Term
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Definition
| * The remedy for violating the 4th amendment must be SUPPRESSION OF THE EVIDENCE- creates the remedy= ER. |
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Term
| Silverthorn Lumber v. US (1920)- Oliver W. Holmes Jr. |
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Definition
* Exclusionary rule applies not only to evidence illegally obtained, but the fruits of this evidence
* FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE. |
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Term
| Mapp v. Ohio (1962)- Tom C. Clark |
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Definition
* Applied exclusionary rule to states
* (overruled Wolf. v. Colorado) |
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Term
| US v. Calandra (1974): J. Lewis Powell |
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Definition
* Deterrence & Balancing test
* Purpose of ER is to deter police misconduct (i.e. judicial remedy, not a personal right)
* Exclusionary rule only applies at trial (not grand jury, indictments, etc.) |
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Term
| US v. Leon (1984): J. Byron White |
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Definition
1. Good faith exception to the ER.
2. The issuing of a warrant must be OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE in order for the exclusionary remedy not to be applicable.
3. The ER is not a right, so you only get a remedy where the police screwed up in some way. |
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Term
| Groh v. Ramirez (2004): J. John Paul Stevens |
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Definition
| Where any PO could have looked at the face of the warrant to see that it was deficient, the good faith exception DOES NOT apply and the ER still applies. (Prong #3 above) |
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Term
| Sanchaz-Llamas v. Oregon (2007): C.J. John Roberts |
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Definition
| 1. The ER only applies for constitutional violations, not violations of treaties. |
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Term
| Wong Sun v. US (1963): Justice William Brennan |
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Definition
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine- if what was done in the first place was illegal, everything that comes from it is tainted.
2. Two-part test: Exclusion extends to evidence gathered in the illegal arrest if…
1. Presence of a primary illegality
Is there an intervening act that separated? Or a nexus between the derivative evidence and the main evidence?
2. Fruit is derived from illegality
3. Then, if tainted, can the taint be purged? PURGE THE TAINT.
1. Yes, if act of voluntariness is “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint”(something that separated the police illegality from the incriminating evidence).
Factors to consider: are there intervening events, what amount of time passed, and how flagrant was the police misconduct? |
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Term
| Brown v. Illinois (1975): Attenuation Exception |
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Definition
3. If evidence has come via the exploitation of the primary illegality, than unable to attenuate the tainted evidence (look at passage of time & proximity)
1. Miranda warnings do not alone purge a tainted arrest because confession was an exploitation of the primary illegality
1. Only two hours between confession and arrest à too much proximity
2. Really Totality of the Circumstances. |
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Term
| Dunaway v. NY, Rawlings v. Kentucky, and Taylor v. Alabama. |
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Definition
1. The court could never figure out where to draw the line so look at the totality of the circumstances and make it a case-by-case analysis.
2. There is a Constitutional violation. |
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Term
| Nix v. Williams (1984): CJ Warren Burger |
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Definition
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
2. If derivative evidence would have been discovered regardless of taint, than admissible
1. Must prove by preponderance of the evidence that evidence was discoverable |
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Term
| Katz v. US (1968): Justice Potter Stewart |
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Definition
Reasonable expectation of privacy, not automatic standing
4. Overruled Olmstead.
5. capacity to claim the protection of the 4th depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place |
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Term
| Rakas v. Illinois (1978, Jones overruled): CJ. Rehnquist |
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Definition
Reasonable expectation of privacy test
6. Reasonable expectation of privacy (and standing) if (imported from Katz):
1. Subjective expectation of privacy
2. Society accepts it as reasonable (objective)
7. BOP on ∆ to prove |
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Term
| Rawlings v. Kentucky- 1980- CJ Rehnquist |
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Definition
| 1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy (possessory interest doesn’t matter) |
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Term
| Brendlin v. California (2007): Justice Souter |
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Definition
| 1. When a vehicle is stopped, a passenger has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his own person and own property of the car. |
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Term
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Definition
| 1. 4th rights are personal (i.e. protect people, not places) |
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Term
| Henry v. US (1961)- J. Douglas, fixed by Scalia |
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Definition
| 8. An arrest is complete when liberty of movement is significantly restricted |
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Term
| California v. Hodari D. (1991): J. Scalia |
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Definition
Defining arrest
1. Application of force (no matter how slight), OR
2. Submission to authority |
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Term
| Maryland v. Pringle (2003): CJ Rehnquist |
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Definition
What is “probable cause” for an arrest?
9. a reasonable grounds for belief in guilt & objective standard
1. Probable cause: 2 point analysis: |
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Term
| Payton v. New York (1980): J. John Paul Stevens |
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Definition
Does arrest warrant give authority to search?
3. Reasonable inference that arrest warrant authorizes search of ∆’s home |
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Term
| Steagald v. US (1981): Justice Thurgood Marshall |
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Definition
4. Arrest warrant only gives implicit authority to search the house of ∆, not everyone he’s associated with.
5. Must get separate search warrant to enter home of 3rd party |
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Term
| 1. Terry v. Ohio (1968): CJ Earl Warren |
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Definition
| brief, temporary detention measured in minutes designed to confirm or dispel an officer’s suspicions about a crime occurring, just occurred, or going to occur |
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Term
| Michigan v. Summers (1981): J. John Paul Stevens |
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Definition
1. under the totality of the circumstances, the pat down was reasonable when they found drugs
2. Authority to detain while conducting a proper search. |
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Term
| US v. Mendenhall (1980): J. Potter Stewart |
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Definition
Stop v. encounter
2. if, in view of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave, then a stop has occurred
