Term
| If politicians, bureaucrats, and voters are rational, how will they behave? If your vote doesn’t actually affect your life, but you believe you should vote, how might that change people’s behavior? How does that impact democracy? |
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Definition
| Politicians chase votes, bureaucrats chase budgets/power, voters chase personal benefits. One vote rarely matters, so people stay uninformed (rational ignorance). Voting from duty/expressive reasons often ignores policy details, weakening informed democracy. |
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Term
| Why are there so many single issue voters? What type of single issue voters are the most valuable to a politician? |
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Definition
| Voters focus on issues with concentrated benefits and ignore diffuse costs. The most valuable are intense single-issue voters who will vote, donate, or punish solely based on that one issue. |
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Term
| Why don’t economists believe in the unanimity rule, or even a supermajority, as the best way to make choices? |
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Definition
| Unanimity avoids coercion but has very high decision-making costs (holdouts, delays). Optimal rules balance external costs against decision costs—usually simple majority. |
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Term
| What did the founding fathers do to protect us from the rise of a tyrant, or the abuse of the many by a small group of people or states? |
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Definition
| Limited enumerated powers, separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, bicameralism, and staggered terms so no single group or person can easily dominate. |
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Term
| How is the selection of the president and the selection of US senators different now than it was then? |
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Definition
| Originally: Electors (often chosen by state legislatures) picked the president; state legislatures picked senators. Now: Popular vote in each state + direct election of senators (17th Amendment). |
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Term
| Why does economic theory say party candidates will tend to be toward the extremes of the whole population, but sitting presidents typically move toward the center. |
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Definition
| Primaries reward candidates who appeal to the more extreme party base. General elections and sitting presidents face the overall median voter, so they move toward the center. |
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Term
| Why do we expect that, when there are more than two candidates, the candidate who the most people like one-on-one won’t actually win. |
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Definition
| With 3+ candidates, Condorcet (pairwise) winners may not exist or may lose under plurality rules due to vote-splitting and strategic voting. |
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