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subject thinks they are in control but they are actually not, we are fooled into exaggerating our own agency.
o Ex: “Skill” in casino, lottery “choice” |
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| school quality, access to venture capital |
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| relational social structure |
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| access to info, financial aid, assistance |
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| competition, stability of S/D, barriers to entry) |
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| demographic social structure |
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| age, discrimination, biased, bans |
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| compare with confirmation bias it’s similar but based on structure rather than cognition. winners” more visible than “losers”, certain opps only attract losers, market prediction selection |
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| illusion of powerlessness- we think world is less contingent on our actions than really is (learned helplessness) |
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| unconscious muscle movement to produce noticeable effects (ouija board) |
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| Expectancy and selective perception |
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| perception is constructive process we “patch” inconsistencies. Expectations affected by context (we expect consonance between elements f our environment) |
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| our inferences about the purpose of the task can act as expectations |
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| order effects: primacy vs. recency |
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| people like to make things up when we don’t know the answer |
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| tendency for particular attribute to command attention (Taylor and Fiske)- minority may have more influence when fewer minorities present in the discussion (also McArthur and Post) |
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| Fundamental attribution error- |
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| assumption that alters’ behaviors result from stable individual traits (ex: bad samaritan) |
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| have well-formed preferences, and we can elicit them |
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| : almost no change in willingness to pay (WTP)- how much is preserving the animals worth? People aren’t willing to pay |
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| for impressions of people, situations, behaviors based on experience and culture, produce behaviors determined by a fixed set of rules. |
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| Osgood and colleagues- impressions of actors, behaviors, objects 3 factors |
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| good/desirable vs. bad/undesirable |
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| strong/powerful vs. weak/powerless |
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| active/young/fast vs. inactive/old/slow |
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| Affect control theory (ACT)- |
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| modern formal theory of affective reasoning and behavior (Heise) |
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| receiving a bad act makes you seem less good |
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| actor makes you seem more powerful/active, object is passive/weaker |
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| powerful acts to powerful targets make you seem more powerful |
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| evaluations of actors, behaviors, objects are biased towards balance )form of generalized transitivity) |
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| actor impression moves towards behavior impression |
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| good things to good object makes more positive impression |
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| sum of squared changes among event elements- shows the inconsistency between base impressions and the impressions in context. o High deflection seem “wrong” or unlikely |
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| affect how we present ourselves to others |
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| Asch conformity experiments |
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| subjects follow alters even if inaccurate |
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| Milgram obedience studies |
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| - as long as orders from authority figure, subjects agree |
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| adjacent to no other nodes |
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| adjacent to only one other node |
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| adjacent to tow or more groups lacking other connecting paths |
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| adjacent to many nodes not adjacent to each other |
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| one node adjacent to many mutually non-adjacent notes |
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| several mutually adjacent nodes |
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| cult is isolated star, central leader, other members can’t act without leader, members receive single source of influence repeatedly, converge to leader |
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| one dimension on which positions vary, distinct concepts: |
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| extent to which position serves as a bridge |
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| extent to which position has short paths to other positions (may have limited direct influence) |
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| minimal redundancy, “gatekeeper” power.Pitfalls: chance of being caught in group conflict, distrust |
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| Theorem of Feld and Krackhardt |
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| average friend has more friends than the average person ahs friends |
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| highest performance with centralized, satisfaction highest in decentralized |
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| Positive exchange networks (non-exclusive |
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| you have more power when trading partners have more power: strong is clique, weak is pendant |
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| Negative exchange networks (exclusive |
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| you have more power when trading partners have less power: strong hubs, weak pendants |
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| memory is finite resource- can’t look more than a few steps ahead (DeGroot’s chess players). Players sometimes treat finite games as infinite |
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| we adjust today for what we think tomorrow will bring. If we are myopic, we will assume current trends continue forever (market) until see end in sight, then burst |
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| assumes that other players reason as you do |
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| must contribute for the good to succeed, each wants someone else to give and contribute (chicken game), and so people choose not to contribute ceteris paribus. |
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a simple heuristic- treat other players as though they are unaffected by your own behavior (static since holds other’s behaviors constant)
problem: relies on assumption that other players are not strategic actors- lead to very poor play |
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| project our own behavior onto others ( a special case of static reasoning) |
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| Exit options and dilemma games |
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| Orbell and Dawes) providing exit options in PD games increase the cooperation rate- the reason is projection |
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| Possibility of irrationality: |
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| 1st order: effects of the strategies themselves, 2nd order: the effects of the knowledge that these strategies are in play |
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| you know that you are rational but suspect that some others are exploitable |
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| convince opponents you have poor impulse control, might be violent unless appeased (pretend madness) so others will step down. (hard to make credible promises once this strategy starts) |
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| imitation or mimicry stemming from informational or strategic processes (Banerjee and Bikchandani) |
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| Information feedback loops |
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| Lux and Butts)- unaware of the extent of message passing, can be convinced by reflections of their own beliefs |
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| cascade-like mechanisms which lead to herd behavior. Individuals have attributes and incentives that depend on the attribute. Dynamic: individuals migrate based on population, but doing do, they chance the population distribution to lead to more migration. Can lead to “tipping point” phenomena |
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| actors rewarded for competency, revealed through decision making, actors chose sequentially. Dynamics: later actors imitate earlier ones, so as to conceal their own information. when people say the same thing they tend to look smarter (Scharfstien and Stein) |
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| herd behavior- prices spiraled out of control |
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| focused on how organizations actually behave- how structural factors change institutions |
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| Organizational isomorphism |
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| basic neoinstitutional prediction: organizations within the same field will become more similar over time |
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| External pressures for organization |
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| strategic environment, regulation, pressures encourage firms in similar positions to become more similar over time. (horizontal in effect) |
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| “Best practices” and “benchmarking |
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| identify firms which seem to be doing well, copy their practices. A secondary effect: diffusion of practices across fields |
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| mgmt fads: Incubation period |
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| few adopters, slow growth |
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| mgmt fads: Take-off period |
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| moderate number of adopters, massive growth |
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| mgmt fads: Ascendancy period |
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| many adopters, slow growth |
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| mgmt fads: Decline period |
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| few adopters, rapid decline |
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| mechanisms drawn from standard observations: firms evaluate “success stories” of innovation use “beset practices” rationale, win-stay lose-shift model. 3 basic results- worthless innovations can spread, fail to adapt, too much hype, less effect |
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| international securities (postal reply coupons) with 50% interest. Sales must grow exponentially for the scheme to stay viable. Miller was convicted in 1903 |
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| tree-like structure, most recent recruits bring new members but new members must pay to invest to start, exponential growth dooms the system |
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