3. totality of the circumstances test |
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Term
| Florida v. Bostick (1991): O’Connor |
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Definition
1. The man on the bus gave consent to be searched and the PO found drugs.
2. Look to see if there was a stop. If there was, if you have something more than a consensual encounter, you have a 4th amendment issue, and you need to look for reasonable suspicion or PC to make sure that it was a constitutional stop or arrest! |
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Term
| Pennsylvania v. Mims (1977) |
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Definition
| 4. Ordering person out of car to pat down for a weapon for officer protection |
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Term
| Maryland v. Wilson (1997): Automatic Companion Rule |
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Definition
| 5. Can frisk passengers for officer protection |
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Term
| Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993): “Plain Feel” Doctrine |
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Definition
| 6. If you pat someone down and feel something suspicious, you don’t have to ignore it (even if you didn’t have PC in the first place- you have PC now). |
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Term
| Maryland v. Buie (1990): “Protective Sweep” Doctrine |
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Definition
| 1. If it was within the scope of RS to investigate to recover the gun, and in doing so they saw contraband in PLAIN VIEW, there is no 4th A violation. |
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Term
| U.S. v. Jacobsen (1984)- J. John Paul Stevens |
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Definition
* As long as the government acts reasonable, no ER application
* Evidence uncovered by a private party’s search can be used by the government. |
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Term
| Hester v. US (1924)- Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. |
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Definition
1. Moonshine was seized from an open field, not a house, paper or effect
2. (backyard is part of house- US v. Oliver- 1974- Powell) |
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Term
| Hoffa v. US- 1966- Potter Stewart |
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Definition
|
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Term
| Coolidge v. NH (1971) Stewart |
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Definition
| * Warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached judiciary official |
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Term
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Definition
| * Magistrate wasn’t neutral. |
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Term
| Connally v. Georgia (1977) |
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Definition
| 1. Magistrate wasn’t neutral or detached. His income depended on the # of warrants. |
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Term
| Aguilar (Goldberg) & Spinelli Test (Harlan) (minority rule- in only 8 states) MOSTLY OVERRULED |
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Definition
7. 2 part test for PC of informants:
1. Basis of knowledge (broader b/c of Spinelli): evidence of how informant reached conclusion
2. Veracity: evidence of reliability |
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Term
| Illinois v. Gates (Rehnquist,1983): Majority rule re: informants and probable cause |
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Definition
8. Totality of Circumstances test
1. Basis of knowledge
2. Detailed description of activity
3. Past reliability of informant
4. Corroboration by police
5. Other indicia of reliability |
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Term
| Florida v. J.L. (Ginsburg, 2001): Anonymous Tips (Disclosing an Informant) |
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Definition
9. Anonymous tips are useless to support probable cause (unless public safety issue).
10. Anonymous information is no information at all.
11. Unless immediate risk to public safety- could be treated differently |
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Term
| Franks v. Delaware (Blackmun, 1978): (go over) |
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Definition
FOUR CORNERS RULE: PC must be determined by look solely at four corners of warrant/affidavit (warrantless search presumed unreasonable)
12. Presumption in favor of validity
13. ∆ must show by preponderance of the evidence that:
1. Contained false info
2. Statements made intentionally or recklessly
3. Magistrate’s finding impossible w/o false info |
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Term
| 14. Particularity with regard to evidence seized (Groh v. Ramirez)- 2004- Justice John Paul Stevens |
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Definition
|
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Term
| US v. Grubbs- 2006- Scalia |
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Definition
| 1. Anticipatory search warrants are no different in principle than regular warrants. (pg20) |
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Term
| Weeks v. US (1914)- Justice William Day |
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Definition
| 15. If probable cause supports arrest, then it supports the search |
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Term
| Chimel v. California (1969)- Justice Potter Stewart |
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Definition
| 16. If lawful arrest, then police may search person and immediate area (wingspan—reach or lunge area) |
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Term
| US v. Robinson (1973)- CJ Rehnquist |
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Definition
17. All lawful custodial arrests justify full search of person w/o warrant
18. As long as you have the authority to arrest someone for a crime- that carries with it the authority to search. |
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Term
| Knowles v. Iowa (1998)- CJ Rehnquist |
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Definition
| 19. Officer gives a ticket- that is NOT AN ARREST. The search was improper. |
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Term
| Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001)- J Souter |
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Definition
| 20. Officer pulled over woman. She was hateful. He arrested her and searched her purse. That was a lawful arrest. |
|
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Term
| VIRGINIA V MOORE (2008)- Scalia |
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Definition
|
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Term
| Carroll v. US (1925): CJ Taft |
|
Definition
The Carroll Doctrine/The Automobile Exception
21. Warrantless search of car permitted when:
1. Probable cause to believe vehicle contains evidence of a crime
2. Must be in place where it is improbable to get search warrant (police don’t have time- impractical to obtain a warrant prior to the search because of the mobility of the vehicle) |
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Term
| Chambers v. Maroney (1970): Justice Byron White |
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Definition
| 22. If there is probable cause to search, no warrant needed for seizure |
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Term
| Delaware v. Prouse (1979): CJ Warren Burger |
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Definition
| 23. Officer didn’t give reason for stop but then saw marijuana on the seat. Not a search but a seizure and not supported by the 4th A. |
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Term
| US v. Ross (1982): Justice JP Stevens |
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Definition
1. Ross Test controls the search of vehicles.
2. if stopping the car to get the container, the Chadwick rule applies and should seize and get warrant. BUT
3. if police have PC to search car and search container incidental to this on scene, don’t need warrant under Chambers.
