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| justifying animal experimentation: The starting point |
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| Who has the research justifies all stance? |
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| Cohen- The Argument from Benefit justifies many if not all experiments conducted on animals. |
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| what is the abolitionist stance |
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“[H]uman gain can never be used to justify animal loss.”
Seek the immediate and absolute abolishment of animal experimentation. |
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| The problem with the utilitarian argument from benefit |
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The word animal is easily replaced with HUMAN:
Animal experimentation causes suffering and is (at least) prima facie bad.
But, if an act causes some suffering but also results in great benefits for all sentient beings that outweigh the bad resulting from the suffering, then that act is morally justified.
Animal experimentation has lead to great benefits (at least in the long run) that improve the lives of all sentient beings, which greatly outweigh the suffering caused.
Therefore, animal experimentation is justified. |
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| Justifying Differential Treatment |
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great chain of being
appeal to similarity
human ancestory |
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aka Argument from Marginal Cases I.
No feature with the exception of human ancestry is shared by all and only humans (at least now). |
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The interest of human parents might matter
What about clones, aliens and neanderthals? |
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1st horn: We could use animals as well as those humans that lack the characteristic in question in order to gain the benefits of research.
OR
2nd horn: We could use neither humans nor animals, and thus give up on the benefits of medical research. |
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| moral status of quality of life, using the argument from marginal cases II |
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All humans have equal inherent value, because they are experiencing subjects of life.
For any morally relevant trait that might justify something’s having more inherent value than another thing that has inherent value, there is a marginal case where a human does not have that trait.
But “marginal” humans have just as much inherent value as other humans. (premise 1)
Therefore, all experiencing subjects of life have equal inherent value. |
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| Which premise does Frey reject in the moral status of quality of life ?? |
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| premise 1: All humans have equal inherent value, because they are experiencing subjects of life. |
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We can’t determine what an animal’s quality of life is, and thus we can’t be certain that any animal has a quality of life that compares with a human’s life.
There must be some morally relevant difference between all humans and any animal, even if we haven’t found it yet.
The quality of life argument leaves us with an unpalatable conclusion and therefore must be wrong. |
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| How Frey is an apologist: |
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The argument from benefit is quite compelling, and if things are the way they appear, then it provides quite a bit of justification for animal experimentation.
It also provides the same level of justification for experiments to be run on some humans.
Since the research is so valuable, we ought to continue to experiment …
But, we should also keep in mind that we are harming things that might have a better quality of life than some humans.
This is turn should give us some reason to favor the 3-R approach. |
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