become controlling of our will and we give up following the internal self-law which guides us toward willing right actions. |
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Definition
| from before experience, not based on experience of the world. |
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Definition
| based on experience in the world. |
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Term
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| a putting together, here of ideas or notions. |
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Definition
| a breaking apart or breaking down into constituent elements. Here it refers to propositions which are known to be true just because of the analysis of the meaning of the terms of the proposition. |
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Term
| SYNTHETIC A PRIORI PRACTICAL PROPOSITION |
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Definition
| This is the technical description of the Categorical Imperative. It is a putting together of intended action with moral obligation prior to the consideration of experience in order to determine what practical action is morally appropriate or right as duty to be used to evaluate a particular situation. |
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Term
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Definition
“I should never act except in such a way that I
can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." (402) Some other formulations of the CI are: CI#2: 421 CI#3: 421 CI#4: 429
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Term
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Definition
| Moral Utopia, the perfect conceptualized and imagined moral world where all rational beings are treated with respect. |
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Term
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Definition
| “The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational; FREEDOM would be the property of this causality that makes it effective independent of any determination by alien causes. Similarly, natural necessity is the property of the causality of all non-rational beings by which they are determined to activity through the influence of alien causes.” 446 |
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Term
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Definition
| “The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational; freedom would be the property of this causality that makes it effective independent of any determination by alien causes. Similarly, NATURAL NECESSITY is the property of the causality of all non-rational beings by which they are determined to activity through the influence of alien causes.” 446. |
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Term
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Definition
| The world we grasp with our senses which influences our desires, wants and intentions when we do not act in accord with respect for ourselves as rational beings. This is the realm of HETERONOMY. |
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Term
| Intelligible world/world of understanding |
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Definition
| This is the realm of true freedom where we are not controlled by external desires of the WORLD OF SENSE. This is the realm of AUTONOMY. |
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Term
| Deontological ethics/duty ethics |
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Definition
| This is what Kant’s ethical system is commonly named. It indicates that ethics is something founded on obligation arising from respect directed toward ours but arising naturally (A PRIORI) within us insofar as we are rational beings. |
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Definition
| A philosophy which seeks the greatest good for the greatest number of people, where good is defined as pleasure and bad as pain. |
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Definition
| A philosophy which finds primary value in the outcome, results or consequences such that the end is able to justify the means. UTILITARIANISM is a form of CONSEQUENTIALISM. Note that in a CONSEQUENTIALIST philosophy the moral value of an action lies in the outcome, not in the intention of the agent doing the action. CONSEQUENTIALISM contrasts with DEONTOLOGY in this since the DEONTOLOGIST holds that the moral value of an action lies in the intention with which the action is done, not in the outcome. |
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Term
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Definition
| The Principle of UTILITY is summed up in the saying, “Greatest Good for Greatest Number” where good is defined as pleasure and the lack of pain and the attainment of these consequences is the end of action. See CONSEQUENTIALISM above. |
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Definition
| A philosophy in which the good is pleasure and the absence of pain. |
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Definition
| This is “Greatest Good for Greatest Number” where good is defined as pleasure and the lack of pain and the attainment of these consequences is the end of action. See CONSEQNENTIALISM above. |
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Term
| The utilitarian object of virtue |
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Definition
| “The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue.” |
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Term
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Definition
| “Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it may be exacted from him, we do not call it his duty.” p.47 |
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Term
| Duties of perfect obligation |
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Definition
| those duties which have a correlative right attached to them. |
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Term
| Duties of imperfect obligation |
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Definition
| those moral obligations which do not give rise to any right in a person. |
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Term
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Definition
| resides in the injured person as one of the forms that the idea and sentiment of justice take. “To have a right, then, is to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of.” p.52 |
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Term
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Definition
| See HEDONISM and UTILITARIANISM. |
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Term
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Definition
| “Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be of the essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual, implies and testifies to this more binding obligation.” p.58 |
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Term
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Definition
| "It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature." (p.66) |
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Term
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Definition
| these are questions about the permissibility or impermissibility of actions. |
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Term
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Definition
| these are questions about the culpability of agents in acting. |
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Term
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Definition
| "the conception of morality as a system of specific precepts binding upon raitonal creatures as such with the conception of it as an unselfconscious disposition of affection and conduct." (p.17) |
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Term
| Principle of double effect |
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Definition
"It is lawful to actuate a morally good or indifferent cause from which will follow two effects, one good and the other evil, if there is a proportionately serious reason, and the ultimate end of
the agent is good, and the evil effect is not the means to the good effect." p.158.
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Term
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Definition
| A person has a corrupt consciousness when s/he is unable to recognize an immoral act for what it is. For example, many people discriminate on the basis of sex or race without recognizing that their discrimination is in fact due to sex or race bias. |
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Term
| Culpably corrupt consciousness |
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Definition
| A person has a culpably corrupt consciousness when s/he is unable to recognize an immoral act for what it is and even when it is pointed out still is unable to recognize it for what it is. For example, many people discriminate on the basis of sex or race without recognizing that their discrimination is in fact due to sex or race bias; and when it is pointed out they still claim that it is not sex or racial bias. |
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Definition
| Reasoning which aims at working out, discovering and carrying out the right moral action determined by reason. |
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Definition
| Evil is not to be done so that good may come of it. |
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Definition
| Having to do with the meaning and intention of an action. The view that human action is voluntary is an explanation of the intension (or meaning) of human action and what goes into it. |
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Term
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Definition
Having to do with the actualization of an intention in the world. Human action in the world is extensional.
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