4. GO OVER pg 24 |
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Term
| Warden v. Hayden (1967): Justice Brennan |
|
Definition
24. If in hot pursuit, then you may make a warrant-less entry to arrest (Exigent Circumstances- Four Elements)
1. Must have probable cause
2. Exigencies must justify immediate warrant-less entry
3. Pursuit must begin from a place where police have lawful right to be
4. Law violation must be serious enough to reasonably justify
5. Also permitted if evidence in jeopardy of being destroyed |
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Term
| Rochin v. CA (1952)- Justice Felix Frankfurter |
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Definition
| 1. D swallowed drugs. They pumped his stomach. Not okay. That shocks the conscience and violates the right to Bodily Integrity/Right to Privacy. |
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Term
| Breithaupt v. Abram (1957)- Justice Clark |
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Definition
| 1. Blood tests not considered offensive to society because they are routine. |
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Term
| Schmerber v. California (1966): Justice Brennan |
|
Definition
Bodily searches
25. Bodily searches can be conducted w/o warrant if:
1. Probable cause- clear indication that you will find evidence of the crime
2. Time is of the essence- no time to get warrant
3. Not too painful/intrusive- carried out in reasonable manner. |
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Term
| US v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976): Justice Rehnquist |
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Definition
| 26. Border searches are different. When you cross the border you have no expectation of privacy. |
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Term
| Michigan State Police v. Sitz (1990): Justice Rehnquist |
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Definition
* All 126 cars were stopped because they were in a vehicle checkpoint
* Have to balance the degree of intrusion with public policy |
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Term
| City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000): O’Connor |
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Definition
| * Checkpoint was to general crime control- not good. Must be more of a direct nexus with the traffic points and purpose |
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Term
| Coolidge v. New Hampshire (Stewart) |
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Definition
1. No reasonable expectation of privacy when things are in plain view in your car so 4th A doesn’t apply. However, PO must be in a place where he has a legitimate right to be.
2. “no search, no matter how cursory, is allowed under the 4th A to determine whether PC exists. The PC must be immediately apparent” under the Plain View Doctrine. |
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Term
| Whren v. United States (1996) (Scalia) |
|
Definition
|
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Term
| Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973): Justice Potter Stewart |
|
Definition
Consent = waiver
1. Consent is waiver of 4th rights
2. May restrict search/attach conditions
3. May revoke consent at any time
4. Consent must be voluntary and intelligent
5. Police do not have to explain 4th rights and waiver
6. Totality of the circumstances test = was it coerced? |
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Term
| US v. Mendenhall (1980): J. Potter Stewart |
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Definition
| 1. You apply the reasonable person standard to see whether the consent was voluntary. |
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Term
| Florida v. Jimeno (1991): CJ Rehnquest |
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Definition
* Police are entitled to think the consent is unrestricted unless told otherwise
* The consent must be affirmatively limited or the PO can interpret it to be that the consent is unlimited. |
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Term
| Katz v. US (1968): Justice Potter Stewart |
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Definition
* Any person w/ reasonable expectation of privacy may consent
* think of roommate hypo. (pg30- go over) |
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Term
| Randolph v. Georgia (2006): J Souter |
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Definition
* Cannot take one person’s consent over the other if both have equal right to reasonable expectation of privacy
* The tie goes to the person withholding consent. No search allowed |
|
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Term
| Camara v. Municipal Court (1967): Justice Byron White |
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Definition
| * No probable cause necessary for inspection warrants if law requires periodic safety inspections (go over- pg31) |
|
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Term
| New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985): Justice Byron White |
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Definition
Student searches
* Student searches ok by school admin w/ reasonable suspicion
* Lower expectation of privacy & safety concerns
* Can do a full-search without a warrant |
|
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Term
| Cady v. Dombrowski (1973)- Justice Rehnquist |
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Definition
* There was a search of the car, with no PC
* Police were doing the COMMUNITY CARETAKING FUNCTION OF THE POLICE and was part of the STANDARD POLICE procedure to protect the public
1. This falls under the COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION |
|
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Term
| South Dakota v. Opperman (1976)- CJ Burger |
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Definition
| 1. Covers the inventory searches of automobiles required by the standard police procedure |
|
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Term
| Michigan v. Tyler (1978): Justice Stewart |
|
Definition
Emergency Care Doctrine
* 4th doesn’t apply to responses to emergencies
* Immediate action must be necessary
* Be careful w/ passage of time so that it doesn’t become and investigation |
|
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Term
| Mincey v. Arizona (1978): Justice Stewart |
|
Definition
* 4th A is not suspended at crime scenes just because it is a crime scene
* once PO have established that it is a crime scene- have to get consent or warrant to keep going in |
|
|
Term
| Kyllo v. US (2001): Justice Scalia |
|
Definition
Technology assisted searches
* Technology-assisted searches presumptively unreasonable if they can’t specifically detect criminal activity (compare w/ Illinois v. Caballes)
* E.g. thermal imaging for marijuana in house |
|
|
Term
| Illinois v. Caballes (2005): Justice Stevens |
|
Definition
Drug dogs & traffic stops
* the of drug dogs at legit traffic stop is ok b/c dog only reveals contraband of which there is no right to possess in the first place |
|
|
Term
| Warden v. Hayden (1967): Justice Brennan |
|
Definition
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: Hot Pursuit” exception
24. If in hot pursuit, then you may make a warrant-less entry to arrest (Exigent Circumstances- Four Elements)
1. Must have probable cause
2. Exigencies must justify immediate warrant-less entry
3. Pursuit must begin from a place where police have lawful right to be
4. Law violation must be serious enough to reasonably justify
5. Also permitted if evidence in jeopardy of being destroyed |
|
|
Term
| Rochin v. CA (1952)- Justice Felix Frankfurter |
|
Definition
| 1. D swallowed drugs. They pumped his stomach. Not okay. That shocks the conscience and violates the right to Bodily Integrity/Right to Privacy. |
|
|
Term
| Breithaupt v. Abram (1957)- Justice Clark |
|
Definition
| 1. Blood tests not considered offensive to society because they are routine. |
|
|
Term
| Schmerber v. California (1966): Justice Brennan |
|
Definition
Bodily searches
25. Bodily searches can be conducted w/o warrant if:
1. Probable cause- clear indication that you will find evidence of the crime
2. Time is of the essence- no time to get warrant
3. Not too painful/intrusive- carried out in reasonable manner. |
|
|
Term
| US v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976): Justice Rehnquist |
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Definition
| 26. Border searches are different. When you cross the border you have no expectation of privacy. |
|
|
Term
| Michigan State Police v. Sitz (1990): Justice Rehnquist |
|
Definition
* All 126 cars were stopped because they were in a vehicle checkpoint
* Have to balance the degree of intrusion with public policy |
|
|
Term
| City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000): O’Connor |
|
Definition
| * Checkpoint was to general crime control- not good. Must be more of a direct nexus with the traffic points and purpose |
|
|
Term
| Coolidge v. New Hampshire (Stewart) |
|
Definition
1. No reasonable expectation of privacy when things are in plain view in your car so 4th A doesn’t apply. However, PO must be in a place where he has a legitimate right to be.
