Term
| Define Logical Behaviorism |
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Definition
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Mental states are identical to complex behavioral states
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Term
| Define the Dispositional property |
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Definition
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People respond to whatever situation the may be in...being in pain; people would complain and try and take pain killers
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Term
| Name the two key problems for the dispositional property |
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Definition
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1. You can fake being in pain
2. You could be in pain but not show it
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Term
| Non reductive materialism involves... |
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Definition
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Brain state supervenes on mental states but the mental cannot do the same. The mental and brain states are not separate entities but cannot be entirely reduced
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Term
| Reductive materialism can be defined as... |
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Definition
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The view that mental states exist only so far as they can be reduced to brain states
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Term
| The identity theory is related to what viewpoint and what does it mean? |
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Definition
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It is related to reductive materialism and is the theory that mental states and brain states are numerically identical
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Term
| Type identity theory/instance identity theory |
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Definition
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type of mental state = type of brain state / instance of mental state = instance of brain state
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Term
| explain Martian pain objection to the identity theory and functionalism |
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Definition
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If our pain is equivalent to C fibers firing, then that should be the fact for any creature in pain. The Martian feels pain but does not have any c fibers. A=B and A=C but B does not equal C
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Term
| Physicalism is the view that... |
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Definition
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only physical objects exist
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Term
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Definition
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The view that mental states are identical with functionalism; in humans these are brain states but may be different in other beings
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Term
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Definition
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an internal causal state that can be specified in terms of cause and effect relations to behavioral states
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Term
| The Chinese room argument is written by _________ as an argument against ____________. It involves... |
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Definition
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John Searle, functionalism. A man in room who speaks no chinese but is handed notes in chinese, where he refers to a manual which describes the proper response. Searle contends that if functionalism were true the man would understand chinese by going through these syntactic processes. This of course is not the case.
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Term
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Definition
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Term
| differences between weak and strong AI theory |
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Definition
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Weak AI can only simulate human behavior that can be described algorithmically. Strong AI supposes machines are capable of conscious thought
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Term
| What is an objection to Strong AI theory? |
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Definition
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Absent qualia; John Searle
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Term
| Lycan's Machine Consciousness |
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Definition
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Since mental states are functional states it is in principle possible for a machine to be conscious and morally responsible.
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Term
| Lycan's supporting thought experiments to machine consciousness |
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Definition
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the case of henrietta - human slowly turned into a robot through replacement of body parts
Henry - android but with human like functions
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Term
| What are some objections to Lycan's machine consciousness |
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Definition
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1. Free will objection
2. the qualia objection
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Term
| What are phenomenal states? |
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Definition
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mental state described in terms of what it feels like
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Term
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Definition
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No current form of reductive materialism is plausible because they ignore (or cant account for) the subjectivity of consciousness
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Term
| The Nagel Mentality can be defined as |
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Definition
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A being has mental states (manifests consciousness) if and only if there is something that it is "like" to be that being
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Term
| Nagel's Bat Argument is an objection to... |
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Definition
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reductive materialism. There is something like to be a bat; reductive materialism cannot account for it, so it is not plausible
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Term
| Who wrote the "what Mary didnt know" argument against physicalism |
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Definition
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Frank Jackson... Mary knows everything about the physical world, including color but does not see color in the room she is kept in. According to physicalism if she were to be exposed to color she wouldn't learn anything. We can assume she would though
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Term
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Definition
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Necessarily if A=B than for any property F if A is F than B must be F
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Term
| What properties do identicals share |
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Definition
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Term
| Difference between Diachronic and Synchronic identity |
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Definition
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Diachronic: Properties that separate individuals from rest of the world, at two different times
Synchronic: properties that individuate at the same time
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Term
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Definition
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3D objects enduring through time, undergoing change
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Term
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Definition
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4D temporal slice aggregates of people. We are just long worm like beings extended through time.
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Term
| Supervenence is most related to.. |
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Definition
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property dualism and or non reductive materialism
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Term
| Mereological Essentialism involves... |
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Definition
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All composite objects have their parts necessarily
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Term
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Definition
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replacing of parts until you have two ships...which one is Theseus'? involves mereological essentialism
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Term
| Locke's View of Personal Identity |
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Definition
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The thing that makes us the same person from day to day is our consciousness.
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Term
| Psychological v Bodily continuity can best be described as... |
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Definition
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We are the same person from now till the next day if we are psychologically or bodily continuous from one day to the next.
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