Term
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Definition
| Being-in-the-world is Heidegger's replacement for terms such as subject, object, consciousness, and world. |
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Term
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Definition
| Both modes of "present-at-hand" and "ready-to-hand," are distinguished from how other things are primarily encountered. While all entities (non-Dasein, other Daseins, and itself) are encountered in these modes, the mode of "being-with" and all the emotion, loneliness and togetherness that it implies, is a unifying mode of being for Dasein and its world. |
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Term
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Definition
| Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. For Example: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining. All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being. |
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Term
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Definition
| Dasein is a German word and is sometimes translated as "being-there" or "being-here" (da combines in its meaning "here" and "there", excluding the spatial-relational distinction made by the English words; Sein is the infinitive, "to be") |
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Term
| Disclosure, or "world disclosure" |
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Definition
| Dreyfus and Spinosa write that: "According to Heidegger our nature is to be world disclosers. That is, by means of our equipment and coordinated practices we human beings open coherent, distinct contexts or worlds in which we perceive, feel, act, and think." |
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Definition
| An object in the world with which we have meaningful dealings. |
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Term
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Definition
| Heidegger uses this word to describe the nature of Dasein's being. Beings unlike Dasein (chairs, shoes, etc.) do not "exist"; they are merely "objectively present". Dasein exists; chairs are objectively present. |
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Term
| Existenziell and Existential |
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Definition
| Existenziell and Existential, are used as descriptive characteristics of Being. To be existenziell is a categorical or ontic characteristic: an understanding of all this which relates to one's existence, while an Existenzial is an ontological characteristic: the structure of existence. |
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Term
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Definition
| Heidegger uses the term ontic, often in contrast to the term ontological, when he gives descriptive characteristics of a particular thing and the "plain facts" of its existence. What is ontic is what makes something what it is. |
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Term
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Definition
| As opposed to "ontic" (ontisch), ontological is used when the nature, or meaningful structure of existence is at issue. Ontology, a discipline of philosophy, focuses on the formal study of Being. Thus, something that is ontological is concerned with understanding and investigating Being, the ground of Being, or the concept of Being itself. |
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Term
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Definition
| With the present-at-hand one has an attitude like that of a scientist or theorist, of merely looking at or observing something. In seeing an entity as present-at-hand, the beholder is concerned only with the bare facts of a thing or a concept, as they are present and in order to theorize about it. This way of seeing is disinterested in the concern it may hold for Dasein, its history or usefulness. |
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Term
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Definition
| In almost all cases we are involved in the world in an ordinary, and more involved, way. We are usually doing things with a view to achieving something. |
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Term
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Definition
| Heidegger refers to this concept of the One in explaining inauthentic modes of existence, in which Dasein, instead of truly choosing to do something, does it only because "That is what one does". Thus, das Man is not a proper or measurable entity, but rather an amorphous part of social reality that functions effectively in the manner that it does through this intangibility. |
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Term
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Definition
| 1. "World" is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of things which can be present-at-hand within the world. |
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Term
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Definition
| 2. "World" functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being of those things we have just mentioned. And indeed 'world' can become a term for any realm which encompasses a multiplicity of entities: for instance, when one talks of the 'world' of a mathematician, 'world' signifies the realm of possible objects of mathematics. |
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Term
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Definition
| 3. "World" can be understood as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as the wherein a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'. "World" has here a pre-ontological existential signification. |
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Term
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Definition
| 4. Finally, "world" designates the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood. Worldhood itself may have as its modes whatever structural wholes any special 'worlds' may have at the time; but it embraces in itself the a priori character of worldhood in genera |
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