2. “no search, no matter how cursory, is allowed under the 4th A to determine whether PC exists. The PC must be immediately apparent” under the Plain View Doctrine. |
|
|
Term
| Whren v. United States (1996) (Scalia) |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973): Justice Potter Stewart |
|
Definition
Consent = waiver
1. Consent is waiver of 4th rights
2. May restrict search/attach conditions
3. May revoke consent at any time
4. Consent must be voluntary and intelligent
5. Police do not have to explain 4th rights and waiver
6. Totality of the circumstances test = was it coerced? |
|
|
Term
| US v. Mendenhall (1980): J. Potter Stewart |
|
Definition
| 1. You apply the reasonable person standard to see whether the consent was voluntary. |
|
|
Term
| Florida v. Jimeno (1991): CJ Rehnquest |
|
Definition
* Police are entitled to think the consent is unrestricted unless told otherwise
* The consent must be affirmatively limited or the PO can interpret it to be that the consent is unlimited. |
|
|
Term
| Katz v. US (1968): Justice Potter Stewart |
|
Definition
* Any person w/ reasonable expectation of privacy may consent
* think of roommate hypo. (pg30- go over) |
|
|
Term
| Randolph v. Georgia (2006): J Souter |
|
Definition
* Cannot take one person’s consent over the other if both have equal right to reasonable expectation of privacy
* The tie goes to the person withholding consent. No search allowed |
|
|
Term
| Camara v. Municipal Court (1967): Justice Byron White |
|
Definition
Inspection warrants
* No probable cause necessary for inspection warrants if law requires periodic safety inspections (go over- pg31) |
|
|
Term
| New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985): Justice Byron White |
|
Definition
Student searches
* Student searches ok by school admin w/ reasonable suspicion
* Lower expectation of privacy & safety concerns
* Can do a full-search without a warrant. (Special Needs Test) |
|
|
Term
| Cady v. Dombrowski (1973)- Justice Rehnquist |
|
Definition
* There was a search of the car, with no PC
* Police were doing the COMMUNITY CARETAKING FUNCTION OF THE POLICE and was part of the STANDARD POLICE procedure to protect the public
1. This falls under the COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION |
|
|
Term
| South Dakota v. Opperman (1976)- CJ Burger |
|
Definition
| 1. Covers the inventory searches of automobiles required by the standard police procedure |
|
|
Term
| Michigan v. Tyler (1978): Justice Stewart |
|
Definition
* 4th doesn’t apply to responses to emergencies
* Immediate action must be necessary
* Be careful w/ passage of time so that it doesn’t become and investigation |
|
|
Term
| Mincey v. Arizona (1978): Justice Stewart |
|
Definition
* 4th A is not suspended at crime scenes just because it is a crime scene
* once PO have established that it is a crime scene- have to get consent or warrant to keep going in |
|
|
Term
| Kyllo v. US (2001): Justice Scalia |
|
Definition
Technology assisted searches
* Technology-assisted searches presumptively unreasonable if they can’t specifically detect criminal activity (compare w/ Illinois v. Caballes)
* E.g. thermal imaging for marijuana in house |
|
|
Term
| Illinois v. Caballes (2005): Justice Stevens |
|
Definition
| * the of drug dogs at legit traffic stop is ok b/c dog only reveals contraband of which there is no right to possess in the first place |
|
|
Term
| Lefkowitz v. Turley (1973): Justice Byron White |
|
Definition
Compulsion defined
* Compulsion places person in the tri-lemma w/o other options (CONFESSION, PERJURY, CONTEMPT)- if no other options- you have compulsion.
* Applies any time statement could lead to criminal investigation
* You don’t have to be the target of the investigation—so long as it could lead to a criminal prosecution. |
|
|
Term
| Piemonte v. US (1961): Justice Frankfurter |
|
Definition
Civil case compulsion
* Can compel you in civil case, unless testimony can possibly be used in a criminal proceeding of any kind (Immunity)
* If there is a possibility that you may be prosecuted, you may invoke the privilege. |
|
|
Term
| US v Ward (1980): Justice Rehnquist |
|
Definition
| * If the legislature classifies something as criminal or civil, that’s the final rule |
|
|
Term
| Hoffa v. US (1966)- Justice Potter Stewart |
|
Definition
| * NO COMPULSION. No one forced Hoffa to confess to the government agent. |
|
|
Term
| Couch v. US (1973): Justice Lewis Powell |
|
Definition
* Compulsion must be upon person asserting the privilege: the person who is being COMPELLED and who can be INCRIMINATED.
* Two exceptions:
1. Constructive possession
2. Temporary possession |
|
|
Term
| Schmerber v. California (1966): Justice Brennan |
|
Definition
Is blood testimonial?
* Blood is not testimonial and is therefore not protected by 5th
* There is no incrimination from being compelled to give blood |
|
|
Term
| Fisher v. US (1976): Justice Byron White |
|
Definition
hat counts as testimony today?
