Term
|
Definition
| The publically observable properties of physical objects such as weight, color, shape, texture and size. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| The things we are aware of (or are able to become aware of) when we are conscious, for example, memories, sensations, beliefs and emotions. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| The inherently “private” perspective from which each person experiences his/her own mental states. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A relation that occurs when the existence of one thing (i.e. consciousness) depends upon the existence of something else (i.e. a properly functioning brain or its functional equivalent). |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A term that refers to theories of mind according to which the mental is ontologically dependent upon the physical in such a way that all mental states can be reduced to or explained in terms of physical states (e.g. behavior or brain processes) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A term that refers to theories of mind according to which the mind is something distinct from the body (including the brain). Dualists typically argue that mental states cannot be reduced to or explained in terms of physical states, and that the mind is ontologically independent from the body |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| In philosophy of mind (as opposed to epistemology) this is the opposite of physicalism. Idealists (who are scarce these days) argue that everything physical can be reduced to or explained in terms of the mental. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A theory defended by René Descartes (among others) according to which the mind and the body are two entirely different types of “substance” or thing, minds being “unextended, thinking things,” and bodies being “extended, unthinking things.” |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Experiences involving a person regaining consciousness after having been “near death.” Such experiences are sometimes cited as evidence of the continued existence of the mind or soul after the death of the body. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| An argument used by Descartes to show that, since it is conceivable that my body does not exist, but it is inconceivable that my mind does not exist (as long as I am thinking), my mind must be something distinct from my body. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| The law according to which A and B are identical (i.e. literally the same thing) only if they have all the same properties, so that whatever is true of A is also true of B, and vice versa. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| The property that some mental states (for example, beliefs and some emotions), have of referring to, or being about, something other than themselves (for example, a belief that it’s raining a fear of snakes) |
|
|
Term
| The Problem of Interaction |
|
Definition
| The problem (confronting substance dualists especially) of explaining how it is possible for the mind to be affected by the body and vice versa. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A logical error that occurs when it is assumed that things belonging to two different logical categories belong to the same category (e.g. a university and the buildings located on the campus of a university), or else that things belonging to the same category belong to two different categories (i.e. “minds” and the various behaviors ordinarily taken to express people’s mental states) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A (physicalist) theory of mind according to which the belief that “the mind” is something distinct from the body rests on a category mistake, and all references to peoples’ mental states can be expressed as references to their dispositions to behave in certain ways under certain circumstances |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A (physicalist) theory of mind according to which mental states and brain states are in some sense identical (despite the fact that this is not immediately apparent). |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A (physicalist) theory of mind according to which a mind (or the mental) should not be thought of as a kind of “stuff,” but rather as a system capable of performing a variety of computational functions that could conceivably be performed by other kinds of systems (e.g. computers or “artificial intelligence”) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| An influential argument against functionalism developed by the contemporary American philosopher, John Searle. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A test proposed to by the pioneering computer scientist, Alan Turing (1912-1953), for determining whether or not a computer can be said to have a mind. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| An influential argument against functionalism developed by the contemporary American philosopher, John Searle. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| The distinctive phenomenal feeling of certain experiences, for example, the particular experience of “redness” we have when we see individual red things (e.g. a particular fire engine). Some philosophers have argued functionalism cannot account for qualia. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A term coined by David Chalmers to refer to hypothetical beings who act like us in every respect but, and who process information as we do, but who lack any kind of subjective consciousness (including any awareness of qualia) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A (physicalist) theory of mind according to which mental states are illusory in such a way that, scientifically speaking, it is better not to refer to them at all, since we can account for reality and everything it includes without referring to them. |
|
|
