Term
| Verificationist Criterion of Meaning |
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Definition
| A statement is true or false (has a truth value) if and only if it can be empirically verified or falsified. |
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| Basic sources of knowledge for VCM |
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Definition
| 5 Senses (seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, testing), Introspection and memory |
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Term
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Definition
| The view that all of our knowledge of the world comes from empirical sources- the scope of our knowledge is limited to these sources |
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Term
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Definition
1) VCM
2) No ethical statement is empirically verified or falsified.
3) No ethical statement is true or false. |
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Definition
| View that moral properties and evaluative properties (right, wrong, good, bad) are natural properties |
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Definition
| One that can be empirically detectable (EX: whiteness of a shirt, judgment of a weight) |
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Term
| 2 Characteristics of Satisfactory Philosophical Definitions (according to Hegel) |
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Definition
1) Immunity from counterexamples
2) Enlightening, original statement |
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Definition
| X is good- meaning that someone has a positive interest in X (this statement has a truth value because it can be empirically tested) |
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Term
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Definition
1) Suppose Bob has a positive interest in nuclear war, and Tom has a negative interest in nuclear war.
2) If D1 is true, then nuclear war is both good and bad.
3) But nothing is both good and bad.
4) D1 is false. |
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Term
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Definition
1) Suppose Bob has a positive interest in nuclear war.
2) If D1 is true, then nuclear war is good.
3) Nuclear war is not good.
4) D1 is false. |
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Term
| Subjective Naturalism (D2) |
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Definition
| When S says that "x is good", S means what he would mean if he said, "I, S, approve or x" |
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Term
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Definition
1) If subjective naturalism is true, when I say, "X is good" my statement is true if and only if I approve of x.
2) But my approving of X can't make my statement true.
3) Subjective naturalism is not true. |
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Term
| No-Conflicts Objection to Subjective Naturalism |
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Definition
a) Bob says, "nuclear war is bad"
a') This means that he says "I, Bob, disapprove of nuclear war."
b) Tom says "nuclear war is good!"
b') "I, Tom, approve of nuclear war."
1) If subjective naturalism is true, then a means the same as a' as b means to b'.
2) There is a logical conflict between the two above statements (a and b)
3) But, is there a logical conflict between the two statements (a' and b')? No.
4) If 2) and 3) are true, then a does not mean the same as a' and b does not mean the same as b'.
5) Subjective naturalism is false.
3) D2 is not true. |
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Term
| Different Proof Objection to Subjective Naturalism |
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Definition
1) If subjective naturalism is true, then a means the same as a' and b means the same as b'.
2) a' and b' can be confirmed by purely psychological evidence.
3) a and b cannot be confirmed by purely psychological evidence.
4) If 2) and 3) are true, then a' and a don't mean the same and b and b' don't mean the same.
5) Subjective naturalism is false. |
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Term
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Definition
| X is good/bad meaning that if there were an ideal observer, he would have a positive/negative interest in x. |
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Term
| Ideal Observer (description) |
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Definition
| Ideal observer knows all of the consequences of the action. He is omniscient, omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent, and normal in other respects |
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Term
| Feldman's Arguments Against Ideal Observer 1 |
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Definition
1) Notion of "disinterest"- he can't have no interest in anything, but it means that he is unbiased, notion of "dispassionate"- doesn't get excited about anything or "ought" not to get excited
THESE ARE BOTH EVALUATIVE/ETHICAL STATEMENTS- therefore not a form of naturalism |
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Term
| Feldman's Argument Against Ideal Observer Theory 2 |
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Definition
| If everyone were ideal observers, would all of them agree? Can two ideal observers disagree? But things can't be good and bad. |
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Term
| Naturalistic Fallacy Argument A |
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Definition
1) Something is yellow if and only if it produces y-vibrations
2) Therefore, x is yellow is a statement that means that x produces y-vibrations
FLAWED |
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Term
| Naturalistic Fallacy Argument B |
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Definition
1) Something is good if and only if someone has a positive interest in it
2_ Therefore, x is good means that someone has a positive interest in x. |
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Term
| Naturalistic Fallacy Argument C |
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Definition
1) Something is good if and only if it is ___.
2) therefore, x is good means that x is ___. |
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Term
| Naturalistic Fallacy Argument D (and Primitive Hedonism) |
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Definition
PH: x is good means that x is pleasant
1) Pleasure is good
2) Therefore, x is good means that x is pleasant. |
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Term
| Naturalistic Fallacy Argument E |
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Definition
1) Oranges are yellow.
2) Therefore, x is yellow meaning that x is an orange. |
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Term
| Naturalistic Fallacy Argument F |
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Definition
1) Life is short.
2) Therefore, x is short meaning that x is alive. |
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Term
| Naturalistic Fallacy Argument G |
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Definition
1) ___ is good.
2) Therefore x is good means that x has ___.
We cannot infer a naturalistic definition of "good" from the fact that goodness can be predicted of some naturalistic property. |
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Term
| Moore's Open-Question Argument (Desiring to desire) |
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Definition
Q1: Is the desire to desire A something that is good?
Q2: Is the desire to desire A something that we desire to desire?
1) Q1 is not very complicated
2) Q2 is very complicated
3) If Q1 is not very complicated but Q2 is very complicated, then Q1 does not mean the same thing as Q2.
4) If Q1 does not mean the same as Q2, then DD (desiring to desire) is false.
5) Therefore, DD is false. |
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Term
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Definition
Take this set of statements:
1. Goldbach's conjecture
2. This table is necessarily a material object
3. This statement is not necessarily a number.
CONCLUSION: All of these statements have a truth value, but none can be empirically determined
4. There is no life after death.
OBJECTION:
1) If the VCM is true, then none of the statements in set A are true.
2) But the statements in set A do have a truth value.
3) The VCM is not true. |
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Term
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Definition
1) The VCM is true only if it ITSELF can be empirically verified or falsified.
2) But it can't be empirically verified or falsified.
3) If the VCM is true, then it is not true and that is absurd. The VCM is self-refuting. It cannot have an argument if it has no truth value. |
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Term
| Motivation Argument against Cognitivism |
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Definition
1) All moral judgments are intrinsically motivated.
2) No factual statement is intrinsically motivating.
3) Therefore, no moral judgment is a factual statement.
CONCLUSION: If you believe a moral statement is true, you would have motivation to follow it. |
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Term
| Argument AGAINST the Motivation Argument of Cognitivism |
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Definition
1) If Premise I is true then it is not possible for there to be an ammoralist (accepts some moral judgments and has no motivation to act in accord with them)
2) But an ammoralist is possible.
3) Premise 1 of the Motivation Argument is not true. |
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