* Implicitly overturned Boyd
* New rule: documents not prepared for trial can be compelled (i.e. if the documents were created before being supoeanad, then you can compel them) |
|
|
Term
| Hiibel v. 6th Judicial District Court of Nevada (2004): Kennedy |
|
Definition
Giving name testimonial? * Giving out name to police is not normally testimonial and thus not incriminating
* Court left some leeway for circumstances where giving name could incriminate
* Certain basic identifying information can be compelled |
|
|
Term
| Brown v. Mississippi (1936): CJ Hughes |
|
Definition
The Voluntariness Test
* CONFESSIONS MUST BE VOLUNTARY
* Totality of the circumstances test to determine whether confessions voluntary
* Three factors:
3. Police conduct- were they reasonable?
4. Characteristics of defendant- how old? Mental illness?
5. Circumstances & environment- how coercive? |
|
|
Term
| McNabb v. United States (1943) & Mallory v. US (1957)- Frankfurter |
|
Definition
* Created exclusionary rule remedy for 5th violations where evidence is excluded if physical or psychological coercion (only at Fed level)
* Statute passed by Congress b/c MMR not yet constitutional law
* Applies totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
Psychological coercion
* Massive overnight interrogation where suspect repeatedly asked for lawyer was the equivalent of a coerced and unvoluntary confession
* (go over) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
* 6th amendment protects from coercion, but only after indictment
* Under 6th, police cannot interrogate w/o attorney after indictment |
|
|
Term
| Miranda v. Arizona (1966): CJ Warren |
|
Definition
#
# Miranda ONLY applies to Custodial Interrogation |
|
|
Term
| Berkemer v. McCarthy (1984): J. Marshall |
|
Definition
* Custody: when a person’s freedom of action has been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest, as judged by reasonable person in that situation
* Based on whether a reasonable person would believe they had been arrested given the totality of the circumstances |
|
|
Term
| Rhode Island v. Innis (1964): Justice Potter Stewart |
|
Definition
* Interrogation- setting must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond custody itself
* Conduct must be known to elicit an incriminating response
* Can’t just be in custody to trigger M, PO must be asking questions |
|
|
Term
| Illinois v. Perkins: 1990- Kennedy |
|
Definition
| * Look at the TOC to determine if the police’ intent was to illicit an incriminating response |
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Term
| Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990)- Brennan |
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Definition
| * M doesn’t apply to PO questions that have nothing to do with the crime being investigated (booking questions) |
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Term
| Frazier v. Cupp (1969)- Justice Marshall |
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Definition
Frazier v. Cupp (1969)- Justice Marshall
* Not a M violation to lie to a suspect but the confession must still be voluntary under Brown.
* Depends on the degree of coercion |
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Term
| Harris v. NY (1971)- CJ Burger |
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Definition
| * The confession can still be used to impeach the witness. |
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Term
| Colorado v. Connelly (1986)- Justice Rehnquist |
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Definition
| * The police videotaped the un-M guy- no questioning whatsoever so no coercion |
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Term
| US v. Dickerson (2000): Justice Rehnquist |
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Definition
Miranda becomes constitutional law
* Miranda laws now part of jurisprudence and people rely on it
* Custody + interrogation = Miranda |
|
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Term
| New York v. Quarles (1984)- Justice Rehnquist |
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Definition
| * Gun in a public place so police need to fun- they didn’t have time to give M warnings where public safety is in danger. |
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Term
| Oregon v. Elstad (1985): O’Connor |
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Definition
Defective confession
* He confessed- they gave him M- and he confessed again
* Defective confessions w/o miranda given may be cured if you give miranda warning and get another confession
* “Fruit of poisonous tree” doesn’t apply b/c Miranda isn’t con law |
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Term
| Missouri v. Seibert- 2004- Kennedy |
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Definition
| * Where deliberate policy is to interrogate-warn-interrogate again- then M is deliberately undermined and violated! |
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Term
| US v. Patane (2004): O’Connor |
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Definition
Derivative evidence suppressed?
* If Miranda is now con law, what happens to “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine (i.e. what do we do with evidence stemming from a defective confession?)
* Violation of Miranda comes when confession obtained w/o warning is used in court. If evidence of confession is not admitted, then no Miranda rights violation.
* Exclusion of statements is a complete and sufficient remedy
* Two interpretations: |
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Term
| Michigan v. Mosley (1975): Justice Stewart |
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Definition
* Rights are personal and may be waived at any time
* Police may inquire into whether suspect is ready to talk or changed their mind as long at there is no coercion |
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Term
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Definition
| * If you invoke your right under M, it only applies to the offense that you are in custody for, it doesn’t apply to interrogation about other offenses, so confessions given in response to that can be used even though M wasn’t given for these. |
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Term
| Edwards v. Arizona (1980): Justice White |
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Definition
| Edwards v. Arizona (1980): Justice White |
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Term
| Davis v. United States (1994): O’Connor |
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Definition
| * When you request a lawyer, it must be AFFIRMATIVE AND UNEQUIVOCAL. |
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Term
| North Carolina v. Butler (1979): Justice Stewart |
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Definition
* Waiver time limits
An express oral or written waiver is not an absolute requirement of M. you just can’t waive by silence alone. |
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Term
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Definition
* The Double Jeopardy clause means 4 things, you can’t re-prosecute after:
o 1) Acquittal of the same offense
o 2) Conviction of the same offense
o 3) Multiple punishments for the same offense
o 4) re-prosecution after an aborted trial (not sure if it applies today)? |
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Term
| Benton v. Maryland (1969) – J. Thurgood Marshall |
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Definition
| * 14th Amend requires that the Double Jeopardy clause be applied at ALL levels of state prosecution (as well as at federal) = incorporation to states |
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Term
| Crist v. Betz (1975) - Justice Potter Stewart |
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Definition
* Double Jeopardy attaches when the trial begins =
o Jury Trial: when the jury is empanelled and sworn in (when oath is administered)
o Bench Trial: when first witness has been sworn in / takes the oath and takes the stand and is asked first question to testify.
+ In bench trials, opening statements don’t count!
o Dicta: 3 Exceptions! = Double Jeopardy clause doesn’t necessarily apply where:
+ 1. The D has successfully appealed his conviction, or otherwise had conviction overturned on appeal for certain reasons
+ 2. When the trial judge dismisses the case prior to a verdict, depending on what the cause of the dismissal is (if Def. causes it, then no double-jeopardy applies)
+ 3. Where a mistrial is declared, depending on what the cause of the mistrial is (if Def. causes it, then no double-jeopardy applies) |
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Term
| Hudson v. United States (1997) by C.J. Rehnquist. |
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Definition
* Rule: Double Jeopardy clause applies to criminal charges; does not apply outside the criminal arena.
