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| confessions freely and voluntarily given is evidence of the most satisfactory kind. |
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voluntariness of confessions: no threats, violence, promises (no one follows the no promises part).
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary is an issue controlled by 5A due process. |
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no physical coercion: (ruling inadmissible confession beaten out of suspects).
applied voluntary requirement to state courts. |
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mental coercion: coercion can be mental as well as physical.
(involuntary confessions are inherently untrustworthy and damages law enforcement integrity)
involuntary if it overpowers self-will?? (check case) |
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| determining voluntariness |
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-culombe: applies totality of circumstances approach to determine voluntariness. Lists factors
-Lego v Twomey: government bear burden of proof by preponderance of evidence that confession was voluntary (also prove reliability).
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-chavez v martinez: questioning a dying suspect while receiving treatment did not violate 5A.
-Corley: did not completely nullify McNabb-Mallory rule |
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promises: rejects bram's statement of voluntariness relating to promises.
(also suggested that admission of confession could constitute harmless error)
(here, confession to prison plant based upon promise of protection did not render confession involuntary) |
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deception does not undermine reliability, unless it overrides free will.
(no violation where police tricked D into confessing by falsely telling him his cousin confessed). |
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confession motivated by D's schizophrenia did not constitute police coercion (thus did not render it involuntary--although it may have been unreliable).
more info:
(state court found confession inadmissible because involuntary--overruled by SCOTUS because voluntary. however, if state court had ruled confession was inadmissible because it was unreliable it might have been upheld). |
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5A right to counsel triggers: (1) coercive custody, (2) interrogation.
this right is enforced by warnings requirement. statements taken in violation of Miranda are presumptively coercive and therefore inadmissible. (however, presumption may be rebutted by a showing of voluntariness).
Miranda is broader than 5A (thus may violate miranda but not 5A and may be admissible. 5A hinges on voluntariness.
Miranda does not bring 5A to the states, does not strike confessions or prohibit physically coerced statements.
purpose of miranda is to protect voluntariness. |
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| intelligent, knowing, voluntary |
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| Miranda warnings need not be identical to language used in Miranda. (warnings are not inadequate if given in a different order). |
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| conditioning warning: officer's statement that attorney would be appointed "if and when D went to court" did not render warning inadequate. |
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| miranda warnings which seemed to imply that right to counsel before, but not during interrogation did not render warning inadequate. |
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interrupted warnings rendered statements inadmissible (D interrupted and said "I know my rights").
(however, although statement was inadmissible, it was voluntary, thus gun recovered was admissible since recovered based on voluntary statement. --since statement was inadmissible it was not self-incriminating. It was voluntary so gun was not fruit of poisonous tree. |
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indirect interrogation: where cops do not explicitly question or interrogate, a conversation claimed to be the functional equivalence of express questioning is to be evaluated by an objective measure.
(functional equivalence: can set the bait, but cannot reel it in. Police can give a speech, and listen if D starts talking, but police cannot engage in conversation). |
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requirement of custody: whether D is in custody is an objective question.
(age of suspect must be considered, for example-13 year old taken from class to principal's office by uniformed officer and questioned was custody (though may not be considered custody for an adult). Thus failure to give miranda warnings made confession inadmissible).
(but see yarborough) |
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| custody is an objective question: finding no custody despite two hour interrogation where parents drove juvenile to police station and waited for him. |
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| custody-voluntary appearance at station: D who came voluntarily and informed he was not under arrest, who left after confession during 1/2 hour interview, was not in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom. (not necessary to give miranda warnings) |
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| arrest constitutes custody to invoke miranda. (Miranda warnings not required where D, although a suspect, was not placed under arrest and voluntariily cam to police station and was allowed to leave after interview) |
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| probationary status is not arrest. |
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| detentions: traffic stop and citation did not constitute custody because the stop occurred in public and citizen knew the stop was temporary. |
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detentions: seizure of 17 year old awaken in his bedroom at 3 am by 3 police officers and taken from his home in handcuffs in underwear for questioning, was an "Arrest" within meaning of 4A.
(D's response of "ok" and failure to struggle with officers did not constitute consent sufficient to overcome PC requirement for arrest. Miranda warnings alone not enough to establish free will).
confession may be involuntary despite miranda warnings. |
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prison incarceration does not constitute custody for miranda purposes.
(does not restrict freedom anymore than already restricted)
also, allowed reapproach because of two week break in Miranda custody. Edwards does not mandate suppression of custodial statement). |
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invoking right to remain silent alone does not automatically invoke right to counsel: Miranda does not require that once a person has invoked right to remain silent any subsequent questioning may be only in done in presence of counsel.
2nd questioning about different offense (after 2 hour hiatus and readmonition of miranda warning) did not violate miranda. statement thus admissible.
(mosley is case specific-can reapproach regarding different case).
suspect may waive right to silence by speaking. (after invocation police may only listen, may not talk back without waiver). |
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cannot reapproach after invoking right to counsel: after invoking right to counsel, valid waiver of right not established by showing only that D responded to police-initiated interrogation after being again advised of rights, thus confession violated 5A rights to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. (edwards is not case speficic-cannot reapproach regarding different case).
(see also Roberson: still could not reapproach next day, different officer asking about different offense)
(but see shatzer, allowing reapproach after two weeks)
***to waive right to counsel after invoking right, suspect must initiate talking (police may not talk back without a waiver, only listen) |
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| D must make unambiguous request for counsel: if suspect makes ambiguous reference to attorney (i.e. maybe I should call an attorney) questioning not required to stop. |
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unresponsiveness does not invoke right to remain silent, or revoke right to remain silent. (invocation must be unambiguous).
explicit waiver not required; need not be expressed; question to D about prayer to God for forgiveness could have been ignored; 5A privilege is not concerned with moral and psychological pressure to confess emanating from a source other than official coercion. |
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| asking to see probation officer is not per se invocation of miranda rights, but admissibility of statement is a question to be resolved using totality of the circumstances. (did he knowingly and voluntarily waive his right-(zerbst/twomney)). |
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| failure of police to inform D of efforts of attorney, retained by his sister without his knowledge, to reach him did NOT deprive D of his right to counsel or taint waiver of his miranda rights. (allegra case) |
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| Miranda warning exceptions |
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Quarles: safety
Munoz: booking
Hiibel: name/identification |
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belated miranda warnings: initial inculpatory statement, while in custody at his home, was technically in violation of Miranda but was voluntary, failure to give Miranda warnings did not bar admissibility of later station house confession made after admonition and waiver of Miranda (notwithstanding failure to advise D that prior statement could not be used against him). -does not presume coercive effect.
Miranda is broader than 5A. Violation of Miranda only does not exclude statements unless also a violation of 5th Amendment. 5A hinges on voluntariness. |
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failure to give cleansing warnings: Miranda warnings given mid-interrogation (after D gave unwarned confession) were ineffective. Thus confession repeated after warnings were given was inadmissible at trial.
Seibert was not told his prior admission was inadmissible. |
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| held that Miranda's warning based approach to determining admissibility of statement was constitutionally based and could not be overruled by legislative act. |
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statement that violates 5A may be used for specific impeachment (against D testimony, but not general-against other defense witnesses).
see also Walder (statement violating 4A may be used for specific impeachment). |
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