* Look at legislative intent |
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Term
| Green v. United States (1957) by Justice Hugo Black |
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Definition
* Def. can be retried only for the offense convicted of, i.e., on only 2nd degree murder since Def. was acquitted of 1st degree murder & thus can’t be tried for 1st degree again; acquittal of greater offense)
* 2 possible rationales Black gives here to reach same point:
o 1. Appeal is part of the same continuing trial – not a second/double trial
o 2. Appeal is an implied waiver of double jeopardy protections (double jeopardy is a const right that can be waived) |
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Term
| Burks v. United States (1978) by C.J. Burger. |
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Definition
* Where the argument on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law – Then, retrial is barred by Double Jeopardy principles!!!, i.e., the evidence/case never should’ve went to jury in first place
* the purpose of the DJ clause is to give the prosecution one shot to put on all the evidence they can to convict |
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Term
| Illinois v. Somerville (1973) by J. Rehnquist |
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Definition
Strict interpretation of the DJ clause
* The DJ clause must sometimes take a backseat to the “Manifest Necessity” Doctrine – where the D’s interest in proceeding to a verdict is outweighed by the demand for public justice
* DJ clause does NOT apply with mistrials b/c the jury couldn’t reach a verdict, because it’s not fault of Pros. AND
* Misbehavior by the D or D’s attorney causing mistrial? = re-trial is okay because Pros. didn’t cause mistrial. Def. can’t cause a mistrial and benefit from it. |
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Term
| Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) J. Rehnquist. |
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Definition
| * Rule: Merely negligent conduct by PROSECUTOR will not bar retrial. Test is intentional (deliberate) misconduct. Merely negligent conduct will not result in a Jeopardy bar for retrial. |
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Term
| Ashe v. Swenson (1970) J. Brennan |
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Definition
| * Rule: When an issue between the same 2 parties has been adjudicated, that issue cannot be retried, whether it is civil or criminal. – the resolution of the issue is binding (COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL) |
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Term
| Blockburger v. United States (1932) J. Sutherland |
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Definition
Deals w/ multiple punishments for same offense
* Rule: The Blockburger Test =“Same Elements” Test to figure out if something is the same offense - List elements of offense side by side. If the offenses contain the exact same elements then they are the same offense for DJ purposes
* If elements of one offense are a subset of all of the elements required for a second offense (ex. also requires intent or premeditation), then they are STILL THE SAME OFFENSE!!! (= an included offense, perhaps a Lesser Related Offense) |
|
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Term
| Missouri v. Hunter (1983) - C.J. Warren Burger |
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Definition
* Look at what the Legislature intended – intended to be separate or same offenses? – if clear that meant to be separate offenses, then DJ clause is not implicated even if it passes the Blockburger Test – This TRUMPS the Blockburger Test!!!
o Analysis:
+ Blockburger Test: Same Elements?
+ Exceptions: Did the Legislature intend multiple punishments for the same conduct? à if yes, no DJ problem |
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Term
| United States v. Lanza (1922) Justice Taft |
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Definition
| * Can you prosecute D for same crime under Fed and State law? Yes à Constitutional doctrine of dual sovereignty. DJ is intended to prohibit prosecutions of the same offense by the same sovereign. Founders never intended to prevent a sovereign entity from enforcing its own laws |
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Term
| Bartkus v. Illinois (1959) by J. Frankfurter. |
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Definition
* Every citizen of the US is also a citizen of a state – same act may transgress the laws of both – both may punish
* It is one course of criminal conduct, but it may be multiple offenses against multiple sovereigns!!! |
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Term
| Heath v. Alabama (1985) by J. O’Connor. |
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Definition
* 2 states tried for same murder because happened across state lines
* Rule: Dual Sovereign doctrine applies to states as well as the federal government. Double jeopardy only bars the same sovereign from trying the same person twice for the same crime!!! |
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Term
|
Definition
| * Right to counsel at ALL CRITICAL STAGES of trial (line-up) |
|
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Term
|
Definition
* PO taking handwriting sample was not critical stage, didn’t need to provide counsel
* The Wade-Gilbert Rule extends to all critical stages post charging |
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Term
| Stovall v. Denno (1967): J Brennan |
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Definition
| * Lineups must be suggestive and unreliable to be thrown out. |
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Term
| Gerstein v. Pugh (1975): Justice Powell |
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Definition
| Probable cause hearings- go over. |
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Term
| Strouder v. W.Va. (1880): |
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Definition
1. No AA allowed on jury and AA man convicted
2. The conviction was reversed |
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Term
| Campbell v. LA (1998): J Kennedy |
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Definition
| * When the makeup of the grandjury is based on racial discrimination, the accused suffers injury |
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Term
| North Carolina v Pierce (1969): Justice Potter Stewart |
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Definition
| * You can’t bring a higher charge on retrial just to punish for appeal- violates the DPC |
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Term
| Blackledge v. Perry (1974): Justice Potter Stewart |
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Definition
| * Vindictiveness will be presumed when the charge is upped on retrial after successful appeal, unless the prosecutor can explain |
|
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Term
| US v. Batchelder (1979): Justice Marshall |
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Definition
| * 2 different levels of charge for same crime under 2 different statutes so prosecutors can pick and choose to charge people with whatever statutes apply as long as they don’t base their decision on race, age, gender etc |
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Term
| Oyler v. Boles (1962): Justice Tom Clark |
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Definition
* Presumption is that the law is being enforced in a nondiscriminatory way.
* Three part test to determine if prosecution unconstitutional:
1. Failure to prosecute others similarly situated
2. Failure to prosecute is intentional
3. Arbitrary reason for discrimination |
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Term
| Napue v. Illinois (1959) - Chief Justice Earl Warrenv |
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Definition
| * DPC requires reversal of a conviction where a witness has committed perjury on a material fact and the prosecutor has failed to disclose that information to the D! (didn’t use the term “exculpatory”, though) |
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Term
| Brady v. Maryland (1963) - Justice William O. Douglas |
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Definition
* Due Process requires reversal because prosecutor has an affirmative duty to reveal exculpatory evidence upon request.
* Evidence material to guilt or punishment must be revealed upon request
* Good faith is not a defense to failure to turn over exculpatory evidence
* The burden is on the prosecutor to turn it over upon request and when it becomes exculpatory. |
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Term
| United States v. Agurs (1976) - Justice John Paul Stevens |
|
Definition
What if the D doesn’t ask for the info? What does the P have to turn over then?
* We don’t care about evidence not turned over if it is not MATERIAL
* Duty of the Prosecutor when a D either makes no request or makes a general request
1. If the D says they want specific evidence, then the prosecutor must either:
# turn them over OR
# go to the TCt and ask the ct to review the evidence en camara to make the decision as to whether evidence must be turned over to the D
2. If no request or a general request is made, this is the functional equivalent as no request at all! Here, Prosecutor only has a DUTY to turn over that which they know is OBVIOUSLY EXCULPATORY!!!
+ Prosecutor is charged with having knowledge of all government agencies, even if another agency hasn’t turned it over to him (ex. the police) –
# Make SPECIFIC REQUESTS for exculpatory evidence items!!! |
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Term
| United States v. Bagley (1985) - Justice Harry Blackmun |
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Definition
| Rule: “Materiality” – exculpatory evidence is material if there is a “Reasonable probability” that had the information been disclosed, the results of the trial would have been different. The remedy is to give a new trial. |
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Term
| Kyles v. Whitely (1995) - Justice David Souter |
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Definition
| Souter’s Opinion: Must disclose when there is reasonable probability that a piece of evidence will affect the outcome. (relaxed Bagley std) |
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Term
| Powell v. Alabama (1932) – J. George Sutherland |
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Definition
1. The “Scottsborough Boys” case.
2. Holding – DPC requires counsel be provided where the penalty may be death!
3. Second trial - atty drunk and passed out didn’t fulfill DPC either |
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Term
| Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) J. Hugo Black |
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Definition
4. Convicted in FL for carrying a concealed weapon – couldn’t afford a lawyer, convicted without the assistance of counsel
5. RULE: The 6th Amendment requires the States (State must cover the cost) to provide counsel to “indigents.” Ct didn’t determine who qualifies as an “indigent.” |
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Term
| Argersinger v. Hamlin (1963) J. William O. Douglas |
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Definition
Don’t have to provide counsel for indigents for every offense!!!
1. petty offense: any offense for which the person cannot go to jail--you don’t get counsel appointed if you are indigent!!!
* Court specifically did NOT define Indigency here!!! à Says it will leave this up to the States and Congress |
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Term
|
Definition
| 6. RULE: Indigents have a right to a lawyer, but don’t have a right to choose which lawyer you want. |
|
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Term
| Massiah v. United States (1964) – J. Potter Stewart |
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Definition
* Police could not interrogate him about his offense without talking to counsel because indictment triggered 6th Amendment right to counsel.
* 2 part test to determine when 6th Amend right to counsel kicks in:
# 1) “adversarial judicial proceedings” must have begun – there must be a formal charge (indictment) -
# 2) whatever event that it is alleged counsel should be present at must be a “critical stage” of the trial.
2. Critical Stages Include:
o 1) Preliminary Hearing
o 2) Post-indictment Line-up
o 3) Guilty Plea Negotiation
o 4) Sentencing
o 5) post-indictment interrogation (Massiah)
3. Not Critical Stages and no right to counsel:
o 1) Photo identification
o 2) Handwriting analysis
o 3) Probation revocation hearings
o 4) Administrative detention of inmates |
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Term
| Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States (1989) – J. Byron White |
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Definition
* 6th amend guarantees counsel of your choice if you can pay for it. If not, then you get ct appointed counsel.
2. Must forfeit money, be indigent, and have ct appointed counsel
3. other instances where this Overriding State Interest would predominate, as well:
1. 1. Expediency (can’t change lawyer day of trial)
2. 2. Conflict of Interest Situation – ex. representing codefendants and gov’t plea offers to some to turn on others |
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Term
| Douglas v. California (1963) – J. Douglas |
|
Definition
* 6th Amendment is a Trial (ONLY) right!!! Applies at ALL Critical Stages of Trial à an Appeal is NOT a trial, the trial is over here. The 6th Amend has no application on appeal.
* DPC, however, requires the right to counsel on appeal!!!
1. Counsel must be provided to the indigent when they perfect an appeal, but ONLY FOR THE FIRST APPEAL
2. DP ONLY GUARANTEES ADEQUATE, NOT PERFECT ACCESS TO THE COURT SYSTEM
3. You DON’T have a Constitutional Right to Appeal! |
|
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Term
| Anders v. California (1967) – J. Tom Clark |
|
Definition
* If counsel truly believes that an appeal is frivolous they must request permission to withdraw, but they still have to file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal (“Anders Brief”).
* If the Client wants to appeal, you have to appeal!
1. This only comes up in ct appointed situations |
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Term
| Griffin v. Illinois (1956) - Justice Hugo Black |
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Definition
| * If you are indigent you get a state-paid transcript. |
|
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Term
| Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) - Justice Thurgood Marshall |
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Definition
* he right to experts – it says right to counsel.
* However, the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment does support such a right to expert assistance. guarantees indigents the right to receive the “basic tools” of an affirmative defense at trial where they are necessary to an adequate presentation of the defense.
defense |
|
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Term
| Griffin v. Illinois (1956) |
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Definition
| o If you are going to give them an appeal- you need to give them a lawyer and access to a transcript |
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Term
| North Carolina v. Pierce (1969) |
|
Definition
o State not to punish you for appealing.
o The prohibition is not absolute. |
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Term
| Powell v. Alabama (1932) – J. George Sutherland |
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Definition
7. The “Scottsborough Boys” case.
8. Holding – DPC requires counsel be provided where the penalty may be death!
9. Second trial - attorney drunk and passed out didn’t fulfill DPC either |
|
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Term
| Strickland v. Washington (1984): O’Connor |
|
Definition
Ineffective counsel defined
4. ∆ must show two things:
1. Counsel’s errors fell below objective standard of reasonable competence (performance prong)
2. ∆ was prejudiced by counsel’s incompetence (prejudice prong) |
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Term
| US v. Cronic (1984): Justice John Paul Stevens |
|
Definition
Presumption of prejudice
* Specific performance of counsel analyzed under Strickland
* There is presumption of prejudice if ∆ can prove general performance fell below objective reasonable standard (was drunk, not member of bar) |
|
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Term
| Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980): Justice Powerll |
|
Definition
Conflict of interest
* Conflicts of interest arising from representation of 2+ clients may cause ineffective assistance of counsel
* Limited and conditional presumption of prejudice
* Conflict of interest may be waived |
|
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Term
| Farretta v. California (1979): Justice Potter Stewart |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| Brady v. United States (1970) – J. Byron R. White |
|
Definition
| * Guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered into without duress, coercion, or something that violates public policy will not be looked behind and will be allowed to stand! |
|
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Term
| North Carolina v. Alford (1970) – J. Byron R. White |
|
Definition
| * Guilty Plea - you don’t have to admit guilt, but plea must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent! |
|
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Term
| Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) – J. Potter Stewart |
|
Definition
* D rejected plea and ended up with harsher sentence
* Plea passes constitutional muster if it represents a choice among known alternatives |
|
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Term
| United States v. Marion (1971) Justice Byron White |
|
Definition
| * Government waited 4 years to charge D. The government can wait to bring an indictment. Delay to bring charges doesn’t matter. Delaying trial after charged, then there’s a problem |
|
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Term
| Doggett v. United States (1992) Justice David Souter |
|
Definition
# Rule: The ONLY REMEDY for a speedy trial right violation is dismissal of the charges. (they get to walk!)
# Speedy trial clause is not applicable until formal charge is brought!
# A D can WAIVE their right to speedy trial either explicitly or impliedly by their conduct (Dicta) |
|
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Term
| United States v. Lovasco (1977) Justice Thurgood Marshall |
|
Definition
# Test: The government is not obligated to file charges as soon as it has PC under the 6th Amend and Marion (because speedy trial right doesn’t kick in until after formal charge), but if the delay was deliberate/reckless or done to gain a tactical advantage over the accused then there is a violation of the DPC!!!
# How Speedy does a Speedy trial have to be?
o Test: Totality of Circumstances: |
|
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Term
| Duncan v. Louisiana (1986) Justice White |
|
Definition
| * Court ruled that the 14th Amendment brought the 6th Amendment right to jury trial to the states. You have a right to a jury trial unless it is a petty offense with no incarceration. |
|
|
Term
| Duncan v. Louisiana (1986) Justice White |
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Definition
| * Court ruled that the 14th Amendment brought the 6th Amendment right to jury trial to the states. You have a right to a jury trial unless it is a petty offense with no incarceration. |
|
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Term
| Johnson v. Louisiana (1972) Justice White* |
|
Definition
* 9-3 Super-majority verdict was constitutionally OK. If have more than 12 jurors, must be in a 9:3 ratio for verdict
* If the jury has fewer than 12 members, the decision must be unanimous.
* In capital cases, there must be 12 jurors |
|
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Term
| Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) |
|
Definition
| * Unless the juror indicates that they will refuse to entertain all options in law, then they cannot be automatically excluded. not enough to be philosophically opposed to or pro death penalty |
|
|
Term
| Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) Justice White |
|
Definition
| * Fair and impartial jury by implication means that the group from which the jury is drawn represents a cross section of the community. |
|
|
Term
| Batson v. Kentucky (1986) Justice Powell |
|
Definition
* peremptory challenges- allows P or D to get rid of jurors for any reason or no reason.
* Peremptory challenges can NOT be used to exclude jurors based solely on race. A three part test was created: (only D can take advantage of this)
3. D is a member of a protected class;
4. P has used its peremptory challenges to systematically get rid of jurors of the same protected class; THEN,\
5. If D effectively makes a prima facie showing of 1 and 2, the burden shifts to P to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the peremptory challenges were used for neutral reasons other than because the jurors were of the same protected class
6. ***Claim must be asserted before end of jury selection |
|
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Term
|
Definition
* Gender is a protected class and the Batson rule applies to it!
* Applies to religion and national origin, too (dicta) |
|
|
Term
| Holland v. Illinois (1990) Justice Scalia |
|
Definition
* Batson and JEB no longer just apply to D, it now applies to both sides as a protection to jurors interest, so now prosecutors and Ds can claim under the Holland.
* Eliminates the first step of Batson, D no longer has to be a member of the protected class!!! |
|
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Term
| Georgia v. McCollum (1992) Justice Blackmun |
|
Definition
| * If it’s the juror’s right to serve, then no one can systematically exclude a juror, both sides (P and D) can raise a Batson challenge on behalf of the juror. |
|
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Term
| Johnson v. California (2005) Justice John Paul Stevens |
|
Definition
NEW BATSON TEST:
1. Is either side systematically excluding jurors of a protected class? AND
2. If the trial court is satisfied that the party has established that members of a protected class are being excluded, the burden shifts to the other side to show a neutral reason, not involving the protected class, for excluding the jurors. |
|
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Term
| Ward v. City of Monroeville (1972) Justice Brennan |
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Definition
| * Violation of the impartial judge requirement (b/c judge/mayor and city financially benefited from each conviction) |
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